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MORALITY AS A SCAFFOLD FOR SOCIAL PREDICTION 
 
Jordan E. Theriault 
 
Advisor: Liane L. Young, Ph.D 
 
 
 Theory of mind refers to the process of representing others’ mental states. This 
process consistently elicits activity in a network of brain regions: the theory of mind 
network (ToMN). Typically, theory of mind has been understood in terms of content, i.e. 
representing the semantic content of someone’s beliefs. However, recent work has 
proposed that ToMN activity could be better understood in the context of social 
prediction; or, more specifically, prediction error—the difference between observed and 
predicted information. Social predictions can be represented in multiple forms—e.g. 
dispositional predictions about who a person is, prescriptive norms about what people 
should do, and descriptive norms about what people frequently do. Part 1 examined the 
relationship between social prediction error and ToMN activity, finding that the activity 
in the ToMN was related to both dispositional, and prescriptive predictions. Part 2 
examined the semantic content represented by moral claims. Prior work has suggested 
that morals are generally represented and understood as objective, i.e. akin to facts. 
Instead, we found that moral claims are represented as far more social than prior work 
had anticipated, eliciting a great deal of activity across the ToMN. Part 3 examined the 
relationship between ToMN activity and metaethical status, i.e. the extent that morals 
were perceived as objective or subjective. Objective moral claims elicited less ToMN 
activity, whereas subjective moral claimed elicited more. We argue that this relationship 
is best understood in the context of prediction, where objective moral claims represent 
strong social priors about what most people will believe. Finally, I expand on this finding 
and argue that a theoretical approach incorporating social prediction has serious 
implications for morality, or more specifically, for the motivations underlying normative 
compliance. People may be compelled to observe moral rules because doing so maintains 
a predictable social environment.    
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Introduction 
 Theory of mind refers to the ability to represent the mental states of others 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Their thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions cannot be 
directly observed, yet, to navigate the social world, it is critical that they be understood. 
To solve this problem, it has been argued that we make an inference: we theorize that 
people’s behaviors are driven by internal mental states (Baron-Cohen, 2001; Gopnik, 
2005; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Saxe, 2009), e.g. if Jane left her shoes under the couch 
and they were later moved, an observer may infer that Jane has the belief: “My shoes are 
under the couch”. Theory of mind almost certainly subsumes a number of sub processes 
(Schaafsma et al., 2014), and recent theoretical work has argued that neural signatures of 
theory of mind may represent social prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between 
expected and observed social behavior (Joiner et al., 2017; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). In 
this dissertation, I will present evidence for this claim, then argue that this theoretical 
perspective may have particularly powerful implications for our understanding of 
morality.  
Social Prediction and Theory of Mind 
 Considering theory of mind in the context of social prediction does not change the 
fundamental problem. The goal remains to infer, based on observable evidence, an 
underlying causal structure that is responsible for an agent’s behavior (Koster-Hale & 
Saxe, 2013). A predictive approach contextualizes this goal within a broader framework; 
e.g. social prediction is a generalized, abstract case of the fundamental problem that the 
brain evolved to solve: predicting all incoming sensory information (Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010). Models using this theoretical approach are referred to as predictive coding models, 
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and are based around the assumption that new sensory information is only encoded in 
terms of prediction error—the difference between observed and predicted input. 
Prediction error runs on the same logic as image compression (as in .gif, or .jpeg files; 
Figure 1): most information is redundant, and it would be inefficient to represent each 
pixel of an image, so instead, images can be compressed by encoding differences. (Also, 
on this line of thought, points of change would be a natural fundamental unit for encoding 
information, e.g. edges and boundaries; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Predictive coding models 
argue that the brain implements a hierarchy of these predictions, each level of which is 
increasingly abstracted from the sensory input (Clark, 2013). The proposal then, is that 
social predictions underlying theory of mind are driven by the discrepancy between 
observed and predicted information.  
 
Figure 1. Example of .gif compression. Three frames of an animation are depicted. The 
waterfall flows, and the flowers in the bottom left corner sway in the wind, but most 
pixels in the image remain stationary. The image can be compressed by encoding 
repeated pixels as green space, meaning that only pixels that differ from their prior values 
need to be updated. In other words, in each frame, pixels only encode prediction error—
the difference between the predicted and observed value for that pixel. 
 
Neural Signatures of Theory of Mind 
 One of the most consistent findings in social neuroscience is that a variety of 
social tasks elicit activity in the same few brain regions (e.g. Blakemore et al., 2003; 
Kircher et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; see Schurz et al., 2014 for 
review). These regions include medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus (or posterior cingulate 
cortex), and bilateral temporoparietal junction, and have been collectively referred to as 
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the “theory of mind network” (ToMN; although the same network has gone by many 
names in other lines of research; Barrett, 2017).  
It has recently been suggested that ToMN activity could be interpreted in terms of 
social prediction error, i.e. social tasks elicit ToMN activity because they license (and 
update, via prediction error) social predictions (Koster-Hale et al., 2013). Part 1 
examines this connection between ToMN activity and social prediction error directly, 
using a detailed set of moral narratives and examining multiple forms of social 
prediction—e.g. dispositional predictions, about who a person is (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995), prescriptive norms, about what a person should do (Cialdini et al., 1990), and 
descriptive norms, about what people frequently do (Cialdini et al., 1990). ToMN activity 
was related to both dispositional and prescriptive prediction error, but not to descriptive 
prediction error. That is, across a number of stories, ToMN is most active when 
dispositional and normative social predictions are violated. 
The Content of Moral Claims 
 Putting aside prediction for a moment, there is an ongoing philosophical debate 
regarding what semantic content is expressed in moral claims. This debate refers to the 
metaethical status of morality: Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with a given 
claim (e.g. “eating meat is wrong”), what semantic information has the claim expressed? 
Facts generally express objective information about the nature of the world. Preferences 
generally express subjective information about a particular person’s beliefs. Where 
morals fall with respect to those two extremes is unresolved. 
Prior work, in both philosophy and developmental psychology has generally 
favored a moral objectivist position. For instance, philosophers have argued that most 
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non-philosophers believe that “… moral questions have correct answers; that the correct 
answers are made correct by objective moral facts … [and that] we can discover what 
these objective moral facts determined by circumstance are” (Smith, 1994, p. 6). In 
developmental psychology, researchers have demonstrated that children distinguish 
moral and conventional violations (Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004). Moral violations 
(e.g. hitting another child) are universally wrong, and cannot be made right by the 
endorsement of an authority (e.g. a teacher says that it is ok). By contrast, conventional 
violations (e.g. wearing pajamas to school) are only locally wrong, and can be licensed 
with permission (e.g. a teacher declares pajama day). 
A great deal of this prior work, however, suffers from serious methodological 
flaws. For instance, forcing participants to classify morals as true, false, or an 
opinion/preference (Goodwin & Darley, 2008), could force participants to make 
classifications that have no analogue in the brain. Even more seriously, prior work has 
made statistical distinctions between categories (e.g. morals, vs. facts, vs. preferences), 
using methods that cannot generalize beyond the exact stimuli that were used. In one 
well-cited example, facts, morals, and preferences were each represented by two 
examples, and conclusions were generalized to the entire moral domain (Wainryb et al., 
2004). Part 2 examines the metaethical status of morality, while attempting to address 
these problems: We used a large sample of stimuli, combined with mixed effects analyses 
(which can generalize beyond samples of both subjects and stimuli) and discovered that 
behaviorally and neurally, moral claims are represented as more similar to social 
preferences than to objective facts. Both morals and preferences elicited activity in the 
medial prefrontal cortex. Surprisingly, however, moral claims actually elicited greater 
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ToMN activity than preferences, a control category that had been designed as a 
benchmark of social content.  
Metaethical Variance and Moral Predictions 
 That moral claims elicited widespread activity in the ToMN (Part 2) could be 
interpreted to mean that the moral domain is distinguished by strong underlying 
representations of social content. However, if ToMN activity is associated with social 
prediction error (as the findings in Part 1 suggest), then a second possibility is raised: 
moral claims may be related to social prediction. Part 3 examines variance in ToMN 
activity in detail, providing evidence consistent with this account.  
Recent work has established that non-philosophers do not hold a unified 
metaethical stance (e.g. Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Wright et al., 2013)—
people see some moral claims as more objective (e.g. “slavery is wrong”) and others as 
more subjective (e.g. “eating meat is wrong”). We observed that ToMN activity was 
correlated with this metaethical variance. Moral claims that were perceived as subjective 
elicited greater ToMN activity, and moral claims that were perceived as objective elicited 
less. Exploratory analyses also suggested that this relationship was not driven by 
underlying differences in mental state representation.  
If subjective moral claims elicit greater ToMN activity, then does the ToMN 
represent moral subjectivity? This seems unlikely. Even accepting that mental functions 
can be localized to specific brain regions (and this is controversial; Barrett, 2017; Uttal, 
2001), classifying brain regions as for metaethical judgment seems like it would be going 
too far. It has been argued that there are no intrinsically “moral” brain regions (Young & 
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Dungan, 2012); extending this argument, brain regions for metaethical judgment only 
seem even more unlikely. 
By contrast: Are objective moral claims predictable? I would propose that they 
are, and that social prediction may underlie the observed relationship between ToMN 
activity and metaethical judgment. Objective moral claims (as opposed to more 
subjective morals) might be thought of as strong social priors—default predictions about 
what other people believe.  For instance, without having to ask a stranger, you might 
predict that they hold certain moral beliefs (e.g. that drinking and driving is bad, that 
slavery is wrong, etc.). If ToMN activity is associated with social prediction error, then 
there would be a relatively small discrepancy between predicted and observed 
information for objective moral claims, explaining the decreased ToMN activity that we 
observed.  
Outline 
 In three parts, I present evidence that morality is related to social prediction. In 
Part 1, we demonstrate that activity in the theory of mind network (ToMN) is related to 
prediction error in the context of both dispositional judgments and prescriptive norms. In 
Part 2, we demonstrate that moral claims are characterized by their social relevance, 
rather than their objectivity; and that simple statements about morality elicit widespread 
activation across the ToMN. In Part 3, we demonstrate that, for moral claims, this ToMN 
activity is related to metaethical judgment: subjective claims elicit greater ToMN activity, 
and objective claims elicit less. Based on this, I argue that reconsidering morality in terms  
of prediction may help to explain why we feel compelled to conform to moral norms.
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Abstract 
 Social tasks reliably elicit activity in the theory of mind network (ToMN), but it 
has remained unclear how this activity should be interpreted. Recently, it has been 
suggested that the ToMN may encode prediction error in social contexts. Classic work in 
social psychology has identified a number of sources that could license social predictions, 
such as dispositional information, prescriptive norms, and descriptive norms. The present 
work examined the by-stimuli relationship between these sources of social prediction and 
ToMN activity. In Study 1, we tested a stimuli set consisting of detailed moral narratives, 
where an agent made a moral (or immoral) decision, that was later reframed, inducing 
participants to change their initial moral judgments. These scenarios were normed using 
an online sample (N = 554), and the dimensional structure underlying these normative 
ratings was obtained using a principal components analysis. Within our stimuli set, 
dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive predictions were distinguished sources of 
information. In Study 2, we examined the relationship between ToMN activity and 
dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive prediction error. Participants (N= 20) read the 
same moral scenarios inside the scanner, providing their moral judgment. We compared 
by-stimuli estimates extracted from Study 1 with by-stimuli estimates of neural activity in 
Study 2, extracted from each ToMN ROI. Across the ToMN, ROI activity was related to 
descriptive and prescriptive prediction error, but not to descriptive prediction error. This 
relationship was specific to scenarios where new, morally relevant information was 
presented (as opposed to morally irrelevant, control information).   Thus, the present 
work provides evidence that the ToMN encodes prediction error in social contexts. 
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Introduction 
The theory of mind network (ToMN) is a network of brain regions that has been 
consistently implicated in tasks that involve representing mental states (e.g. belief, 
intentions; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Fletcher et al., 1995; 
Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Ruby & Decety, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher 
2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001; Young et al., 2007; 2010) and social 
information more generally (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Harris et al., 2005; Jenkins & 
Mitchell, 2010; Ma et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2005; Yeshurun et al., 2017; for review, 
see Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Although these regions are reliably active 
during social tasks, less is known about the computations implemented within them. 
Recently, it has been proposed that the ToMN may represent prediction error in social 
contexts (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; also see Joiner et al., 2017). The present work used 
an item analysis to test this proposal within a set of detailed moral scenarios, in which 
participants formed and then updated moral judgments. This item analysis allowed us use 
contextually rich stories to interrogate processes underlying ToMN activity at a finer 
grain than traditional fMRI contrasts (Westfall et al., 2016), asking whether ToMN 
activity tracks by-stimuli differences in social prediction error.  
  Theory of mind refers to the ability to represent internal mental states (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978). The ToMN is active for a variety of social tasks (Schurz et al., 
2014), such as reading about false beliefs (e.g. Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe & 
Kanswisher, 2003), watching social animations (e.g. Blakemore et al., 2003), making 
strategic decisions in economic games (e.g. Kircher et al., 2009), and impression 
formation (Baron et al., 2011; Bhanji & Beer, 2013; Cloutier et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2012; 
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Mende-Siedlecki & Todorov, 2016; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; Schiller et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the ToMN overlaps (at least partially; Mars et al., 2012, also see Schurz et 
al., 2017) with the default mode network, a network of regions active during rest that are 
thought to be critical for generating an internal model of the world (Barrett, 2016; 
Buckner, 2012; Hassabis & Maguire, 2010). That such diverse tasks elicit such broad 
overlapping activation raises the possibility that ToMN activity represents some more 
general underlying process (or collection of processes)—albeit a process tightly linked 
with social cognition. Consistent with this, some researchers have argued that theory of 
mind is most likely not a singular process (Schaafsma et al., 2014; Heyes, 2014): for 
instance, to represent a mind, one would presumably need to (at the very least) 
distinguish oneself from others, track goals and intentions, and understand causality 
(Schaafsma et al., 2014). Others have called attention to the functional overlap in critical 
regions in the ToMN, e.g. the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is well positioned for a 
high-level integrative role, sitting at the nexus of regions implicated in memory, 
attention, social cognition, and language (Carter & Huettel, 2013). However, the dilemma 
remains: ToMN is strongly associated with social processing, but it is unclear how best to 
interpret ToMN activity. 
 A promising hypothesis comes from recent theoretical work connecting theory of 
mind with a predictive coding framework (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Predictive coding 
models aim at offering a unifying framework of neural computation, proposing that the 
brain is a “hierarchical prediction machine” (A. Clark, 2013), attempting to match 
internally generated predictions with incoming sensory information (Barrett, 2017; 
Friston, 2010). This framework offers a radically different approach than classic 
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representational theories (e.g. Fodor, 1983), where dedicated mechanisms transform 
sensory information for use in some central cognitive space. Instead, predictive coding 
models propose that the brain actively predicts sensory information, and updates these 
predictions on the basis of “prediction error”—the difference between observed and 
predicted input. In this framework, social predictions could be characterized as high-
level, abstracted predictions about incoming sensory information.  Koster-Hale & Saxe 
(2013) proposed that the ToMN may represent such high-level social predictions. Prior 
research could be interpreted as consistent with this account (e.g. Dungan et al., in press; 
Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013); however, to our knowledge, the relationship between 
ToMN activity and social prediction error has not been directly examined. In the present 
work, we examine this relationship and attempt to go further, borrowing distinctions from 
social psychology to examine multiple forms of social prediction. 
 Social predictions can take several forms. For instance, classic work in social 
psychology has demonstrated that behavior can be attributed to dispositional or 
situational sources (Gilbert & Malone, 1995)—e.g. “Dave was short with the waiter 
because Dave is a jerk” vs. “Dave was short with the waiter because the parking meter 
was running out”. Furthermore, within a situation, we can make predictions on the basis 
on social norms, i.e. implicit expectations about how people will behave. Social norms 
are not singular, and prior work has typically made a distinction between prescriptive and 
descriptive norms (Brauer & Chaurand, 2010; Cialdini et al., 1990).  Prescriptive norms 
refer to expectations based on moral or social values. Descriptive norms refer to 
expectations based on statistical frequency. For instance, descriptively most people will 
drive a short distance rather than walk; however, prescriptively this is frowned on (i.e. 
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people often do it, but they shouldn’t; Brauer & Chaurand, 2010). Note that the concept 
of a prescriptive norm is similar to a moral judgment, but is framed in terms of 
expectation rather than rules, a feature we return to in the general discussion. Recent 
work has also considered these classic effects in a predictive framework (Bach & 
Schenke, 2017). In sum, information about people (i.e. dispositional information) and 
about descriptive/prescriptive norms could be used to generate social priors. These 
sources of social prediction were examined in the present work.  
Present Work 
 The present work tested the relationship between multiple forms of social 
prediction and ToMN activity. Allowing multiple forms of social prediction to coexist in 
a single experimental design is not trivial; for instance, impression formation has been 
studied by presenting discrete, contradictory pieces of information about individuals (e.g. 
Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013), which targets dispositional information, but omits 
situational social norms. To address this problem, we designed a series of detailed 
narratives, each of which elicited an initial moral judgment, and subsequently induced 
participants to update that judgment. Each scenario described an agent facing a moral 
dilemma: it described the background and potential outcomes (e.g. a hospital 
administrator must choose to save one sick child, or create a larger immunization 
program); it presented the agent’s decision (e.g. the administrator creates the 
immunization program); and then it reframed the dilemma with additional information 
(e.g. the hospital board has promoted past administrators who began new programs). The 
additional information reframed the scenario, rather than offering a direct contradiction. 
Scenarios were also intentionally wide-ranging, eliciting initial and reframed moral 
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judgments of varying strengths. The intention was to create variability, so that by-stimuli 
differences in dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive prediction error could be 
examined.  
In Study 1 we characterized the stimuli by collecting online ratings of each 
scenario on a number of measures and then performing a principal components analysis 
to identify the underlying dimensions. Within our stimuli set, dispositional, prescriptive, 
and descriptive sources of social prediction were clearly distinguished. In Study 2, we 
examined the relationship between Study 1 by-stimuli component scores, and by-stimuli 
ToMN activity. We used mixed effects analyses in both studies to model by-subject and 
by-stimuli variance, allowing us to extract by-stimuli estimates in each study (best linear 
unbiased predictors; BLUPs; Baayen, 2008; Baayen et al., 2008). Across ROIs (regions 
of interest), ToMN activity was associated with dispositional and prescriptive prediction 
error. 
Study 1 
 In Study 1 we collected behavioral ratings of all stimuli and examined the 
relationship among them, performing a principal components analysis to identify the 
underlying dimensions. Questions were selected to test the extent that reframing 
information violated predictions about the agent, or the extent that the agent’s decision 
violated prescriptive or descriptive norms (Table 1). Questions also measured more 
general stimuli features used in prior item analyses of the ToMN (mental state inferences, 
mental imagery; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), in addition to valence, arousal and moral 
judgment.  
Method 
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 Participants. Participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) at an approximate rate of $6/hour, in line with standard AMT compensation rates. 
Participants were recruited in two cohorts. Cohort one consisted of 239 adults (132 
female, 1 unspecified; MAge = 36.4 years, SDAge = 12.1 years), after excluding four 
participants for failing a simple attention check, asking them to briefly describe any of 
the scenarios they had read. Cohort two consisted of 315 adults (140 female, 1 
unspecified; MAge = 33.6 years, SDAge = 9.4 years), after excluding seven participants for 
failing the same attention check. The Boston College Institutional Review Board 
approved Studies 1 and 2, and each participant provided consent before beginning. 
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of twenty-four scenarios, adapted or inspired from 
prior work (Critcher et al., 2012; Lichtenstein et al., 2007; Tetlock et al., 2000; Uhlmann 
et al., 2013; Appendix A). Scenarios described tragic and taboo dilemmas. Tragic 
dilemmas forced agents to choose between two moral outcomes, whereas taboo dilemmas 
forced agents to choose between a moral and selfish outcome. For instance, in a tragic 
dilemma, Gregory, a fisherman, could save the jobs of his crew, but at the expense of 
killing more dolphins; in a taboo dilemma, he could save the dolphins, but at a personal 
cost (Figure 1; Appendix A).  
First, scenarios were described as tragic or taboo, then later, they were reframed. 
For instance, in a tragic–taboo scenario, at first Gregory must choose between saving 
dolphins or saving his crew’s jobs. He chooses to save his crew. Next, participants learn 
that this decision sustained Gregory’s side-business: selling black-market dolphin fins. In 
the taboo–tragic version of this scenario, at first Gregory must choose between his side-
business and saving dolphins. He chooses his side business. Next, participants learn that 
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this decision saved Gregory’s crew. Thus, participants ultimately read the same content 
for tragic–taboo and taboo–tragic scenarios, only presented in different orders. These 
reframing scenarios were intermixed with control scenarios, which appended morally 
irrelevant information (Figure 1).  
For each scenario, participants provided either one or two judgments. First pass 
judgments were made after the initial dilemma (Figure 1d), and second pass judgments 
were made during the reframed dilemma (Figure 1e). In cohort one, all segments were 
presented sequentially, whereas in cohort two segments a–d were presented 
simultaneously (along with first pass judgments), followed by segment e. This change 
was made to decrease page loading times.  
 
Figure 1. Example scenario. Scenarios consisted of segments which could be substituted 
or rearranged to form four conditions: Tragic–Taboo, Tragic–Control, Taboo–Tragic, and 
Taboo–Control. For each scenario, participants made either both first and second pass 
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judgments, or only a second pass judgment. The text above is abbreviated. 24 scenarios 
were used in total; for full text see Appendix A.  
 
Procedure. Each participant read 24 scenarios (6 tragic–taboo; 6 taboo–tragic; 6 
tragic–control; 6 taboo–control), presented in a semi-random order to counterbalance 
condition–scenario combinations across participants. Ten measures were collected in 
total. In cohort one, participants provided first and second pass judgments of either 
mental state inference, mental imagery, or valence and arousal (Kron et al., 2013). In 
cohort two, all participants provided first and second pass moral judgments, and 
subgroups of participants provided second pass judgments of either impression violation, 
belief violation, desire violation, prescriptive norm violation, or descriptive frequency 
(Figure 1; Table 1). Measures for prescriptive and descriptive norms were adapted from 
Brauer & Chaurand (2010).  
Analysis. We used mixed effects analyses to model each measure. Critically, 
these models included crossed by-subject and by-stimuli random effects. In traditional 
models (e.g. ANOVA) these two sources of variance cannot be modeled simultaneously, 
meaning that we would be forced to average across stimuli (or across participants), and 
limit our conclusions to the exact stimuli (or participants) that were tested (Baayen et al., 
2008; H. Clark, 1973; Judd et al, 2012; Westfall et al., 2016). Another reason for this 
analysis, is that it allowed us to easily extract BLUPs (best linear unbiased predictors; 
Baayen, 2008; Baayen et al., 2008). BLUPs were by-stimuli estimates of behavioral 
ratings for each scenario and condition. BLUPs were preferable to simple by-stimuli 
averages for two reasons:  a) by-stimuli BLUPs are independent from by-subject 
variance, meaning that estimates were specific to the scenarios (and could be compared 
with by-stimuli estimates of ToMN activity in Study 2); and b) by-stimuli BLUPs 
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incorporate the sample distribution into the estimate (i.e. they are semi-pooled estimates; 
Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012), meaning that they anticipate regression to the mean and 
mitigate against outliers.  
Data was modeled using R (R Core Team, 2016) and the lme4 package (Bates et 
al., 2015). All mixed effects models used the maximal random effects structure, including 
all necessary by-subject and by-stimuli random slopes and intercepts (Barr et al., 2013). 
For measures where first-pass and second-pass judgments were collected (moral 
judgment, mental state inference, mental imagery, valence, and arousal), models 
specified fixed, by-subject, and by-stimuli random effects as: A + B + AxB + AxC + 
AxBxC, where A = Time Point (first pass, 0/second pass, 1), B = Initial Condition 
(tragic, -0.5/taboo, +0.5), C = Reframing Condition, (control, -0.5/reframed, +0.5); the 
main effect for Reframing Condition was omitted because the distinction between control 
and reframed conditions was only relevant to second pass judgments. For measures 
where only second-pass judgments were collected (impression violation, belief violation, 
desire violation, prescriptive norm violation, and descriptive norm violation), models 
specified fixed, by-subject, and by-stimuli random effects as: B + C + BxC, where B = 
Initial Condition (tragic, -0.5/taboo, +0.5), C = Reframing Condition, (control, -
0.5/reframed, +0.5).  
Any model simplifications to achieve convergence are described in Results 
below, and convergence was achieved before testing any relationships of interest. Models 
were simplified by temporarily removing correlations between random effects, inspecting 
the uncorrelated model and removing any random effects parameters with zero variance, 
then returning correlations to the model.  
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Results 
 Modeling. Across cohorts, we collected ten measures: a) impression violation, b) 
belief violation, c) desire violation, d) prescriptive norm violation, e) descriptive norm 
violation, f) moral judgment, g) mental state inference, h) mental imagery, i) valence, and 
j) arousal. Model simplification was necessary only for moral judgment, where the by-
subject Time Point x Initial Condition parameter was dropped, meaning that by-subject 
random effects could not be separately estimated for tragic–control and taboo–control 
conditions. Condition mean estimates for each measure are reported in Table 1. For each 
model, we extracted by-stimuli BLUPs for each scenario and condition combination, 
providing 96 data points for each measure.
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Table 1. Behavioral rating condition means. 
  Initial 
Tragic 
Initial 
Taboo 
Tragic–
Taboo 
Tragic–
Control 
Taboo–
Tragic 
Taboo–
Control 
Measure Text M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Mental State 
Inference  
(n = 80) 
“To what extent did this story make you 
think about someone's experiences, 
thoughts, beliefs, and/or desires?”  
1–7;  “not at all” – “very much” 
5.48 (0.12) 5.40 (0.11) 5.04 (0.15) 4.54 (0.19) 5.24 (0.14) 4.75 (0.18) 
Mental 
Imagery  
(n = 80) 
“To what extent did you picture or imagine 
the events of the story happening as you 
read? 
5.38 (0.12) 5.33 (0.12) 5.38 (0.12) 3.77 (0.19) 5.41 (0.13) 3.78 (0.19) 
Valence  
(n = 79) 
Difference of positive and negative 
unipolar scales. “Please rate your feelings 
regarding this statement on two scales:” 
1–8; “no unpleasant feelings – “strong 
unpleasant feelings” 
1–8; “no unpleasant feelings – “strong 
unpleasant feelings” 
-1.81 
(0.41) 
-3.60 
(0.40) 
-2.90 
(0.46) 
-1.58 
(0.40) 
-1.27 
(0.44) 
-3.01 
(0.39) 
Arousal  
(n = 79) 
Sum of positive and negative unipolar 
scales. 
8.18 (0.17) 8.38 (0.13) 8.41 (0.16) 7.87 (0.21) 8.37 (0.18) 8.11 (0.17) 
Moral 
Judgment  
(n = 315) 
“Are <agent>’s actions moral?”  
1–7; “not at all” – “completely” 
4.08 (0.20) 2.62 (0.21) 3.30 (0.19) 4.12 (0.20) 4.01 (0.18) 2.79 (0.21) 
Impression 
Violation  
(n = 63) 
“Is this new information inconsistent with 
your previous impression of <agent>?”  
n/a n/a 3.80 (0.20) 2.13 (0.15) 4.12 (0.20) 2.15 (0.15) 
Belief Violation 
(n = 61) 
“Is this new information inconsistent with 
what you previously thought <agent> 
believed?”  
n/a n/a 4.08 (0.21) 2.21 (0.19) 4.45 (0.19) 1.99 (0.17) 
Desire 
Violation 
(n = 67) 
“Is this new information inconsistent with 
what you previously thought <agent> 
desired?” 
n/a n/a 3.82 (0.19) 2.36 (0.19) 3.92 (0.21) 2.33 (0.20) 
Prescriptive 
Norm Violation 
(n = 62) 
“With this new information in mind, to 
what extent is <agent>'s decision deviant 
(i.e. to what extent does it go against the 
n/a n/a 4.24 (0.21) 3.07 (0.21) 3.21 (0.14) 4.09 (0.25) 
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norms of our society)?”  
Descriptive 
Frequency (n = 
62) 
“With this new information in mind, to 
what extent is <agent>'s decision common 
(i.e. to what extent is it frequently observed 
in our society)?” 
n/a n/a 4.15 (0.18) 4.22 (0.17) 4.17 (0.17) 4.12 (0.20) 
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 Principal Components Analysis. A principal components analysis reduced the 
dimensionality of our measures. We tested 2-factor, 3-factor, 4-factor, 5-factor, and 6-
factor varimax rotated solutions (Table 2 & Table S1 of the online supplemental 
materials). To fit all variables, we wanted to ensure that the communalities—i.e. the 
proportion of variance explained for each variable—were high in all cases. A 2-factor 
solution was a poor fit for descriptive frequency (h2 = .23). A 3-factor solution offered an 
improvement, but remained a poor fit for mental imagery (h2 = .51). A 4-factor solution 
was a reasonable fit for the data, with the worst fit being for arousal (h2 = .68); however, 
communalities were high across all variables in the 5-factor solution (h2min = .89), and a 
6-factor solution offered only modest improvement (h2min = .92). Based on this, we 
decided to use the 5-factor solution. Factors were: 1) dispositional prediction error 
(impression violation, belief violation, desire violation, & mental state inference); 2) 
prescriptive prediction error (moral judgment, valence, prescriptive norm violation; factor 
loadings were reverse scored); 3) mental imagery; 4) descriptive prediction error 
(descriptive frequency, reverse scored); and 5) arousal. Factor loadings and fit for all 
solutions are reported in Table 2, and correlations among measures are visualized in 
Figure 2.  
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Table 2. Principal components analysis; 5-factor solution.   
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.41  0.90   0.99 
Mental State Inference 0.82  0.44  0.21 0.91 
Valence   0.94    0.89 
Arousal  0.50 -0.27   0.80 1 
Descriptive Frequency  0.20  0.97  0.99 
Prescriptive Norm Violation  -0.87  -0.34  0.89 
Belief Violation 0.95     0.97 
Desire Violation 0.97     0.96 
Impression Violation 0.96     0.96 
Moral Judgment  0.96    0.94 
Component loading 3.85 2.68 1.11 1.08 0.78  
Proportional variance explained .39 .27 .11 .11 .08  
Cumulative variance explained .39 .65 .76 .87 .95  
PCA was performed on by-stimuli BLUPs, extracted from Study 1 models for each measure. Factor 
loadings with an absolute value < .2 are omitted for ease of interpretation. Principal components were 
varimax rotated. 
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Figure 2. Correlations among by-stimuli BLUPs. Each measure was estimated in a 
separate model, and all measures were collected from separate participants (with the 
exception of moral judgment). Dimension reduction was achieved using principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation. The 5-factor solution fit all variables well, 
and was clearly interpretable. Factor 1 was interpreted as dispositional prediction error; 
factor 2 as prescriptive prediction error (reverse coded), factor 3 as mental imagery; 
factor 4 as descriptive prediction error (reverse coded); and factor 5 as arousal. Note that 
factors 3 and 5 also partially load on factor 1. Factors were extracted as weighed averages 
based on all loadings (Table 2).  
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 identified dimensions underlying our stimuli set. Principal components 
analysis distinguished between dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive prediction 
error (Figure 2; Table 2). Mental imagery and valence comprised additional dimensions. 
With by-stimuli measures of social prediction error established, we could compare ratings 
with ToMN activity, estimated in Study 2. 
Study 2 
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 Study 2 examined whether by-stimuli differences in social prediction error were 
related to BOLD activity in the ToMN. Participants read the scenarios analyzed in Study 
1 while undergoing fMRI. The ToMN was identified using an independent functional 
localizer, and BOLD activity was extracted for five ROIs: dorsal-/ventral-medial 
prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and right/left temporoparietal junction 
(DMPFC/VMPFC/PC/RTPJ/LTPJ). By-stimuli estimates were extracted from each ROI 
and compared with Study 1 component scores (testing for overall effects of ToMN 
activity and interactions across ROIs).  
Method 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 20-right handed participants (10 
female, 9 male, 1 unspecified; Mage = 27.3 years, SDage = 5.0 years), after excluding two 
participants from analysis due to excessive movement, identified during spatial 
preprocessing. The sample size was chosen in advance to be consistent with fMRI studies 
of social cognition (e.g., Fourie et al., 2014; Koster-Hale et al., 2013; Mende-Siedlecki et 
al., 2013; Ratner et al., 2012; Young & Saxe, 2009). Participants were a community 
sample, recruited through an online posting and given a $65 cash payment. Participants 
were native English speakers with no reported history of learning disabilities, previous 
psychiatric or neurological disorders, or a history of drug or alcohol abuse.  
 Stimuli and Measures. Stimuli were identical to those used in Study 1. 
Participants were told that they would read about a character and provide a moral 
judgment at the end of the story, so they should keep their judgment in mind as they read. 
At the end of each scenario, participants provided a single moral judgment (“How 
morally wrong?”; 1 – “Not at all”, 4 – “Very”). We collected one second pass judgment 
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(as opposed to both first and second pass judgments) to avoid interrupting participants as 
they read. 
 Procedure. Scenarios were projected onto a screen in the scanner, and appeared 
cumulatively in five parts (+10 s each, 50 s total). Moral judgments were probed on a 
separate screen (+4 s), followed by fixation (+12 s). Runs were 4.6 mins each, and the 
total scan time was 64.6 mins, due to the inclusion of a second study reported elsewhere 
(involving reading and evaluating claims about facts, morals, and preferences; Theriault 
et al., 2017a, 2017b).  Stimuli were presented in white text on a black background, using 
Matlab 7.7.0 (R2008b), on an Apple Macbook Pro. 
 As in Study 1, each participant read 24 scenarios (6 tragic–taboo; 6 taboo–tragic; 
6 tragic–control; 6 taboo–control), presented in a semi-random order to counterbalance 
condition–scenario combinations across participants. 
 fMRI Imaging and Analysis. Scanning was performed using a 3.0 T Siemens 
Tim Trio MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) and a 12-
channel head coil at the Center for Brain Science Neuroimaging Facility at Harvard 
University. Thirty-six slices with 3mm isotropic voxels, with a 0.54mm gap between 
slices to allow for full brain coverage, were collected using gradient-echo planar imaging 
(TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 216 x 216 mm; interleaved 
acquisition). Anatomical data were collected with T1-weighted multi-echo magnetization 
prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo image (MEMPRAGE) sequences (TR = 2530 
ms, TE = 1.64 ms, FA = 7°, 1mm isotropic voxels, 0.5mm gap between slices, FOV = 
256 x 256 mm). Data processing and analysis were performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and custom software. The data were motion-corrected, 
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realigned, normalized onto a common brain space (Montreal Neurological Institute, 
MNI), spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (full-width half-maximum = 5 mm 
kernel), and high-pass filtered (128 Hz). 
 ToMN Localizer Task. ToMN ROIs were identified using an independent 
functional localizer task (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), contrasting ten stories about mental 
states (false-belief) and ten stories about physical representations (false-photograph). 
Stories were matched in complexity across conditions; see 
http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php for the complete set. Each trial presented a story (10 
s) and a statement about the story, which participants rated true or false (+4 s). A boxcar 
for the full duration was used to model BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent) activity. A 
simple contrast (false belief > false photograph; p < .001, k > 10) identified significant 
ToMN voxels for each participant.  
ROIs were defined for DMPFC, VMPFC, PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, and each 
comprised all significant voxels in a 9mm-radius sphere surrounding the peak voxel in 
each location (for coordinates, see Table S2 of the online supplemental materials). It is 
worth noting that the chosen threshold is lenient (Eklund et al., 2016); however, our 
principal aim was to compare our findings with prior work which has identified the 
ToMN (e.g. Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), which required that we 
apply the localizer using the same method. Note that ROIs were defined for each subject, 
based on the localizer contrast; if no voxels were active then no ROI was defined, 
meaning that Ns differ across ROIs (Table S2).  
 Functional ROI Analysis. Within each ToMN ROI, we transformed BOLD 
activity at each time point into percent signal change (PSC = raw BOLD magnitude for 
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[condition – fixation]/fixation), offsetting the time course by 4 seconds to account for 
hemodynamic lag (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). For each subject, PSC was mean-centered 
for each run. Across the entire sample, outliers within each ROI were removed using an 
iterated Grubbs test (Grubbs, 1969), at a threshold of p < .001. PSC was then averaged 
across three epochs: background epoch (4–24 s, before scenarios diverged into initial 
tragic and initial taboo; Figure 1); first pass epoch (24–44 s; after scenarios diverged into 
initial tragic and initial taboo); and second pass epoch (44–58 s; after scenarios were 
reframed and diverged into four conditions, including moral judgment). To simplify 
analysis, values for the background epoch were dropped from analysis, and we entered 
first and second pass epoch PSC for each subject and scenario into a mixed effects 
analysis. 
 Mixed Effects Analysis. As in Study 1, we used mixed effects analyses to build 
models with crossed by-subject and by-stimuli random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Judd 
et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2016). From these models, we extracted by-stimuli BLUPs, 
estimating activity for each scenario and condition, within each ToMN ROI. Data was 
modeled using R (R Core Team, 2016) and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015).  
Mixed effects models were first modeled as maximal, including all necessary by-
subject and by-stimuli random slopes and intercepts (Barr et al., 2013). All models were 
initially specified as: A + B + AxB + AxC + AxBxC, where A = Epoch (first pass epoch, 
0/second pass epoch, 1), B = Initial Condition (tragic, -0.5/taboo, +0.5), C = Reframing 
Condition, (control, -0.5/reframed, +0.5); as in Study 1, the main effect for Reframing 
Condition was omitted because the distinction between control and reframed conditions 
was only relevant in the second pass epoch. Any model simplification to achieve 
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convergence is described in Results below, and convergence was achieved before testing 
any relationships of interest. Steps for simplification were the same as described in Study 
1. 
Results 
 Modeling. PSC for each ToMN ROI was fit using mixed effects models (see 
Mixed Effects Analysis in Methods).  No simplification was necessary for PC, and 
VMPFC, RTPJ, and LTPJ were simplified by removing by-stimuli random intercepts, 
which for our purposes meant that all scenarios in these ROIs varied by condition around 
a fixed point (see Barr et al., 2013). DMPFC was simplified further by removing by-
stimuli random intercepts, and by-stimuli random slopes for Initial Condition and Initial 
Condition x Epoch, meaning that, within DMPFC, by-stimuli variance was removed in 
the first pass epoch, and reduced in the second pass epoch. It was promising that so little 
simplification was necessary, as the design called for the estimation of a fairly large 
number of random effects. That convergence could be achieved suggests that our sample 
size met at least the minimum requirements for estimation (granted, more accurate 
estimates will always be produced in a larger sample). Condition mean estimates for each 
ROI are reported in Table 3. Model details are reported in Table S3 of the online 
supplemental materials. As in Study 1, we extracted by-stimuli BLUPs for each scenario 
and condition combination, providing 96 data points for each ROI.  
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Table 3. ToMN percent signal change condition means. 
 Initial Tragic Initial Taboo Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
ROI M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
DMPFC 0.105 (0.031) 0.089 (0.029) -0.018 (0.043) -0.111 (0.038) -0.048 (0.042) -0.070 (0.043) 
VPMFC 0.101 (0.036) 0.075 (0.052) 0.039 (0.046) -0.050 (0.049) -0.020 (0.048) -0.045 (0.048) 
PC 0.129 (0.027) 0.117 (0.027) 0.042 (0.035) -0.025 (0.041) 0.078 (0.050) -0.037 (0.026) 
RTPJ 0.050 (0.023) 0.061 (0.022) -0.005 (0.025) 0.005 (0.034) 0.017 (0.027) 0.019 (0.028) 
LTPJ 0.141 (0.029) 0.144 (0.027) 0.073 (0.038) -0.007 (0.031) 0.060 (0.045) -0.028 (0.034) 
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 ToMN activity–behavioral component score analysis. Across by-stimuli 
BLUPs, we examined the relationship between component scores, derived in Study 1, 
and ToMN activity. As component scores were derived only for second pass judgments, 
we did not analyze first pass ToMN ROI activity (although they were still included in the 
model above, deriving by-stimuli BLUPs). Each component score was fit with a linear 
model, first adding Initial Condition, Reframing Condition, and their interaction, then 
adding ToMN activity and its interaction with all terms, and finally adding ROI 
interactions (no main effect of ROI was included, as component scores were identical 
across ROIs; for details, see Table S4 of the online supplemental materials). 
 For dispositional prediction error (Figure 3a), we observed an interaction between 
ToMN activity and Reframing Condition, F(1, 456) = 4.44, p = .035, such that 
dispositional prediction error was associated with ToMN activity within tragic–
taboo/taboo–tragic scenarios, B = 0.10, t(487) = 2.54, p = .022, but not within tragic–
control/taboo–control scenarios, B = -0.01, t(487) = 0.18, p = .980 (corrected for two 
comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method; multcomp package, Hothorn et al., 
2008). The interaction was not qualified by any further interaction with ROI, F(4, 456) = 
1.35, p = .250; however, for visualization the effect is broken down by ROI in Figure 3a. 
For prescriptive prediction error (Figure 3b), we also observed an interaction between 
ToMN activity and Reframing Condition, F(1, 456) = 9.94, p = .002, such that 
prescriptive prediction error was also associated with ToMN activity within tragic–
taboo/taboo–tragic scenarios, B = 0.18, t(487) = 2.46, p = .028, but not within tragic–
control/taboo–control scenarios, B = -0.06, t(487) = 0.50, p = .852 (corrected for two 
comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method). This interaction was also not qualified 
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by an ROI interaction, F(4, 456) = 0.53, p = .710, although as above, we visualize each 
ROI in Figure 3b for the sake of clarity. ToMN activity was not related to descriptive 
prediction error (Figure 3c; Table S4), mental imagery (Figure S1, Table S4), or arousal 
(Figure S1, Table S4). Thus, when participants were required to update their initial 
impressions and moral judgments, ToMN activity tracked the magnitude of the 
dispositional and prescriptive prediction error. By contrast, we did not observe this 
pattern in a component measuring descriptive prediction error .   
 
Figure 3. ToMN–behavioral component score relationships. Main effects of ToMN 
activity (left) and their breakdown by ROI (right). Interactions with ROI were not 
significant, but separate results for individual ROIs are presented for ease of 
interpretation. (a) Dispositional prediction error was related to ToMN activity within 
reframed scenarios (i.e. tragic–taboo/taboo–tragic) but not within control scenarios (i.e. 
tragic–control/taboo–control). (b) Prescriptive prediction error showed the same pattern, 
and was related to ToMN activity for reframed, but not control, scenarios. (c) Descriptive 
prediction error showed no relationship with ToMN activity. Note that component scores 
were orthogonal, so common patterns cannot stem from correlations among component 
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scores. Relationships for mental imagery, and arousal component scores were non-
significant and are presented in Figure S1, of the online supplemental materials. P values 
are corrected for two comparisons in each model (α familywise = .05; single-step method). 
 
General Discussion. 
In the present work, we tested the relationship between ToMN (theory of mind 
network) activity and several forms prediction error. Across ToMN ROIs, activity was 
associated with both dispositional and prescriptive prediction error (Figure 3), but not 
descriptive prediction error (i.e. violations of descriptive norms). That is, scenarios which 
contradicted either moral norms or specific impressions of the agent, elicited greater 
activity across the ToMN. Measures of prediction error were aggregated component 
scores (extracted from a principal components analysis in Study 1), and were 
orthogonally rotated to remove correlations among factors—meaning that the observed 
relationships between dispositional and prescriptive prediction error cannot be explained 
by a correlation between dependent variables. Thus, our findings are consistent with the 
proposal that the ToMN is involved in the computation of social prediction error (Koster-
Hale & Saxe, 2013; Joiner et al., 2017).  
Notably, the relationship between ToMN activity and both dispositional and 
prescriptive prediction error was significant only during reframed scenarios (tragic–
taboo/taboo–tragic), where participants were given additional, morally relevant 
information. Neither relationship was significant across control scenarios (tragic–
control/taboo–control). For dispositional prediction error, this non-significance could 
plausibly be explained by a lack of variance (Figure 3), i.e. it is possible that a different 
set of control scenarios, which violated personal impressions (without reframing moral 
judgment), would be associated with ToMN activity. Thus, one weakness of the present 
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study is that such variance could not be explored. However, prescriptive judgments were 
variable across control scenarios—as participants formed first pass moral judgments 
during the initial dilemma (initial tragic/initial taboo) and maintained them in their 
second pass judgments (Table 1). Thus, ToMN activity was related to prescriptive 
prediction error only when new, morally relevant information was presented.  
If ToMN is responsive to social prediction error, then future work may better 
account for observed patterns of activity by considering the normative contexts in which 
stimuli are presented. For instance, prior work in impression formation has contrasted 
positive and negative impression updating (e.g. Bhanji & Beer, 2013), finding separate 
neural correlates for each. However, other work suggests that diagnosticity is a common 
denominator for (at least some) neural activity related to impression updating (Mende-
Siedlecki et al., 2013). For instance, putting aside prescriptive norms for the moment, 
within the domain of moral behaviors, extreme immorality is descriptively uncommon—
people behave themselves more often than not. By contrast, in the domain of proficiency, 
it is descriptively uncommon to encounter people who are extremely skilled. Across both 
domains, updating based on descriptive frequency elicited activity in regions such as left 
superior temporal sulcus, and left/right ventral-lateral prefrontal cortex (Mende-Siedlecki 
et al., 2013), although effects were generally stronger for moral updating. It may be that 
social predictions based around morality are particularly salient in social situations (see 
also Theriault et al., 2017b)—our social world is predictable when others behave morally, 
and when they let us down it is important that we update our social predictions.  
The ToMN is broadly involved in social cognition, and based on the present study 
alone, it is impossible to make conclusions about the precise relationship between mental 
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state representation and social prediction; for instance, does all mental state 
representation boil down to prediction? Or is prediction only one part of the broader 
construct? Despite this, it is worth pointing out that we included a measure of mental 
state representation (used in prior work; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), and it loaded heavily 
onto our factor tracking dispositional prediction error (Figure 2; Table 2). Intuitively, this 
makes sense, as people should be most inclined to consider mental states when an agent 
does not behave as predicted. In other words, mental state inference is a solution to the 
problem of prediction when a system does not behave according to a transparent system 
of input and output (Dennett, 1987; Theriault & Young, 2014).  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what we consider to be the benefits of the item 
analysis approach taken in the present work. Social behavior is complicated, and, in our 
opinion, social categories do not lend themselves to the level of specificity that simple 
BOLD contrasts require—there is simply no plausible way to control for all confounds 
and deliver a clean contrast. At the other end of the spectrum, computational models can 
cleanly characterize a process, but also require that the task be somewhat removed from 
naturalistic contexts (e.g. economic games). Item analysis offers a middle path, where 
researchers can relax constraints on their sample of stimuli but, at the same time, conduct 
fine-grained analyses of the dimensions that emerge across the it. Furthermore, this 
approach is advantageous in that stimuli can be normed and reused, meaning that other 
researchers can utilize our stimuli (and normed estimates) to test their own hypotheses 
about the underlying dimensions (see Appendix B for the complete stimuli set and paired 
BLUPs).  
Conclusion 
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ToMN activity is associated with social prediction error, consistent with a 
predictive coding account of social cognition (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Although 
future research is necessary to better characterize the relationship between ToMN activity 
and social cognition, the present work is consistent with an account that imagines the 
brain as a “hierarchical prediction machine” (A. Clark, 2013), using information about 
people, contexts, and statistical frequency to anticipate its social environment.    
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Appendix A. Scenario Text. 
Scenario 1     
a) Rebecca is in charge of running a yearlong drug trial at McAdam Hospital. The drug was given to 
the experimental group of patients, and a placebo was given to the control group. At two months, 
early results suggest that the drug is effective. 
 
b) Rebecca has the option to give the control group the medicine early. This could potentially save 
the lives of patients who would die without immediate access to the treatment. 
 
 Initial Tragic Initial Taboo 
c) Holding the trial at the original length would 
produce more conclusive data. This would help 
develop better treatments in the long run, and 
save the lives of patients in the future.  
 
Giving treatment to the control group before a 
study is complete is frowned on in the medical 
community. If Rebecca ends the study early, 
she will have trouble progressing her career.  
 
d) Rebecca thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to continue the study at its original length. 
The drug trial continues for the remainder of the year, but some patients in the control group die 
during this time. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Giving treatment to 
the control group 
before a study is 
complete is frowned 
on in the medical 
community. If 
Rebecca ends the 
study early, she will 
have trouble 
progressing her career. 
 
 
 
 
 
After Rebecca arrives 
home from work, she 
makes herself 
spaghetti for dinner 
and watches 
television. After 
dinner she washes the 
dishes and takes a 
shower before going 
to bed. 
 
Holding the trial at the 
original length would 
produce more 
conclusive data. This 
would help develop 
better treatments in 
the long run, and save 
the lives of patients in 
the future. 
 
After Rebecca arrives 
home from work, she 
makes herself 
spaghetti for dinner 
and watches 
television. After 
dinner she washes the 
dishes and takes a 
shower before going 
to bed. 
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Scenario 2     
a) Jessica is in charge of a subcommittee of the Environmental Protection Agency and must break a 
tie in a vote. The vote is on whether to approve a project proposed by a drug company. 
 
b) If Jessica rejects the project then the drug company will be prevented from harvesting old growth 
forests to develop their drug. This would prevent severe environmental damage which would wipe 
out many endangered species. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) By approving the project, Jessica will be 
allowing highly effective treatments for 
multiple sclerosis to be developed. No other 
treatment is nearly as effective as this drug, and 
the new drug would help thousands of people 
across America. 
 
Jessica’s boss, the head of the EPA, would 
personally benefit if this new drug were to be 
produced. By approving the project Jessica 
would win his gratitude and he would be more 
likely to grant the promotion she planned to ask 
for. 
 
d) Jessica thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to approve the project. The drug is developed, 
and the old growth forest is destroyed. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Jessica’s boss, the 
head of the EPA, 
would personally 
benefit if this new 
drug were to be 
produced. By 
approving the project 
Jessica would win his 
gratitude and he 
would be more likely 
to grant the promotion 
she planned to ask for. 
 
 
 
 
 
Jessica calls several of 
her close friends and 
makes plans to see a 
movie the following 
weekend. The movie 
had received good 
reviews in the local 
newspaper and Jessica 
has seen all of the 
leading actor’s 
previous movies.  
 
By approving the 
project, Jessica will 
be allowing highly 
effective treatments 
for multiple sclerosis 
to be developed. No 
other treatment is 
nearly as effective as 
this drug, and the new 
drug would help 
thousands of people 
across America. 
 
Jessica calls several of 
her close friends and 
makes plans to see a 
movie the following 
weekend. The movie 
had received good 
reviews in the local 
newspaper and Jessica 
has seen all of the 
leading actor’s 
previous movies.  
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Scenario 3     
a) Emil owns a small farm in Argentina. Emil is considering expanding his farm, which would allow 
him to grow more varieties of fruits and vegetables.  
 
b) Emil sells his crops to a nearby village. He knows that what he grows does not contain enough 
nutrients for a healthy diet. By expanding his farm he could save the villagers from 
malnourishment. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Emil knows that the area of the rainforest that 
borders on his farm contains an exceptional 
number of endangered species, and that 
expanding into it will cause many of them to 
die out. 
 
Emil regularly brings in tourists who pay for 
tours of the rainforest near his house, and 
continuing to give these tours will be more 
profitable then planting more crops and feeding 
the village. 
 
d) Emil thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to expand his farm into the rainforest. His 
farm is not developed any further, and the villagers continue to suffer from malnourishment. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Emil regularly brings 
in tourists who pay 
for tours of the 
rainforest near his 
house, and continuing 
to give these tours 
will be more 
profitable then 
planting more crops 
and feeding the 
village. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emil received a call 
the next day from an 
acquaintance he had 
lost contact with. 
They agreed to meet 
the next week at a 
café in the city in 
order to catch up on 
their lives since high 
school.  
 
Emil knows that the 
area of the rainforest 
that borders on his 
farm contains an 
exceptional number of 
endangered species, 
and that expanding 
into it will cause 
many of them to die 
out. 
 
Emil received a call 
the next day from an 
acquaintance he had 
lost contact with. 
They agreed to meet 
the next week at a 
café in the city in 
order to catch up on 
their lives since high 
school.  
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Scenario 4     
a) Sanjeev is a government official in India who is in charge of a local wildlife preservation. A 
family of endangered tigers has been attacking people on the border of the preserve, and she must 
decide what to do about it. 
 
b) The World Wildlife Foundation has asked that they be allowed to capture the tigers alive and 
relocate them. This will leave the villagers in danger for longer, but will save the tigers. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) The nearby villagers are terrified and afraid to 
let their children out of their houses. By 
sending the army to kill the tigers Sanjeev 
could eliminate the danger almost immediately. 
 
Sanjeev knows that the teeth of these tigers are 
very valuable and can be sold as an 
aphrodisiac. By sending the army to kill the 
tigers Sanjeev could take a share of the profit. 
 
d) Sanjeev thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to send in the army. The army kills the entire 
family of endangered tigers. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Sanjeev knows that 
the teeth of these 
tigers are very 
valuable and can be 
sold as an 
aphrodisiac. By 
sending the army to 
kill the tigers Sanjeev 
could take a share of 
the profit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next afternoon, 
Sanjeev goes for a 
walk to get exercise. 
She forgot to eat 
breakfast that 
morning and becomes 
hungry after 30 
minutes. She decides 
to take the shorter 
route home. 
 
The nearby villagers 
are terrified and afraid 
to let their children 
out of their houses. 
By sending the army 
to kill the tigers 
Sanjeev could 
eliminate the danger 
almost immediately. 
 
The next afternoon, 
Sanjeev goes for a 
walk to get exercise. 
She forgot to eat 
breakfast that 
morning and becomes 
hungry after 30 
minutes. She decides 
to take the shorter 
route home. 
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Scenario 5     
a) Sarah and her five year old son Jeffery were recently evicted from their house and are living in a 
homeless shelter. A very rich couple has approached Sarah explaining that they are unable to 
conceive and that they would be willing to adopt Jeffery.  
 
b) The couple has told Sarah that they will be moving to California. They do not plan to return and it 
is unlikely that Sarah will ever see her son again if they adopt him.  
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Sarah can barely feed Jeffery, let alone provide 
a comfortable life for him. She is absolutely 
certain that Jeffery would be very well off with 
his new family.  
 
Sarah has been told by the couple that they will 
buy her an expensive new car to replace her old 
one. They will purchase the car when she signs 
over custody of Jeffery. 
 
d) Sarah thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to allow the family to adopt Jeffery. Jeffery 
moves to California with the family, and Sarah never sees him again. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Sarah has been told 
by the couple that 
they will buy her an 
expensive new car to 
replace her old one. 
They will purchase 
the car when she signs 
over custody of 
Jeffery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah goes to her 
former high school’s 
basketball game that 
weekend. Her high 
school used to rank 
poorly, but recently 
has improved its 
standing in the league.   
 
Sarah can barely feed 
Jeffery, let alone 
provide a comfortable 
life for him. She is 
absolutely certain that 
Jeffery would be very 
well off with his new 
family.  
 
Sarah goes to her 
former high school’s 
basketball game that 
weekend. Her high 
school used to rank 
poorly, but recently 
has improved its 
standing in the league.   
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Scenario 6     
a) Candace is the Mayor of a small mid-western American city. The city needs to make cuts to the 
education budget. The council has brought two proposals to her about programs that could 
potentially be cut. 
 
b) Candace could cut after school programs for at-risk youth. This would leave many adolescents 
without alternatives to getting involved with drugs and crime. It would almost certainly negatively 
affect their future prospects. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Cutting day-care programs would put a 
financial strain on single parents. Parents with 
jobs would need to work more hours and see 
their children less. Parents without jobs would 
have to balance childcare and their time to job 
hunt. 
 
Cutting day-care programs would make parents 
unhappy, and Candace is up for reelection next 
year. The votes of these parents were essential 
to her victory in the last election. Losing the 
support of parents could lose her the next 
election. 
 
d) Candace thinks carefully and ultimately decides to cut the after school programs for at-risk youth. 
As a result, many of these children get involved with drugs and crime. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Cutting day-care 
programs would make 
parents unhappy, and 
Candace is up for 
reelection next year. 
The votes of these 
parents were essential 
to her victory in the 
last election. Losing 
the support of parents 
could lose her the 
next election. 
 
 
 
 
Candace takes her 
dog, Spot, on a walk 
through the 
downtown city park. 
The park allows dogs 
to go off of their 
leashes, but only in 
certain areas. When 
Candace reaches the 
area, she lets Spot off 
of his leash and 
throws the ball with 
him. 
 
Cutting day-care 
programs would put a 
financial strain on 
single parents. Parents 
with jobs would need 
to work more hours 
and see their children 
less. Parents without 
jobs would have to 
balance childcare and 
their time to job hunt. 
 
Candace takes her 
dog, Spot, on a walk 
through the 
downtown city park. 
The park allows dogs 
to go off of their 
leashes, but only in 
certain areas. When 
Candace reaches the 
area, she lets Spot off 
of his leash and 
throws the ball with 
him. 
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Scenario 7     
a) Michael is 36 years old and is visiting his mother in the hospital. She is completely paralyzed and 
unable to speak. She had told Michael that in such situations she wants to be euthanized and the 
decision is legally Michael’s to make. 
 
b) Michael could ask the doctors to euthanize his mother. The procedure would be painless and if it 
was not performed she would live for years, completely unable to move or speak. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Michael’s wife is adamantly opposed to 
euthanasia. She understands Michael’s 
mother’s circumstances, but has told Michael 
that she will divorce him if he has his mother 
euthanized. 
 
Michael’s mother is very wealthy and has set 
up automatic deposits to Michael’s bank 
account. When she dies, her fortune will be 
donated to her favorite charity, and Michael 
will stop receiving money. 
 
d) Michael thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave his mother to die naturally. His 
mother remains conscious but unable to move or speak. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Michael’s mother is 
very wealthy and has 
set up automatic 
deposits to Michael’s 
bank account. When 
she dies, her fortune 
will be donated to her 
favorite charity, and 
Michael will stop 
receiving money. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On his way home, 
Michael listens to the 
radio.  He hears that 
winter is expected to 
come early this year. 
As soon as he arrives 
home he writes 
himself a note to put 
the winter tires on the 
car on Friday. 
 
Michael’s wife is 
adamantly opposed to 
euthanasia. She 
understands Michael’s 
mother’s 
circumstances, but has 
told Michael that she 
will divorce him if he 
has his mother 
euthanized. 
 
On his way home, 
Michael listens to the 
radio.  He hears that 
winter is expected to 
come early this year. 
As soon as he arrives 
home he writes 
himself a note to put 
the winter tires on the 
car on Friday. 
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Scenario 8     
a) Erica is a 25-year-old woman who is seven months pregnant and single after her husband’s death 
in a car accident. After a recent visit to the doctor, she learns that her baby has a rare chronic 
medical condition. 
 
b) Erica could choose to have her baby. Although the medical condition will be debilitating, the 
baby’s life expectancy is expected to be completely normal. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Erica knows that her baby would be in extreme 
pain for his entire life. The condition causes 
skin to be hypersensitive and painful to any sort 
of touch.  
 
Erica knows that her baby’s medical condition 
would require her specialized equipment. She 
would need to move to a cheap apartment in 
order to afford this. 
 
d) Erica thinks carefully and ultimately decides to have an abortion. Her unborn baby is aborted, and 
Erica suffers no negative consequences from the abortion. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Erica knows that her 
baby’s medical 
condition would 
require her 
specialized 
equipment. She would 
need to move to a 
cheap apartment in 
order to afford this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Erica cooks 
dinner that night she 
accidentally burns the 
potatoes. She notices 
that the smoke 
detector does not go 
off and replaces the 
batteries.  
 
Erica knows that her 
baby would be in 
extreme pain for his 
entire life. The 
condition causes skin 
to be hypersensitive 
and painful to any sort 
of touch.  
 
When Erica cooks 
dinner that night she 
accidentally burns the 
potatoes. She notices 
that the smoke 
detector does not go 
off and replaces the 
batteries.  
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Scenario 9     
a) Abby is the CEO of Morrison Motors, a large car manufacturing company. Abby must make a 
decision about whether to issue a recall due to a defect in the Ellipsis line of cars. 
 
b) Abby could issue a recall to fix this defect, which would return the thousands of Ellipsis cars to 
the factory. This would protect customers from the fatal accidents that can occur when the brakes 
fail.  
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Abby knows that the finances of the company 
are poor, and the negative press and expense of 
a recall would bankrupt them. Thousands of 
long-time employees would lose their jobs and 
pensions. 
 
The cost of settlements with the families of the 
victims would be much cheaper than the cost of 
a recall. Not issuing a recall could save the 
company money and even set Abby up for a 
promotion. 
 
d) Abby thinks carefully, and ultimately decides not to issue the recall. The company saves a great 
deal of money, but fatal accidents occur as a result. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) The cost of 
settlements with the 
families of the victims 
would be much 
cheaper than the cost 
of a recall. Not 
issuing a recall could 
save the company 
money and even set 
Abby up for a 
promotion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abby went to the gym 
next to the office to 
exercise after work. 
She had originally 
planned to run on the 
treadmill, but they 
were all occupied so 
she used the bicycle 
machine instead. 
 
Abby knows that the 
finances of the 
company are poor, 
and the negative press 
and expense of a 
recall would bankrupt 
them. Thousands of 
long-time employees 
would lose their jobs 
and pensions. 
 
Abby went to the gym 
next to the office to 
exercise after work. 
She had originally 
planned to run on the 
treadmill, but they 
were all occupied so 
she used the bicycle 
machine instead. 
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Scenario 10     
a) Brock is a clerk working for the Canadian military and can decide to approve or reject draftees 
that have been referred to him. He is currently considering the case of Aaron, a young man who is 
eligible to be drafted. 
 
b) Brock knows that Aaron has experience with engineering and could be put on a bomb defusal 
squad. This expertise could potentially save the lives of civilians and fellow soldiers. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Brock read that Aaron works with Engineers 
without Borders. If rejected from the draft, 
Aaron would continue to build wells in South 
Africa, giving the poor access to fresh water. 
 
Brock was contacted by Aaron’s family, who 
are very influential. They will contact Brock’s 
superiors and get him promoted if he rejects 
Aaron’s file and spares him the draft. 
 
d) Brock thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to reject Aaron’s file. Aaron is not drafted into 
the army. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Brock was contacted 
by Aaron’s family, 
who are very 
influential. They will 
contact Brock’s 
superiors and get him 
promoted if he rejects 
Aaron’s file and 
spares him the draft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following 
afternoon, Brock 
attends a meeting 
along with the other 
clerks. They discuss a 
new database program 
that will help to 
reduce the amount of 
paper used in their 
jobs. 
 
Brock read that Aaron 
works with Engineers 
without Borders. If 
rejected from the 
draft, Aaron would 
continue to build 
wells in South Africa, 
giving the poor access 
to fresh water. 
 
The following 
afternoon, Brock 
attends a meeting 
along with the other 
clerks. They discuss a 
new database program 
that will help to 
reduce the amount of 
paper used in their 
jobs. 
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Scenario 11     
a) Elizabeth owns and operates an animal shelter that cares for stray dogs. The shelter had signed a 
contract under a previous owner to supply dogs to a nearby university for research purposes. The 
contract is up for renewal.  
 
b) Elizabeth could refuse to re-sign the contract, in which case the sale of animals to the university 
would end. The university studies the causes of blindness and tests hazardous chemicals on the 
animals. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) The animal shelter is in poor financial shape. If 
Elizabeth refuses to re-sign the contract the 
shelter will likely close.  As a result, all of the 
animals in their care would be turned out into 
the street. 
 
If Elizabeth re-signs the contract, then the 
university will increase their payment for the 
animals to adjust for inflation. The university 
has also promised to pay Elizabeth a signing 
bonus of $5000. 
 
d) Elizabeth thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to re-sign the contract with the university. 
Several cats and dogs are taken each month for experimentation. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) If Elizabeth re-signs 
the contract, then the 
university will 
increase their 
payment for the 
animals to adjust for 
inflation. The 
university has also 
promised to pay 
Elizabeth a signing 
bonus of $5000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After work, Elizabeth 
stops at a friend’s 
house to borrow a 
movie that her friend 
had recommended. 
Elizabeth planned to 
watch it that night, but 
got distracted by 
another program that 
was on TV.  
 
The animal shelter is 
in poor financial 
shape. If Elizabeth 
refuses to re-sign the 
contract the shelter 
will likely close.  As a 
result, all of the 
animals in their care 
would be turned out 
into the street. 
 
After work, Elizabeth 
stops at a friend’s 
house to borrow a 
movie that her friend 
had recommended. 
Elizabeth planned to 
watch it that night, but 
got distracted by 
another program that 
was on TV.  
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Scenario 12     
a) Angela is a 40-year-old mother of two children, aged 12 and 14. She is has been approached by 
two women (Sandra and Megan) to act as a surrogate mother, and is considering whether to 
accept either offer. 
 
b) By being a surrogate mother for Sandra, Angela would be helping a close friend who has always 
wanted a child but cannot conceive on her own. Sandra is willing to pay for Angela’s healthcare 
costs, so that the pregnancy will not cost Angela anything. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Angela wants to send her children to college, 
but she does not have the money for a college 
savings fund. Megan has promised to pay 
Angela generously for carrying her child. 
Without this money, Angela may not be able to 
send her children to college. 
 
By being a surrogate mother for Megan, 
Angela will be generously compensated. 
Megan is a wealthy acquaintance and in 
addition to the large payment, has offered to 
buy Angela box seats at the Metropolitan 
Opera, of which Angela is an enormous fan.  
 
d) Angela thinks carefully and ultimately decides to act as a surrogate mother for Megan. She is 
generously compensated for her trouble. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) By being a surrogate 
mother for Megan, 
Angela will be 
generously 
compensated. Megan 
is a wealthy 
acquaintance and in 
addition to the large 
payment, has offered 
to buy Angela box 
seats at the 
Metropolitan Opera, 
of which Angela is an 
enormous fan.  
 
 
While Angela’s 
children are at school 
she reads her favorite 
book. She notices that 
she is nearly finished 
and drives to a local 
bookstore to pick out 
something new. The 
store was having a 
sale, and so she picks 
out two books instead 
of just the one she 
planned to buy. 
 
Angela wants to send 
her children to 
college, but she does 
not have the money 
for a college savings 
fund. Megan has 
promised to pay 
Angela generously for 
carrying her child. 
Without this money, 
Angela may not be 
able to send her 
children to college. 
 
While Angela’s 
children are at school 
she reads her favorite 
book. She notices that 
she is nearly finished 
and drives to a local 
bookstore to pick out 
something new. The 
store was having a 
sale, and so she picks 
out two books instead 
of just the one she 
planned to buy. 
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Scenario 13     
a) Gregory is the captain of a fishing vessel that operates off the coast of Cape Cod. He is 
considering implementing a new fishing method for himself and his crew. 
 
b) The new method involves specialized nets that release larger creatures caught in them. If used, it 
would decrease the number of dolphins that are accidentally caught and strangled in the netting. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Gregory knows that by implementing the new 
method he would be forced to lay off a third of 
his crew due to the related expenses. These 
people would have a very difficult time finding 
other jobs. 
 
Gregory has run a profitable business on the 
side where he sells dolphin fins to natural 
medicine distributors. If he implemented the 
new fishing method, he would need to shut 
down this business. 
 
d) Gregory thinks carefully and ultimately decides not to implement the new fishing method. The 
vessel continues to kill several dolphins per month. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Gregory has run a 
profitable business on 
the side where he sells 
dolphin fins to natural 
medicine distributors. 
If he implemented the 
new fishing method, 
he would need to shut 
down this business. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On Saturday, Gregory 
drives to Connecticut 
to spend the weekend 
with his parents. The 
traffic is very light 
and Gregory arrives at 
his parent’s house two 
hours earlier than he 
had expected to.   
 
Gregory knows that 
by implementing the 
new method he would 
be forced to lay off a 
third of his crew due 
to the related 
expenses. These 
people would have a 
very difficult time 
finding other jobs. 
 
On Saturday, Gregory 
drives to Connecticut 
to spend the weekend 
with his parents. The 
traffic is very light 
and Gregory arrives at 
his parent’s house two 
hours earlier than he 
had expected to.   
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Scenario 14     
a) Sergei is the governor of a small state in an Eastern European country. Sergei is considering 
whether to pass or veto an amendment banning the death penalty and public executions. 
 
b) If Sergei passes the amendment, then the death penalty and public executions will be banned 
immediately. Based on the estimates of Sergei’s staff, this would prevent at least ten executions of 
innocents per year. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Sergei knows that the state uses the income 
from tickets sold to public executions. Banning 
the death penalty would eliminate funding for 
several ongoing investigations into gang 
violence, leaving citizens in danger.  
 
The public executions are very popular among 
Sergei’s supporters. Sergei will have a much 
better chance of reelection if he vetoes the 
proposal and allows both public executions and 
the death penalty to continue. 
 
d) Sergei thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to veto the proposal. The death penalty is 
maintained. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) The public executions 
are very popular 
among Sergei’s 
supporters. Sergei will 
have a much better 
chance of reelection if 
he vetoes the proposal 
and allows both 
public executions and 
the death penalty to 
continue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sergei attends a 
briefing on the 
accounting 
department of the 
local government. The 
head accountant 
arrives late, but the 
meeting still ends 
early as most of the 
plans had been 
discussed previously 
at a related meeting. 
 
Sergei knows that the 
state uses the income 
from tickets sold to 
public executions. 
Banning the death 
penalty would 
eliminate funding for 
several ongoing 
investigations into 
gang violence, leaving 
citizens in danger.  
 
Sergei attends a 
briefing on the 
accounting 
department of the 
local government. The 
head accountant 
arrives late, but the 
meeting still ends 
early as most of the 
plans had been 
discussed previously 
at a related meeting. 
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Scenario 15     
a) Brian is a contestant in a game show in which pairs of participants answer questions for money 
but are humiliated if they fail. Brian’s partner has just failed the final question, and Brian has the 
option to “save” him. 
 
b) If Brian decides to save his partner, his partner will not be dropped into a tank of human 
excrement, and Brian will end the game with half of the $10,000 he has earned. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Earlier, both Brian and his partner stated their 
reasons for being on the show. Brian’s cousin 
was diagnosed with lung cancer, and Brian 
wants help pay for his treatment. 
 
By abandoning his partner to be dropped into 
the tank of human excrement, Brian will keep 
all of his money and be given a new Mercedes 
Benz car as a bonus prize. 
 
d) Brian thinks carefully and ultimately decides to abandon his partner. Brian’s partner is dropped 
into the human excrement, and Brian collects his earnings. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) By abandoning his 
partner to be dropped 
into the tank of 
human excrement, 
Brian will keep all of 
his money and be 
given a new Mercedes 
Benz car as a bonus 
prize. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brian is browsing 
Facebook later that 
night and notices that 
a former coworker has 
recently gotten 
married. Brian tells 
his wife who is 
surprised to hear the 
news. 
 
Earlier, both Brian 
and his partner stated 
their reasons for being 
on the show. Brian’s 
cousin was diagnosed 
with lung cancer, and 
Brian wants help pay 
for his treatment. 
 
Brian is browsing 
Facebook later that 
night and notices that 
a former coworker has 
recently gotten 
married. Brian tells 
his wife who is 
surprised to hear the 
news. 
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Scenario 16     
a) Cassandra is a member of the transportation board in a large American city. The board is 
considering the addition of a lane to a dangerous section of the freeway at the edge of the city.  
 
b) Cassandra knows that this stretch of highway is notorious for causing vehicles to lose control, and 
that there have been fatal accidents year round at it. Adding an additional lane would prevent 
approximately 50 deaths due to accidents per year. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Cassandra recently spoke to the mayor, who 
told her that the money for the lane would need 
to come from the education budget. By 
rejecting the repairs to the highway, Cassandra 
could prevent the city from having to lay off 
100 teachers. 
 
Cassandra’s husband is a personal injury 
lawyer who makes most of his income from 
settling accidents. Approving the additional 
lane would create less business for Cassandra’s 
husband, decreasing their combined income by 
a great deal. 
 
d) Cassandra thinks carefully and ultimately decides not to approve the construction of the new 
highway lane. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Cassandra’s husband 
is a personal injury 
lawyer who makes 
most of his income 
from settling 
accidents. Approving 
the additional lane 
would create less 
business for 
Cassandra’s husband, 
decreasing their 
combined income by 
a great deal. 
 
 
 
 
When Cassandra 
arrives home she 
notices that the sports 
magazine “NFL 
Monthly” is in her 
mailbox. She does not 
subscribe to this 
magazine, and has 
received magazines 
that were intended for 
a former tenant of her 
apartment since she 
moved in. 
 
Cassandra recently 
spoke to the mayor, 
who told her that the 
money for the lane 
would need to come 
from the education 
budget. By rejecting 
the repairs to the 
highway, Cassandra 
could prevent the city 
from having to lay off 
100 teachers. 
 
When Cassandra 
arrives home she 
notices that the sports 
magazine “NFL 
Monthly” is in her 
mailbox. She does not 
subscribe to this 
magazine, and has 
received magazines 
that were intended for 
a former tenant of her 
apartment since she 
moved in. 
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Scenario 17     
a) Dr. Robertson is the medical administrator at St. Luke’s hospital. The hospital has received a 
$10,000 donation and she must decide how it will be spent. 
 
b) Dr. Robertson could use the $10,000 to save the life of Caleb, an 8 year-old boy who has a rare, 
but curable, degenerative disease. Caleb’s family cannot afford the treatment on their own, and if 
it were given then Caleb would be cured immediately. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Dr. Robertson knows that many patients who 
come to St. Luke’s hospital cannot afford basic 
immunizations. Setting up a free immunization 
clinic with the $10,000 could provide an 
essential service and save hundreds of lives in 
the long term. 
 
Dr. Robertson knows that the hospital board 
has promoted past administrators who 
implemented new programs. Creating a free 
immunization clinic with the money would set 
Dr. Robertson up for promotion.  
 
d) Dr. Robertson thinks very carefully and ultimately uses the $10,000 to set up the free 
immunization clinic. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Dr. Robertson knows 
that the hospital board 
has promoted past 
administrators who 
implemented new 
programs. Creating a 
free immunization 
clinic with the money 
would set Dr. 
Robertson up for 
promotion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Robertson later 
attends a seminar on a 
database the hospital 
is implementing. The 
database will help to 
coordinate organ 
transplants with other 
area hospitals. The 
meeting runs late and 
Dr. Robertson arrives 
home after dark. 
 
Dr. Robertson knows 
that many patients 
who come to St. 
Luke’s hospital 
cannot afford basic 
immunizations. 
Setting up a free 
immunization clinic 
with the $10,000 
could provide an 
essential service and 
save hundreds of lives 
in the long term. 
 
Dr. Robertson later 
attends a seminar on a 
database the hospital 
is implementing. The 
database will help to 
coordinate organ 
transplants with other 
area hospitals. The 
meeting runs late and 
Dr. Robertson arrives 
home after dark. 
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Scenario 18     
a) Peter is a lieutenant in the United States Army during World War I, returning from a 
reconnaissance mission. He is behind enemy lines with Arthur, a private from his unit who was 
injured by a landmine. 
 
b) By taking Arthur back with him Peter would be saving his life. Due to his injury, Arthur cannot 
walk and would be killed by the Germans if Peter were to leave him. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Peter knows that a German sneak attack is 
about to launch. Unless Peter leaves Arthur 
behind he will not reach the trenches in time to 
warn and save his unit. 
 
By leaving Arthur behind, Peter will avoid 
having to pay the money he owes Arthur. The 
soldiers have been playing cards in the trenches 
and Peter owes Arthur $1,000. 
 
d) Peter thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave Arthur behind. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) By leaving Arthur 
behind, Peter will 
avoid having to pay 
the money he owes 
Arthur. The soldiers 
have been playing 
cards in the trenches 
and Peter owes Arthur 
$1,000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter comes across an 
abandoned German 
truck on his way back 
to the trenches. He 
checks if it can be 
hot-wired, but quickly 
realizes that the truck 
is inoperable. 
 
Peter knows that a 
German sneak attack 
is about to launch. 
Unless Peter leaves 
Arthur behind he will 
not reach the trenches 
in time to warn and 
save his unit. 
 
Peter comes across an 
abandoned German 
truck on his way back 
to the trenches. He 
checks if it can be 
hot-wired, but quickly 
realizes that the truck 
is inoperable. 
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Scenario 19     
a) Angelo is a treasure hunter in the Amazon, who is returning to camp with his partner Galeno after 
finding a powerful magical artifact: the mystic ankh. On the path to their camp, a trap knocks 
Galeno and the ankh into quicksand. 
 
b) Angelo could save Galeno by pulling him from the quicksand. The mystic ankh is sinking, and if 
Angelo saves Galeno it will be lost forever. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) The villagers that hired Angelo and Galeno to 
find the ankh need its magical power to grow 
their crops. Unless it is returned to them they 
will all starve. 
 
By saving the ankh and letting Galeno sink, 
Angelo could avoid having to split the pay that 
was promised by the villagers that hired them. 
 
d) Angelo thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to let Galeno sink .He pulls the mystic ankh 
from the quicksand. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) By saving the ankh 
and letting Galeno 
sink, Angelo could 
avoid having to split 
the pay that was 
promised by the 
villagers that hired 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On his way back to 
camp, Angelo sees 
movement in the 
jungle. He remains 
still in case it is a 
predator, and then 
continues to the camp. 
 
The villagers that 
hired Angelo and 
Galeno to find the 
ankh need its magical 
power to grow their 
crops. Unless it is 
returned to them they 
will all starve. 
 
On his way back to 
camp, Angelo sees 
movement in the 
jungle. He remains 
still in case it is a 
predator, and then 
continues to the camp. 
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Scenario 20     
a) Justice Adams is a judge in London, England in the year 1878. He is considering his verdict on 
the case of Vincent. Vincent is the son of a rich merchant and killed a man while he was drunk. 
 
b) Justice Adams could convict Vincent. The sentence for murder in cold blood is death. Vincent 
would be kept in a cell overnight and hanged at dawn the next morning. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Justice Adams knows that Vincent owns a 
business, employing 100 men. These men and 
their families would almost certainly starve if 
Vincent were convicted, as the business would 
need to close. 
 
A wealthy colleague of Vincent’s offered to 
pull strings to promote Justice Adams to a 
superior court. This offer is on the condition 
that Justice Adams pardons Vincent. 
 
d) Justice Adams thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to pardon Vincent.  
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) A wealthy colleague 
of Vincent’s offered 
to pull strings to 
promote Justice 
Adams to a superior 
court. This offer is on 
the condition that 
Justice Adams 
pardons Vincent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice Adams is 
scheduled to hear 
another murder trial 
after this case. The 
court cannot find the 
key witness in time, 
and the trial is 
postponed until 
tomorrow. 
 
Justice Adams knows 
that Vincent owns a 
business, employing 
100 men. These men 
and their families 
would almost 
certainly starve if 
Vincent were 
convicted, as the 
business would need 
to close. 
 
Justice Adams is 
scheduled to hear 
another murder trial 
after this case. The 
court cannot find the 
key witness in time, 
and the trial is 
postponed until 
tomorrow. 
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Scenario 21     
a) Dr. Ingris is a professor at McAdams University. Dr. Ingris employs Eric, a graduate student, and 
is part of an international project investigating the causes of cancer. A fire has broken out in her 
lab and when she arrived the lab was filled with smoke. 
 
b) Eric is lying unconscious on the floor. Dr. Ingris could drag her graduate student to safety, saving 
his life. This would leave the lab server, which stores all of the lab’s data, to be destroyed in the 
fire. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) The lab server contains five years of research 
into the causes of cancer. Losing this data 
would set back progress in treatment by several 
years and lead to hundreds of patients’ needless 
deaths. 
 
Dr. Ingris has stored her own research on the 
server, which is unrelated to the cancer work. If 
she left the lab server behind then it could take 
several more years for her to obtain tenure. 
 
d) Dr. Ingris thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to save the lab server.  
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Dr. Ingris has stored 
her own research on 
the server, which is 
unrelated to the 
cancer work. If she 
left the lab server 
behind then it could 
take several more 
years for her to obtain 
tenure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside the building, 
Dr. Ingris learns that 
the fire began in the 
lab beside hers after 
unstable chemicals 
were left too close to 
a hotplate. The fire 
had then spread 
through the walls into 
Dr. Ingris’ lab. 
 
The lab server 
contains five years of 
research into the 
causes of cancer. 
Losing this data 
would set back 
progress in treatment 
by several years and 
lead to hundreds of 
patients’ needless 
deaths. 
 
Outside the building, 
Dr. Ingris learns that 
the fire began in the 
lab beside hers after 
unstable chemicals 
were left too close to 
a hotplate. The fire 
had then spread 
through the walls into 
Dr. Ingris’ lab. 
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Scenario 22     
a) Matthew is 32 years old and lives in Argentina, next door to his brother. He is woken in the night 
by a tornado warning. There is a storm shelter in the basement of Matthew’s apartment building. 
 
b) Matthew’s brother is disabled and cannot move without help. Unless Matthew helps him, he will 
be killed when the tornados hit. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Matthew’s neighbors left their two children 
home alone for the night. If Matthew saves his 
brother he will not have time to get them to 
shelter. 
Matthew is listed as the beneficiary in his 
brother’s life insurance. If his brother dies then 
Matthew will receive a large compensation 
package. 
 
d) Matthew thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to save his brother. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Matthew is listed as 
the beneficiary in his 
brother’s life 
insurance. If his 
brother dies then 
Matthew will receive 
a large compensation 
package. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Days later, Matthew 
learns that there were 
five other tornados 
that night. He hears 
that international aid 
might help with the 
rebuilding effort. 
 
Matthew’s neighbors 
left their two children 
home alone for the 
night. If Matthew 
saves his brother he 
will not have time to 
get them to shelter. 
 
Days later, Matthew 
learns that there were 
five other tornados 
that night. He hears 
that international aid 
might help with the 
rebuilding effort. 
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Scenario 23     
a) Carver is a contractor for a private company hired by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). Carver is in charge of containing a nuclear meltdown in a major American city.  
 
b) Fixing the nuclear reactor will expose Carver’s crew to radiation. By waiting on special 
equipment for defusal, Carver could guarantee the safety of his crew when they are sent inside to 
contain the reaction. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) By sending in his crew immediately, Carver 
could be sure that the radiation is stopped 
before it could contaminate the city’s water 
supply. If the water supply is contaminated the 
city will be uninhabitable for years. 
 
Carver’s contract makes it clear that future 
work is only guaranteed if the situation can be 
resolved quickly. By sending his crew in 
immediately Carver would bring more business 
to the company and possibly be promoted. 
 
d) Carver thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to wait for special equipment, sending his 
crew in immediately. 
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) Carver’s contract 
makes it clear that 
future work is only 
guaranteed if the 
situation can be 
resolved quickly. By 
sending his crew in 
immediately Carver 
would bring more 
business to the 
company and possibly 
be promoted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carver sends a team 
to collect radiation 
readings throughout 
the city. Hundreds of 
samples must be 
collected and sent 
back to the laboratory. 
This information will 
determine how the 
clean-up proceeds 
next. 
 
By sending in his 
crew immediately, 
Carver could be sure 
that the radiation is 
stopped before it 
could contaminate the 
city’s water supply. If 
the water supply is 
contaminated the city 
will be uninhabitable 
for years. 
 
Carver sends a team 
to collect radiation 
readings throughout 
the city. Hundreds of 
samples must be 
collected and sent 
back to the laboratory. 
This information will 
determine how the 
clean-up proceeds 
next. 
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 Scenario 24     
a) Andrei is 40 years old and lives in Latvia. He is driving home from the market when he comes 
across the scene of a terrible accident and sees an injured man lying in the street. 
 
b) Andrei could drive the man to a hospital. The hospital is a 30-minute drive away. The man would 
almost certainly survive if he was able to quickly get medical attention. 
 
 Initial Tragic  Initial Taboo  
c) Andrei lives with and cares for his father, who 
suffers from Alzheimer’s. Andrei left him 
sleeping at home and unless he returns 
immediately his father may wake and wander 
into the street. 
 
The injured man is covered in blood and it will 
get on the seats if Andrei helps him. Andrei had 
planned to sell his car soon and this would 
lower the car’s value. 
 
d) Andrei thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave the injured man.  
 
 Tragic–Taboo Tragic–Control Taboo–Tragic Taboo–Control 
e) The injured man is 
covered in blood and 
it will get on the seats 
if Andrei helps him. 
Andrei had planned to 
sell his car soon and 
this would lower the 
car’s value. 
 
On the drive home 
Andrei sees that he is 
running low on gas. 
He stops at the next 
gas station to fill his 
tank, as he will not 
pass another until he 
reaches home. 
 
Andrei lives with and 
cares for his father, 
who suffers from 
Alzheimer’s. Andrei 
left him sleeping at 
home and unless he 
returns immediately 
his father may wake 
and wander into the 
street. 
 
On the drive home 
Andrei sees that he is 
running low on gas. 
He stops at the next 
gas station to fill his 
tank, as he will not 
pass another until he 
reaches home. 
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Appendix B. By-stimuli best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs). 
 
Scenari
o Description 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
DMPF
C 
VMPF
C PC RTPJ LTPJ 
Tragic-Taboo 
 1 Drug trial 0.1505 -0.4360 1.4758 -1.8834 -0.8203 0.0575 -0.0217 0.0466 -0.0246 0.1776 
 2 EPA vote 1.3138 -0.0567 -0.7408 -1.6045 0.7643 -0.0062 0.0565 0.0444 0.0259 0.2055 
 3 Expanding farm 1.1065 -0.2988 -0.0291 -0.9230 0.8282 -0.0317 0.0714 0.0431 0.0477 0.0828 
 4 Tiger 
preservation 
1.2608 1.3875 -0.2842 -0.3801 0.8234 -0.0402 0.1437 0.0346 -0.0666 -0.0893 
 5 Education 
budget 
0.4736 -0.0083 -0.5134 1.4894 2.0359 -0.0041 0.0125 0.0448 -0.0377 0.0354 
 6 Paid adoption 0.7384 0.8854 0.2269 -1.4888 0.8453 -0.0326 -0.0126 0.1009 0.0404 0.0133 
 7 Euthanize 
mother 
1.2122 1.0979 0.0683 0.0678 0.6727 -0.0267 0.1570 0.0825 0.0563 -0.0064 
 8 Pregnant 
medical 
condition 
0.4783 -0.4699 0.7120 -0.3247 -2.2520 -0.0386 0.0494 0.0023 -0.0088 0.0683 
 9 Car recall -0.6043 1.6330 0.7173 -0.5896 2.9266 0.0035 0.0991 0.0698 0.0185 0.0473 
 10 Military draft 1.8932 -0.1472 -1.0550 1.1406 -0.9889 -0.0418 0.1422 0.1668 0.0382 0.0114 
 11 Animal shelter 0.4669 0.5320 0.1705 -0.1119 1.4362 -0.0314 -0.0314 -
0.0159 
-0.0539 0.0225 
 12 Surrogate 
mother 
-0.4396 -2.2091 0.4868 1.4532 1.3789 -0.0408 0.0711 0.0659 -0.0075 0.0157 
 13 Fishing captain 0.8879 1.0157 -0.5004 0.6157 1.2384 0.0143 0.0767 0.0465 0.0347 -0.0405 
 14 Banning death 
penalty 
0.5447 0.7758 0.1707 -0.8851 0.2467 -0.0196 0.0645 0.0807 0.0126 0.0245 
 15 Humiliating 
game show 
0.8010 -0.0688 0.2105 -0.4218 -1.1703 -0.0090 -0.0077 -
0.0001 
-0.0526 -0.0576 
 16 Highway lane 1.6641 1.0280 -0.4369 -0.2916 -1.2172 0.0042 0.1303 0.0787 0.0139 0.0970 
 17 Hospital 
donation 
0.6934 -0.4719 0.4098 -0.6476 1.1408 -0.0431 0.0813 -
0.0372 
-0.0026 -0.0339 
 18 WWI soldier 1.9435 0.8957 -0.9612 1.6938 -1.4412 0.0131 0.1075 -
0.0074 
-0.0303 0.0278 
 19 Magic Ankh 0.5815 1.3557 -0.3110 -0.0032 0.9704 -0.0297 0.1482 0.0647 0.0037 0.1213 
 20 London judge 1.2172 1.3089 0.5656 0.6588 -1.2748 -0.0410 0.1452 0.0970 0.0782 0.0193 
 21 Lab fire -0.0811 0.5218 0.6902 1.1457 2.4347 -0.0425 0.0445 -
0.0026 
-0.0622 0.1697 
 22 Tornado shelter 1.0566 1.2399 0.7360 0.8376 -0.4485 -0.0181 0.0916 -
0.0100 
-0.0422 0.0631 
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 23 Nuclear 
meltdown 
1.1939 0.2574 0.0427 0.0683 -0.0597 -0.0255 0.0370 0.0172 -0.0810 -0.0268 
 24 Road accident 1.0657 1.3433 0.4913 -0.4635 -1.7822 -0.0084 0.0850 -
0.0080 
-0.0171 -0.0186 
Taboo-Tragic 
1  Drug trial -0.0631 -1.2230 1.8706 -1.1677 1.0138 -0.1139 -0.1071 -
0.1761 
-0.0552 -0.1405 
 2 EPA vote 1.1647 -1.2069 0.3010 -0.5339 1.5040 -0.0791 -0.0142 -
0.0137 
-0.0484 -0.0994 
 3 Expanding farm 1.4583 -0.9820 -0.0448 0.5873 -0.8396 -0.1300 0.0229 -
0.1272 
-0.0905 -0.0408 
 4 Tiger 
preservation 
0.8268 0.5238 0.7415 -0.5780 -0.5949 0.1202 0.1894 0.1525 0.0324 0.0523 
 5 Education 
budget 
0.1923 -1.0728 0.6032 0.8111 1.6277 -0.0592 -0.0619 -
0.1597 
-0.0574 -0.0515 
 6 Paid adoption 0.2809 0.1996 0.7858 -1.3206 0.1995 -0.1249 -0.0569 0.1138 0.0712 -0.0095 
 7 Euthanize 
mother 
1.7293 0.3770 0.6874 -0.9022 -0.7487 -0.0839 0.1832 0.2050 0.0158 0.0265 
 8 Pregnant 
medical 
condition 
0.5893 -1.3522 0.8952 -0.6139 0.4928 0.0047 0.0223 -
0.1013 
-0.0209 -0.0648 
 9 Car recall -0.0193 0.7778 1.1429 -0.3560 0.7429 -0.0372 0.1113 0.1423 0.0340 0.0282 
 10 Military draft 1.7214 -1.4300 -0.9208 0.4151 0.6987 -0.0251 0.1559 0.1202 0.0197 -0.0029 
 11 Animal shelter 1.0544 -0.2153 0.5983 -0.6826 -0.6921 -0.1143 -0.0981 -
0.0894 
-0.0431 -0.1231 
 12 Surrogate 
mother 
-0.4022 -2.4092 2.0058 0.1392 0.5257 -0.0701 0.0710 0.1141 0.0019 -0.0247 
 13 Fishing captain 1.0864 0.3505 -0.1250 -0.9104 0.0671 0.0850 0.0915 0.1158 0.0377 0.0452 
 14 Banning death 
penalty 
0.9169 0.0660 0.1776 0.0521 -0.3610 -0.0192 0.0608 0.0781 -0.0180 0.0048 
 15 Humiliating 
game show 
1.3239 -1.2947 1.2102 0.2900 -0.4405 -0.0524 -0.0286 0.1909 -0.0094 -0.0123 
 16 Highway lane 1.5365 -0.4764 -0.8424 -0.6419 0.8150 -0.0514 0.1177 0.0813 0.0812 0.0118 
 17 Hospital 
donation 
0.4696 -1.3582 0.9436 -0.6026 1.0051 0.0242 0.1139 0.0956 0.1088 -0.0075 
 18 WWI soldier 1.7786 -0.5818 -0.2867 0.9575 0.6662 -0.0987 0.1276 0.1393 0.1290 -0.0439 
 19 Magic Ankh 1.4679 0.1012 -0.4153 1.2791 -1.5258 0.0180 0.1823 0.2813 0.1465 -0.0426 
 20 London judge 1.0933 0.0594 0.3537 0.3139 -0.6779 -0.0409 0.1750 0.2572 0.0573 0.0773 
 21 Lab fire 0.4096 -0.3649 0.9469 1.4535 0.6915 -0.1014 -0.0093 0.1271 -0.0664 -0.0934 
 22 Tornado shelter 1.4710 -0.2312 0.2910 1.1000 0.0186 -0.1620 0.1043 0.1253 0.0322 0.0108 
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 23 Nuclear 
meltdown 
1.3189 -1.0155 0.2529 1.1491 0.3950 -0.0323 -0.0088 -
0.0032 
-0.0320 -0.0403 
 24 Road accident 1.0253 0.4156 0.3088 -0.7112 0.4637 0.0037 0.0895 0.1921 0.0816 0.0576 
Tragic-Control 
1  Drug trial -0.6985 -0.9015 -0.0926 -1.5469 -1.4533 -0.0536 0.0203 -
0.0070 
-0.0129 0.1015 
 2 EPA vote -0.7260 -1.1220 -1.6364 -0.7380 0.7167 -0.106 0.0195 -
0.0097 
-0.0174 -0.0857 
 3 Expanding farm -0.7939 -0.9507 -0.2856 0.5583 -0.5454 -0.1403 0.0091 0.0018 0.0891 -0.0960 
 4 Tiger 
preservation 
-0.6249 0.0972 -1.3332 -0.5912 -0.0064 -0.0971 -0.0362 -
0.0250 
-0.0152 -0.0199 
 5 Education 
budget 
-0.6605 -1.5528 -2.6268 1.0609 1.0821 -0.1000 0.0169 -
0.0034 
-0.0047 -0.0251 
 6 Paid adoption -0.8336 0.1490 0.1414 -1.5735 -0.5885 -0.1400 0.0036 -
0.0893 
-0.0590 -0.0635 
 7 Euthanize 
mother 
-0.6596 0.3054 -1.2926 -1.0193 0.0268 -0.1261 -0.0184 -
0.0755 
0.0132 -0.1051 
 8 Pregnant 
medical 
condition 
-0.4861 -1.1289 -0.6679 -0.7612 -2.4576 -0.1191 -0.0033 0.0353 0.0455 0.0097 
 9 Car recall -0.6992 1.2571 -1.3774 -0.2444 0.4159 -0.0884 -0.0170 -
0.0597 
-0.0160 -0.1420 
 10 Military draft -0.7533 -1.7831 -1.2257 0.4896 -0.4508 -0.1283 -0.0178 -
0.1650 
-0.0573 -0.0875 
 11 Animal shelter -0.6952 -0.0320 -1.1454 -0.8914 -0.0772 -0.1368 0.0084 0.0422 0.0560 0.142 
 12 Surrogate 
mother 
-0.6942 -2.4295 -0.6822 -0.2672 -0.6096 -0.1366 -0.0134 -
0.0515 
0.0150 0.0762 
 13 Fishing captain -0.6756 0.2381 -1.5725 -0.8937 0.1691 -0.0534 -0.0248 -
0.0302 
-0.0095 0.0203 
 14 Banning death 
penalty 
-0.5001 -0.0726 -1.6578 0.1097 -0.8410 -0.1063 -0.0135 -
0.0660 
-0.0153 -0.0801 
 15 Humiliating 
game show 
-0.4024 -0.9692 -2.5167 0.2576 -1.1810 -0.1032 -0.0072 -
0.0062 
0.0145 -0.0126 
 16 Highway lane -0.6596 -0.7933 -1.1230 -0.8074 -0.9267 -0.0907 0.0002 -
0.0586 
0.0144 -0.1450 
 17 Hospital 
donation 
-1.0643 -1.7030 0.3133 -0.7277 0.3924 -0.1194 -0.0268 0.0535 0.0408 0.0840 
 18 WWI soldier -0.6799 -0.8698 -0.7763 1.3878 -0.7784 -0.0920 -0.0167 0.0133 -0.0059 0.0132 
 19 Magic Ankh -0.8677 0.3772 0.0694 1.7133 -1.1921 -0.1082 -0.0171 -
0.0676 
-0.0834 -0.1679 
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 20 London judge -0.7670 -0.1495 0.1196 0.3012 -1.8022 -0.1307 -0.0244 -
0.0956 
0.0165 -0.1808 
 21 Lab fire -1.2216 0.0228 1.0551 1.8310 0.6076 -0.1445 0.0082 0.0159 0.0334 -0.0935 
 22 Tornado shelter -1.0541 -0.4750 1.3668 1.4458 -1.0586 -0.1341 -0.0142 0.0264 0.0067 -0.1542 
 23 Nuclear 
meltdown 
-1.1247 -1.0083 2.1975 1.2473 -0.9295 -0.1145 0.0028 0.0019 0.0237 -0.0117 
 24 Road accident -0.7794 0.9166 0.9790 -0.6107 -1.9420 -0.0912 -0.0113 0.0125 0.0398 -0.1776 
Taboo-Control 
1  Drug trial -1.3640 -0.3846 1.7239 -2.0113 -0.2000 0.1299 0.0941 -
0.0123 
-0.0018 -0.0082 
 2 EPA vote -0.8701 0.5313 -0.9949 -1.2952 1.0218 -0.0210 0.0279 -
0.0473 
-0.0117 -0.0424 
 3 Expanding farm -0.8441 -0.1110 -0.0577 0.1815 -0.0830 -0.0299 -0.0193 -
0.0370 
-0.0282 -0.0520 
 4 Tiger 
preservation 
-0.9362 0.9683 -0.2946 -0.4567 0.2942 -0.2453 -0.2571 -
0.0459 
0.0390 -0.0462 
 5 Education 
budget 
-0.8883 0.2145 -1.7888 1.4702 1.1502 -0.0328 0.0446 -
0.0209 
0.0009 -0.0421 
 6 Paid adoption -1.0814 0.6554 0.2642 -1.7908 0.2729 -0.0356 0.1103 -
0.0201 
0.0255 -0.0496 
 7 Euthanize 
mother 
-1.0723 0.7580 0.4278 -0.4723 0.3255 -0.0568 -0.1012 -
0.0410 
0.0046 -0.0580 
 8 Pregnant 
medical 
condition 
-0.8937 -0.4822 -0.0291 -0.7022 -0.8119 -0.1503 -0.0232 -
0.0414 
0.0084 -0.0327 
 9 Car recall -1.1016 1.7166 -0.0322 -0.0234 0.7282 -0.0357 -0.0622 -
0.0337 
0.0191 -0.0609 
 10 Military draft -0.6603 -0.0245 -1.8691 0.7256 0.3427 -0.1329 -0.1703 0.0168 0.0080 -0.0544 
 11 Animal shelter -0.9864 0.8816 -0.1790 -0.6675 0.1199 -0.0418 0.0444 -
0.0278 
0.0118 -0.0125 
 12 Surrogate 
mother 
-1.2639 -2.1233 0.3500 0.3827 0.4387 -0.0952 -0.0345 -
0.0358 
0.0151 -0.0213 
 13 Fishing captain -0.9061 0.9887 -1.2438 -0.3465 0.6290 -0.1120 -0.1462 -
0.0456 
0.0168 -0.0339 
 14 Banning death 
penalty 
-0.7499 0.6222 -0.9922 -0.1421 -0.0542 -0.0946 -0.0543 -
0.0222 
0.0023 -0.0513 
 15 Humiliating 
game show 
-0.8462 -0.1156 -0.5139 -0.0687 -0.4605 -0.0477 0.0891 -
0.0351 
0.0220 -0.0454 
 16 Highway lane -0.6727 1.4279 -1.0795 -0.9316 -0.1423 -0.0229 -0.0093 -
0.0344 
0.0379 -0.0580 
  
75 
75 
 17 Hospital 
donation 
-1.2777 -0.0518 0.9815 -0.9935 0.5974 -0.1746 -0.0323 -
0.0643 
0.0524 -0.0231 
 18 WWI soldier -0.7531 1.5042 -0.8756 1.8387 -0.1537 0.0319 -0.0021 -
0.0470 
0.0646 -0.0343 
 19 Magic Ankh -0.8792 1.4683 -0.6540 1.6701 -0.5686 -0.1437 0.0231 -
0.0475 
0.0600 -0.0637 
 20 London judge -1.0591 0.7814 0.7341 0.6548 -0.7202 -0.1188 -0.1637 -
0.0399 
0.0141 -0.0687 
 21 Lab fire -1.4976 0.8465 1.6413 2.3171 0.7233 -0.0734 -0.0204 -
0.0570 
0.0049 -0.0468 
 22 Tornado shelter -1.2156 1.6833 1.9677 1.7229 -0.5693 0.0218 0.0191 -
0.0647 
0.0338 -0.0630 
 23 Nuclear 
meltdown 
-1.0596 0.6280 1.5080 1.0941 -0.1835 -0.0956 -0.0407 -
0.0273 
0.0211 -0.0441 
 24 Road accident -1.0491 1.4266 0.9526 -0.5648 -0.6008 -0.0912 0.0189 -
0.0590 
0.0463 -0.0724 
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Figure S1. Additional ToMN behavioral component scores relationships. Main effects of 
ToMN activity (left) and their breakdown by ROI (right). Interactions with ROI were not 
significant, but are presented for ease of interpretation. Neither mental imagery (a) nor 
arousal (b) was related to ToMN activity in either reframed (i.e. tragic–taboo/taboo–
tragic), or control (i.e. tragic–control/taboo–control) scenarios. Component scores were 
varimax rotated. Relationships for person-based prediction error, moral/normative 
prediction error, and descriptive prediction err are reported in the main paper (Figure 3).
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Table S1. All Study 1 Principal Components Analyses. 
2-Factor PCA 
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2     Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.71      0.5 
Mental State Inference 0.94      0.89 
Valence   0.89     0.79 
Arousal  0.71 -0.40     0.66 
Descriptive Frequency  0.47     0.23 
Prescriptive Norm 
Violation 
 -0.94     0.89 
Belief Violation 0.96      0.93 
Desire Violation 0.93      0.86 
Impression Violation 0.95      0.91 
Moral Judgment  0.94     0.89 
Component loading 4.61 2.94      
Proportional variance 0.46 0.29      
Cumulative variance  0.46 0.76      
3-Factor PCA 
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3    Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.71      0.51 
Mental State Inference 0.94      0.89 
Valence   0.93     0.87 
Arousal  0.72 -0.39     0.67 
Descriptive Frequency  0.20 0.97    0.98 
Prescriptive Norm 
Violation 
 -0.88 -0.33    0.89 
Belief Violation 0.96      0.93 
Desire Violation 0.92      0.86 
Impression Violation 0.95      0.91 
Moral Judgment  0.96     0.93 
Component loading 4.61 2.77 1.07     
Proportional variance 0.46 0.28 0.11     
Cumulative variance  0.46 0.74 0.85     
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4-Factor PCA 
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4   Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.42  0.89    0.97 
Mental State Inference 0.84  0.44    0.91 
Valence   0.93     0.87 
Arousal  0.65 -0.39 0.31    0.68 
Descriptive Frequency  0.20  0.97   0.99 
Prescriptive Norm 
Violation 
 -0.88  -0.33   0.89 
Belief Violation 0.96      0.96 
Desire Violation 0.97      0.94 
Impression Violation 0.96      0.95 
Moral Judgment  0.96     0.93 
Component loading 4.12 2.76 1.14 1.07    
Proportional variance 0.41 0.28 0.11 0.11    
Cumulative variance  0.41 0.69 0.80 0.91    
5-Factor PCA  
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5  Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.41  0.90    0.99 
Mental State Inference 0.82  0.44  0.21  0.91 
Valence   0.94     0.89 
Arousal  0.50 -0.27   0.80  1.00 
Descriptive Frequency    0.97   0.99 
Prescriptive Norm 
Violation 
 -0.87  -0.34   0.89 
Belief Violation 0.95      0.97 
Desire Violation 0.97      0.96 
Impression Violation 0.96      0.96 
Moral Judgment  0.96     0.94 
Component loading 2.85 2.68 1.11 1.08 0.78   
Proportional variance 0.38 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.08   
Cumulative variance  0.38 0.65 0.76 0.87 0.95   
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6-Factor PCA 
Measure Fact
or 1 
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Communality 
Mental Imagery  0.40  0.90    0.99 
Mental State Inference 0.81  0.44  0.22  0.92 
Valence   0.92    0.36 0.99 
Arousal  0.49 -0.27   0.80  1.00 
Descriptive Frequency  0.20  0.98   1.00 
Prescriptive Norm 
Violation 
 -0.88  -0.30  0.26 0.96 
Belief Violation 0.95      0.97 
Desire Violation 0.96      0.96 
Impression Violation 0.96      0.96 
Moral Judgment  0.96     0.95 
Component loading 3.84 2.68 1.11 1.06 0.79 0.22  
Proportional variance 0.38 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.02  
Cumulative variance  0.38 0.65 0.76 0.87 0.95 0.97  
PCA was performed on by-stimuli BLUPs, extracted from Study 1 models for each measure. Factor loadings with an absolute value < .2 are omitted from tables for ease of 
interpretation. Principal components were varimax rotated. 
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Table S2. ToMN ROI peak coordinates. 
Region Subjects x y z k 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
     DMPFC 17/20 1.5 (4.1) 56.0 (4.6) 25.9 (7.6) 123 (78.4) 
     VMPFC 16/20 1.4 (3.6) 55.2 (4.8) -8.1 (6.3) 133.8 (74.1) 
     PC 19/20 0.9 (4.3) -56.0 (5.2) 36.4 (5.2) 247.3 (80.8) 
     RTPJ  20/20 50.8 (6.1) -53.4 (4.5) 25.4 (5.3) 263.4 (83.7) 
     LTPJ 19/20 49.7 (6.8) 57.1 (5.3) 26.9 (4.8) 220.2 (83.5) 
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Table S3. ToMN ROI models. 
DMPFC 
Model:  
PSC ~ InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 
+ (1+  InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch +  InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Subject) 
+ (0 +                        Epoch +                                   ReframeCond*Epoch +  InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Scenario) 
REML criterion at convergence: 156.7 
Epoch: Dummy coded (first pass = 0; second pass = 1) 
InitialCond: Contrast coded (initial tragic = -0.5; initial taboo = +0.5) 
ReframeCond: Contrast coded (reframed = -0.5; control = +0.5) 
Random effects structure (by-subject) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations 
Intercept 0.009 0.097 -      
InitialCond 0.001 0.031 -0.35 -     
Epoch 0.010 0.101 -0.64 0.65 -    
InitialCond*Epoch 0.004 0.064 -0.69 0.82 0.51 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.009 0.097 0.57 -0.42 -0.35 -0.71 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.016 0.128 0.12 -0.31 0.21 -0.39 -0.26 - 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations 
Epoch 0.002 0.042 -      
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.007 0.085 -0.16 -     
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.043 0.208 -0.09 1.00 -    
Residual         
 Variance St.Dev       
 0.062 0.248       
Fixed effects B (SE) t(df) p  
Intercept 0.10 (0.03) t(16.3) = 3.59 .002 ** 
InitialCond -0.02 (0.03) t(74.5) = -0.61 .546 
Epoch -0.16 (0.03) t(18.0) = -5.00 < .001 *** 
InitialCond*Epoch 0.02 (0.04) t(42.4) = 0.56 .575 
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.06 (0.04) t(18.8) = 1.48 .156 
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch -0.07 (0.07) t(19.4) = -0.97 .345 
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VMPFC 
Model:  
PSC ~ InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 
+ (1 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Subject) 
+ (0 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Scenario) 
REML criterion at convergence: 503.1 
Epoch: Dummy coded (first pass = 0; second pass = 1) 
InitialCond: Contrast coded (initial tragic = -0.5; initial taboo = +0.5) 
ReframeCond: Contrast coded (reframed = -0.5; control = +0.5) 
Random effects structure (by-subject) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations     
Intercept 0.018 0.134 -      
InitialCond 0.010 0.099 0.87 -     
Epoch 0.035 0.187 -0.89 -0.89 -    
InitialCond*Epoch 0.009 0.093 -0.49 -0.70 0.83 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.003 0.051 0.19 -0.23 -0.22 -0.06 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.011 0.103 -0.81 -0.91 0.66 0.35 0.42 - 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations     
InitialCond 0.015 0.122 -      
Epoch 0.001 0.036 0.64 -     
InitialCond*Epoch 0.045 0.212 -0.93 -0.67 -    
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.012 0.110 -0.91 -0.36 0.72 -   
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.046 0.215 0.23 0.03 0.13 -0.53 -  
Residual Variance St.Dev       
 0.102 0.320       
Fixed effects B (SE) t(df) p  
Intercept 0.09 (0.04) t(15.0) = 2.34 0.034 *  
InitialCond -0.03 (0.05) t(23.6) = -0.54 0.594  
Epoch -0.11 (0.05) t(15.6) = -2.01 0.063 †  
InitialCond*Epoch -0.0006 (0.07) t(23.2) = -0.01 0.993  
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.06 (0.04) t(23.9) = 1.33 0.195  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch -0.06 (0.08) t(24.8) = -0.75 0.461 
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PC 
Model:  
PSC ~ InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 
+ (1 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Subject) 
+ (1 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Scenario) 
REML criterion at convergence: 8 
Epoch: Dummy coded (first pass = 0; second pass = 1) 
InitialCond: Contrast coded (initial tragic = -0.5; initial taboo = +0.5) 
ReframeCond: Contrast coded (reframed = -0.5; control = +0.5) 
Random effects structure (by-subject)      
 Variance St.Dev Correlations     
Intercept 0.002 0.043 -      
InitialCond 0.005 0.068 -0.15 -     
Epoch 0.014 0.117 -0.42 -0.81 -    
InitialCond*Epoch 0.004 0.062 -0.09 -0.74 0.60 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.003 0.053 0.57 -0.79 0.31 0.76 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.015 0.122 0.06 -0.98 0.88 0.65 0.67 - 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli)    
 Variance St.Dev Correlations   
Intercept 0.002 0.042 -      
InitialCond 0.024 0.155 0.04 -     
Epoch 0.001 0.028 -0.65 -0.70 -    
InitialCond*Epoch 0.045 0.212 0.27 -0.95 0.50 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.013 0.112 0.81 -0.25 -0.17 0.51 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.030 0.175 -0.14 -0.98 0.81 0.91 0.26 - 
Residual Variance St.Dev       
 0.05 0.22       
Fixed effects B (SE) t(df) p  
Intercept 0.12 (0.02) t(21.4) = 7.22 <.001 
InitialCond -0.01 (0.04) t(26.2) = -0.28 0.785 
Epoch -0.11 (0.03) t(18.5) = -3.46 0.003 ** 
InitialCond*Epoch 0.02 (0.05) t(23.2) = 0.43 0.674 
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.09 (0.03) t(22.3) = 2.69 0.013 * 
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.05 (0.06) t(25.2) = 0.76 0.456 
RTPJ 
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Model:  
PSC ~ InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 
+ (1 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Subject) 
+ (0 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Scenario) 
REML criterion at convergence: -262.8 
Epoch: Dummy coded (first pass = 0; second pass = 1) 
InitialCond: Contrast coded (initial tragic = -0.5; initial taboo = +0.5) 
ReframeCond: Contrast coded (reframed = -0.5; control = +0.5) 
Random effects structure (by-subject) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations    
Intercept 0.005 0.072 -      
InitialCond <0.001 0.022 -0.22 -     
Epoch 0.012 0.108 -0.77 -0.42 -    
InitialCond*Epoch <0.001 0.019 -0.80 -0.41 0.99 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.004 0.067 0.30 0.82 -0.74 -0.76 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.003 0.055 0.44 -0.96 0.17 0.16 -0.72 - 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations   
InitialCond 0.006 0.080 -      
Epoch 0.001 0.033 -0.59 -     
InitialCond*Epoch 0.021 0.145 -0.93 0.43 -    
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.005 0.070 -0.09 0.56 0.25 -   
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.006 0.078 -0.78 0.31 0.56 -0.50 -  
Residual Variance St.Dev       
 0.038 0.195       
Fixed effects B (SE) t(df) p  
Intercept 0.06 (0.02) t(18.9) = 2.96 0.008 **  
InitialCond 0.01 (0.02) t(25.8) = 0.45 0.655  
Epoch -0.05 (0.03) t(20.8) = -1.63 0.118  
InitialCond*Epoch 0.01 (0.04) t(22.8) = 0.18 0.860  
ReframeCond*Epoch -0.01 (0.03) t(21.5) = -0.22 0.831  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.01 (0.04) t(36.1) = 0.17 0.867 
 
 
 
LTPJ 
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Model:  
PSC ~ InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 
+ (1 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Subject) 
+ (0 + InitialCond + Epoch + InitialCond*Epoch + ReframeCond*Epoch + InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch | Scenario) 
REML criterion at convergence: -40.2 
Epoch: Dummy coded (first pass = 0; second pass = 1) 
InitialCond: Contrast coded (initial tragic = -0.5; initial taboo = +0.5) 
ReframeCond: Contrast coded (reframed = -0.5; control = +0.5) 
Random effects structure (by-subject)     
 Variance St.Dev Correlations     
Intercept 0.008 0.089 -      
InitialCond 0.003 0.05 -0.29 -     
Epoch 0.008 0.092 -0.44 -0.56 -    
InitialCond*Epoch 0.003 0.051 -0.07 -0.89 0.56 -   
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.007 0.082 0.81 -0.33 0.03 -0.13 -  
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.016 0.128 0.07 -0.09 0.56 -0.22 0.64 - 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli)    
 Variance St.Dev Correlations     
InitialCond 0.010 0.102 -      
Epoch 0.001 0.037 -0.39 -     
InitialCond*Epoch 0.021 0.144 -0.99 0.40 -    
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.020 0.140 0.10 0.41 -0.19 -   
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.017 0.131 0.27 0.01 -0.38 0.91 -  
Residual Variance St.Dev       
 0.047 0.217       
Fixed effects B (SE) t(df) p  
Intercept 0.14 (0.02) t(18.1) = 6.20 <.001 *** 
InitialCond 0.003 (0.03) t(23.3) = 0.08 0.934 
Epoch -0.12 (0.03) t(19.7) = -4.38 <.001 *** 
InitialCond*Epoch -0.02 (0.04) t(23.2) = -0.45 0.66 
ReframeCond*Epoch 0.08 (0.04) t(26.3) = 2.08 0.048 * 
InitialCond*ReframeCond*Epoch 0.01 (0.06) t(20.7) = 0.13 0.896 
St.Dev = standard deviation. p values for fixed effects were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation of degrees of freedom, 
implemented in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2015). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
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Table S4. Study 2 omnibus tests for theory of mind network activity–behavioral component score analysis 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
  Person-based 
prediction error 
Moral/normative 
prediction error 
Descriptive 
prediction error 
Mental 
imagery 
Arousal 
 df F p F p F p F p F p 
InitialCond F(1, 456) 2.18 0.140 0.63 0.429 31.27 < .001 *** 0.26 0.614 11.65 0.001** 
ReframeCond F(1, 456) 1721.97 < .001 *** 0.44 0.506 45.75 < .001 *** 0.36 0.551 29.35 < .001 *** 
PSC F(1, 456) 4.69 0.031 * 5.28 0.022 * 1.24 0.266 1.03 0.311 1.60 0.207 
InitialCond* 
ReframeCond 
F(1, 456) 19.06 < .001 *** 178.3
1 
< .001 *** 1.38 0.240 0.15 0.699 16.60 < .001 *** 
PSC* 
ReframeCond 
F(1, 456) 4.45 0.036 * 9.94 0.002 ** 2.64 0.105 1.25 0.264 1.85 0.174 
PSC* InitialCond F(1, 456) 0.08 0.774 2.21 0.138 0.03 0.852 0.16 0.688 0.98 0.323 
PSC*ROI F(4, 456) 0.70 0.590 0.50 0.733 0.06 0.994 0.52 0.719 0.18 0.950 
PSC* InitialCond* 
ReframeCond 
F(1, 456) 1.25 0.264 0.01 0.914 1.18 0.278 0.12 0.733 0.20 0.657 
PSC* 
ReframeCond*ROI 
F(4, 456) 1.35 0.250 0.53 0.710 0.80 0.525 0.59 0.668 0.15 0.963 
PSC* 
InitialCond*ROI 
F(4, 456) 0.20 0.939 0.68 0.609 0.09 0.985 0.28 0.892 0.12 0.975 
PSC* InitialCond* 
ReframeCond*ROI 
F(4, 456) 0.44 0.782 1.14 0.336 0.65 0.629 0.24 0.916 0.21 0.931 
p values were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation of degrees of freedom, implemented in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2015). 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Abstract 
Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral 
claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas 
moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. 
Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist 
view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have 
disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work 
addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral 
and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can a) 
generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and b) test whether particular item features are 
associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were 
perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences 
elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within dorsal-
medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common 
DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, 
and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the Theory of Mind 
network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. 
Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and 
preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental 
states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work 
has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has 
argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships.  
Keywords: metaethics, morality, social cognition, fMRI, theory of mind
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Introduction 
Moral claims (e.g. “eating meat is wrong”) can be evaluated on multiple levels. 
One may agree or disagree with a given claim (a first-order judgment); however, 
independent of this, one may make a second-order (i.e. metaethical) judgment—
regardless of whether you agree or disagree, what information does the claim express? 
Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are either true or false, and that this 
truthfulness is independent of anyone’s personal beliefs (i.e. moral claims are akin to 
facts). By contrast, moral subjectivists believe that personal beliefs govern whether moral 
claims are true—or that moral claims cannot be true or false at all (i.e. moral claims are 
akin to preferences; Sayre-McCord, 1986; for review, see Goodwin & Darley, 2010). 
Metaethical questions are the subject of intense philosophical debate, yet they are highly 
relevant to cognitive, social, and moral psychology. Metaethical questions ask how moral 
information is represented. It is possible that morals are represented as distinct from other 
sorts of social and non-social information, such as facts and preferences; however, 
morals, facts, and preferences may also draw on common cognitive processes. Moral 
objectivists might predict that this common processing should occur between morals and 
facts, whereas moral subjectivists might predict the same for morals and preferences. In 
the present work, we address this question of cognitive representation, using a 
combination of behavioral and neural methods to determine whether morals are 
represented as more similar to facts or to preferences. 
Metaethics and mental state representations 
Subjective claims are mind-dependent—their truth depends on the speaker’s 
mental states (e.g., “chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla” is true for the speaker if 
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they believe this). By contrast, objective claims are mind-independent (e.g. “2 + 2 = 4” is 
true, regardless of what anyone believes; Goodwin & Darley, 2010; Sayre-McCord, 
1986). It follows that subjective claims should evoke mental state representations, 
because mental state representations are necessary to evaluate the claim1. By contrast, 
objective claims should not necessarily evoke mental state representations, since in this 
case the mental states are not a precursor for evaluation.  
What this all means for moral claims, is that if morals are represented as 
subjective, then they should elicit greater activity in brain regions responsible for mental 
state representation. This hypothesis is made testable by recent work in social 
neuroscience: a set of brain regions—the Theory of Mind (ToM) network—has been 
consistently implicated in mental state representation (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Decety & 
Cacioppo, 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, 
& Saxe, 2010; Young & Saxe, 2009; for reviews see Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 
2009). Within this network, some regions of interest (ROIs) are more active during tasks 
that involve general forms of social cognition, such as trait inference, or assessing the 
similarity of others to the self (dorsal/ventral-medial prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, VMPFC; 
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; 
Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010; Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2012; 
Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005; Schurz et al., 2014; Van 
Overwalle, 2009; Young & Saxe, 2009). Other ROIs are more active during tasks where 
                                                
1 In the present study, “evaluate” refers to participants rating their agreement with a given 
claim. Agreement ratings have an advantage over true/false categorization in that they are 
easy to understand, and critically, they translate well across examples of facts, morals, 
and preferences. To agree with subjective claims, it is assumed that participants must 
hold on to some mental state representation (either their own or others’, see Saxe, 2009).  
 91 
participants represent mental states, such as beliefs or intentions (precuneus, and right/left 
temporoparietal junction; PC, RTPJ, LTPJ; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Dodell-Feder, 
Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini, 
Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Ruby & Decety, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher 
2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001; Young et al., 2010; Young, Cushman, 
Hauser, & Saxe, 2007; Young, Scholz & Saxe, 2011; Young & Saxe, 2008; 2009). Some 
ToM ROIs, such as RTPJ, have been shown to play a critical role in moral judgment 
(Young et al., 2010; Young & Saxe, 2009); however, researchers have hypothesized that 
these regions are critical to processes underlying moral judgment (e.g. representing 
intention), rather than being intrinsically “moral areas” (Young & Dungan, 2012), and 
prior neuroimaging work has generally compared subtypes of moral dilemmas (e.g. 
intentional vs. accidental violations), as opposed to contrasting moral and non-moral 
claims. To our knowledge, no prior work has examined neural activity in response to 
simple moral claims, presented outside of the context of any moral dilemma or judgment. 
Given that the ToM network is involved in representing subjective mental states 
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), we expected that ROIs within this network would be more 
active as participants read and evaluated preferences and less active for facts. If moral 
claims require processing subjective mental states (i.e. if morals are represented as 
subjective), then they too should elicit neural activity in the ToM network, and the extent 
that these regions overlap with those activated by preferences can act as one metric of 
their shared cognitive processes (likewise with common activity between morals and 
facts throughout the brain). Analyses of item features in these regions (described in detail 
below) can fine-tune inferences about common representations even further.  
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Metaethics and moral psychology 
 It is important to situate the present work within the large body of prior research 
in moral psychology. A great deal of this research might be roughly split into two 
categories: a) the study of moral judgment and behavior—e.g. moral judgment in 
response to dilemmas, (e.g. Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Patil, Melsbach, Henning-Fast, & Silani, 2016); the 
development of moral-based social preferences (e.g. Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007); 
cooperation and behavioral economics (e.g. Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012)—and b) the 
moralization of distinct behaviors (e.g. Schein & Gray, 2015; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, 
Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, 
& Haidt, 2012). For instance, within this latter category, Moral Foundations theorists 
have proposed that moral violations can be classified into five domains, of which political 
liberals are primarily concerned with harm and fairness and political conservatives are 
additionally concerned with loyalty, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2011). By 
contrast, other theories have proposed that all of these domains are reducible to harm 
(Schein & Gray, 2015), or a dyad involving an intentional agent and a suffering victim 
(Gray et al., 2012). The present work does not fit neatly into either category. We do not 
ask for moral judgments, and we are not concerned with what makes a claim moral or 
not. Instead, we simply validated that claims were perceived as moral, then observed 
what behavioral and neural overlap with facts and preferences this entailed. That said, 
between the two dominant approaches our method and our findings may be more relevant 
to the latter—we expand on this in the general discussion. 
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 Our central question concerns how people represent moral information (regardless 
of what makes it moral), and the work that bears the most direct relevance may lead one 
to predict that people represent morals as objective (i.e. fact-like). The distinction 
between morals as either fact-like or preference-like has a parallel in developmental 
psychology, where research has demonstrated that children and adults draw a distinction 
between moral and conventional violations (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Smetana, 
1981; Tisak & Turiel 1988; Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004). In this case, moral 
violations refer to actions that are universally wrong (e.g. hitting another child is wrong, 
not just here, but everywhere). Conventional violations refer to actions that are only 
locally disallowed (e.g. you may not wear pajamas to class, but there may be other 
schools where you may). Thus, under this paradigm, morals are definitionally objective 
claims. Recent work in social psychology and experimental philosophy adds some 
nuance to this moral-conventional distinction: although morals are largely perceived as 
fact-like, some moral claims are perceived as more objective than others (Beebe, 2014; 
Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 2012; Heiphetz & Young, in press; Sarkissian et al., 2011; 
Wright et al., 2013). The present work uses several methodological advances to better 
characterize the cognitive representation of the moral domain. First, we use a novel 
approach to measure metaethical judgments that avoids constraining participants’ 
responses. Second, we use an analytical approach that can generalize beyond our set of 
example stimuli, and can account for item features that may coincide with domain 
differences (such as intrinsic differences in valence between morals, facts and 
preferences). We describe each advance in turn below.  
Measuring metaethics  
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Measuring metaethical judgment requires that researchers create questions that 
are interpretable to an audience without philosophical training. This has been a 
methodological concern throughout prior work; for instance, researchers have argued that 
it would be “a somewhat pointless exercise to ask naïve participants to produce fine 
distinctions between sophisticated meta-ethical views. .... [Instead, researchers] need 
ways to pose questions about the topic that are understandable to human participants 
without philosophical training” (Goodwin & Darley, 2010, p. 165). To solve this 
problem, it has been proposed that researchers ask “whether people take their [moral] 
beliefs to be objectively true statements of fact, or alternatively, subjective preferences or 
attitudes” (Goodwin & Darley, 2010, p. 165). For instance, participants may read moral 
propositions—alongside propositions about social conventions, aesthetic tastes, and 
scientific facts—and categorize each as true, false, or an opinion/attitude (Goodwin & 
Darley, 2008). The present work builds on this approach. 
 We wanted to test participants’ intuitions about metaethics without unnecessarily 
constraining their responses. Prior work has typically imposed a zero-sum relationship 
between judgments of morals as objective or subjective (e.g. Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 
2012), and, while this may reflect the philosophical distinction, it also constrains how 
participants are allowed to express their intuitions. It is possible that participants see 
morals as both fact-like and preference-like to some extent, and a categorical (or one-
dimensional) approach rules out this outcome before testing it. To address this, we had 
participants read moral claims (among facts and preferences) and make a comparison. 
Rather than categorizing claims (e.g. “eating meat is wrong”) as either objective or 
subjective, participants rated each claim on three scales, presented simultaneously (Figure 
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1): “To what degree is this statement about [facts, morals, preferences]?” We expected 
that all morals would be perceived as moral-like; however, the question of interest was 
which secondary feature would dominate. Are morals, overall, perceived as more fact-
like or more preference-like?  
	
Figure 1. Sample Stimuli and Behavioral Task. Participants read 72 claims in total, 
evenly divided between morals, facts, and preferences. For each claim, all rating prompts 
were presented simultaneously, and there was no explicit indication as to whether any 
claim was a moral, fact, or preference. See Appendix A for the full text of all stimuli. 
 
Analytic approach 
Our analytical approach differed from prior work in that it allowed for statistical 
generalizations beyond the sampled set of stimuli. Researchers face a particular set of 
statistical hurdles when comparing domains (e.g. morals, facts, and preferences), where 
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those domains are comprised of sets of example stimuli. Although one can never test 
every possible moral claim (e.g. “eating meat is wrong” is one of countless possible 
moral claims), with enough examples one might hope that the results are generalizable 
past the specific set. Unfortunately, this hope is not statistically supported (Clark, 1973; 
Cornfield & Tukey, 1956; Judd, Westfall & Kenny, 2012). To generalize beyond a 
sample of stimuli, one must treat those stimuli as random effects (while at the same time 
treating subjects as random effects). This “crossed random effects” design is not possible 
in many traditional analyses (e.g. ANOVA). For instance, averaging across stimuli in 
each domain and then performing traditional analyses across subjects is not sufficient. In 
this case, one is only licensed to conclude that the result would replicate in another group 
of subjects with the exact same set of stimuli—domains and their exemplars are perfectly 
confounded, and, under normal circumstances, Type I error rates for conclusions about 
domain differences can exceed 50% (Judd et al., 2012; Westfall, Kenny, & Judd, 2014). 
In the present work, we used linear mixed effects analyses, modeling crossed random 
effects for subjects and stimuli (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Judd, Westfall, & 
Kenny, 2012; Westfall, Kenny, & Judd, 2014). This analytic technique allowed us to 
statistically account for the heterogeneity of stimuli in each domain, meaning that our 
conclusions are generalizable beyond our specific examples, applying instead to sampled 
populations of morals, facts, and preferences. 
 Of course, morals, facts, and preferences also differ in intrinsic ways, and these 
intrinsic differences will be confounded with domain differences. This is particularly 
concerning for neural analyses; some brain regions may be active for both morals and 
facts (or for both morals and preferences), but presumably this activity is related to some 
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more basic feature of the stimuli (e.g. valence, reading ease), rather than the socially 
constructed domain (Young & Dungan, 2012). Item analyses allowed us to turn this 
confound to our advantage (e.g. Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2013; Dodell-Feder et al., 
2011): given that domains (and the stimuli that comprise them) differ in intrinsic ways, 
which features of these stimuli are related to neural activity? We can determine the item 
features responsible for domain differences by first identifying domain differences in 
neural activity (e.g. within a ROI, morals and preferences may elicit greater activity than 
facts) and then adding item features (e.g. valence) as covariates. If particular item 
features can reduce the initial domain difference to non-significance, then they may 
explain why morals elicit common activity with facts or preferences. This analysis is 
directly related to our central aim: we want to know if morals are represented as similar 
to facts or preferences, and item analyses license more specific inferences about the 
dimensions responsible for this similarity. 
Present work 
The present work is concerned with the cognitive representation of moral claims: 
do people represent morals as more similar to objective facts or to subjective 
preferences? Study 1 probed this question behaviorally, simultaneously asking 
participants to rate the extent that morals (presented among facts and preferences) were 
“about [morals, facts, and preferences].” This method was selected to make metaethical 
questions interpretable without constraining participants’ responses. Study 2 examined 
neural activity as participants evaluated claims about morals, facts, and preferences 
(rating their agreement with each). First, we performed a whole-brain random effects 
analysis to identify brain regions where morals and facts (or morals and preferences) 
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elicited activity in common. Next, we examined activity within ToM ROIs (regions 
implicated in social cognition) and used item analyses to examine the relationship 
between ROI activity and item features, collected from independent online samples and 
from text analysis software (Coh-Metrix 3.0; Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 
2004; McNamara, Louwerse, Cai, & Graesser, 2014). These item analyses allowed us to 
identify which underlying features were responsible for observed differences in neural 
activity between morals, facts, and preferences.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. We recruited participants online using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) at an approximate rate of $5/hour, in line with standard AMT compensation rates. 
Our final sample consisted of 68 adults (36 female; MAge = 34.0 years, SD Age = 11.1 
years), after excluding 11 participants for failing a simple attention check that asked them 
to describe any claim they had read. Using standard assumptions about variance 
components among random effects (Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 2014), our subjects and 
stimuli should allow us to detect effects sizes as small as .303 at 80% power. The Boston 
College Institutional Review Board approved Studies 1 and 2, and each participant 
provided consent before beginning. 
Procedure. Participants were instructed that they would read a series of claims, 
and, for each, rate their agreement and the extent to which it was about facts, about 
morals, and about preferences (Dimension: fact-like/moral-like/preference-like). 
Agreement was measured with a single question: “To what extent do you disagree/agree 
with this statement?” (1 – “Completely disagree”; 6 – “Completely agree”). Dimension 
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ratings were presented as a set of three questions: “To what degree is this statement about 
[facts, morals, preferences]” (1 – “not at all"; 6 – “completely”)? These questions were 
presented simultaneously, and their order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Claims were presented one at a time, at the top of the page, and participants were given 
no indication that any claim was designed to be a fact, moral, or preference.  
At the end of the survey, participants answered two brief questionnaires (not 
discussed in this paper) about their general stance toward moral objectivity (Forsyth, 
1980) and consequences of that stance. Following these questionnaires, participants 
provided demographic information. Participants were generally socially liberal (M = 5.3, 
SD = 1.6, 7-point scale anchored at 1, “Socially Conservative”, and 7, “Socially 
Liberal”), as indicated by a one-sample t-test against the scale mid-point, t(67) = 6.82, p 
< .001, d = .83. 
Stimuli. Participants read 72 claims in total, divided evenly between content 
categories (24 facts, 24 morals, and 24 preferences; see Appendix A for the full text of all 
stimuli). Claims did not contain any mental state markers (e.g., “She thinks,” “He 
believes”), which might have explicitly engaged ToM. Claims within each content 
category were refined across a series of pilot studies to ensure that the moral claims we 
generated were not perceived as more fact-like or preference-like than they were moral-
like. The present study used the final set of stimuli generated from this process. Content 
categories also contained consensus sub-categories (i.e. sub-categories were designed to 
elicit either agreement, disagreement, or no consensus across individuals), which are 
explored in greater detail elsewhere (Theriault, Waytz, Heiphetz, & Young, under 
review). 
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Statistical methods. We use mixed effects analyses throughout this paper, 
following recommendations to model crossed by-subject and by-item random effects 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Judd et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2014). This analysis 
allows for generalizations beyond a sample of participants (as is the case for standard 
statistical analyses, such as ANOVA), but also beyond a sample of stimuli (which is not 
the case for most standard statistical analyses). We performed analyses using R (R Core 
Team, 2016) and the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), and 
obtained p values for fixed effects using the Kenward-Roger approximation of degrees of 
freedom, implemented in lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) and 
pbkrtest packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). We followed the recommendation of 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) in using the maximal random-intercepts structure 
justified by the design: we modeled by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as 
all by-subject and by-item random slopes justified by the design. Random slopes were 
removed from the model only when the model failed to converge (Baayen et al., 2008).  
Results 
 First, we validated our a priori content categories (facts, morals, and preferences), 
using paired t-tests to compare mean ratings on our three dimensions (fact-like, moral-
like, preference-like; Figure 2). Consistent with our design, facts were perceived as more 
fact-like, MFact: Fact-like = 5.46, than moral-like, MFact: Moral-like = 1.13, or preference-like, 
MFact: Preference-like = 1.29, ts > 33, ps < .001, ds > 4.1. Preferences were perceived as more 
preference-like, MPreference: Preference-like = 5.68, than fact-like, MPreference: Fact-like = 1.57, or 
moral-like, MPreference: Moral-like = 1.21, ts > 36, ps < .001, ds > 3.9. And morals were 
perceived as more moral-like, MMoral: Moral-like = 4.82, than fact-like, MMoral: Fact-like = 2.11, 
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t(67) = 19.6, p < .001, d = 2.95 or preference-like, MMoral: Preference-like = 4.21, t(67) = 3.8, p 
< .001, d = 1.64. 
 In the analysis above, morals emerged as principally moral-like, but also as 
largely preference-like. Indeed, when repeating the analysis using a maximal mixed 
effects model, morals just barely remained significantly more moral-like than preference-
like, z = 2.02, p = .043 (for full mixed effects analysis, see Table S1 of the online 
supplemental materials). By contrast, even in this more stringent mixed effects model, 
morals were robustly more preference-like than fact-like, z = 7.45, p < .001.  
		
Figure 2. Behavioral Ratings. Claims were rated highest on their content-consistent 
dimension (e.g., facts were rated as fact-like), but morals were also rated as more 
preference-like than fact-like. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. For estimates 
derived from the mixed effects analysis, see Table S1 of the online supplemental 
materials.  
 
Discussion  
According to Study 1, if participants are allowed the flexibility to rate moral 
claims as any combination of moral-like, fact-like, and preference-like, then moral claims 
are perceived as highly preference-like. This result is surprising, as prior work has 
suggested that morals are largely seen as objective (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; 
Smetana, 1981; Tisak & Turiel 1988; Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004). Although 
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recent work has demonstrated that this objectivity is variable—some moral claims are 
more objectivity than others (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 2012)—the conclusion remained 
the same: morals are perceived as highly objective. It is possible that our sample of 
stimuli were exceptional in some way, and that in another sample morals would be 
perceived as more fact-like and less preference-like; however, this is unlikely, as we were 
able to replicate the effect in an independent sample of stimuli, derived from items used 
in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; see 
supplemental study in the online supplemental materials). Still, based on this behavioral 
result alone, it is difficult to answer why exactly morals and preferences are perceived as 
similar, i.e. what are the underlying features that are responsible for their perceived 
similarity? We aimed to address this question in Study 2, performing a neural analysis, 
paired with an analysis of item features2.  
Study 2 
Behaviorally, morals were perceived as highly preference-like. Morals and 
preferences may also elicit neural activity in common, and the brain regions in which this 
common activity occurs can help us better understand the basis of their similarity; 
however, reverse inferences such as these are also extremely limited in their explanatory 
power (Poldrack, 2006). Thus, we also use item analyses to supplement our 
interpretation. Most likely, morals and preferences are intrinsically different from facts 
                                                
2 The fMRI data used in Study 2 is also analyzed in a separate study (Theriault et al., 
under review). Analyses are not repeated between the two studies: the present study 
focuses on domain-level similarity between morals, facts, and preferences, and attempts 
to explain similarity on the basis of item features. The separate study focuses on the 
relationship between neural activity and within-domain variability in metaethical 
judgment (i.e. why are some moral claims seen as more objective than others?). 
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along many dimensions (e.g. emotional valence, social relevance). Of these dimensions, 
some may explain common neural activity better than others. In our item analysis, we 
tested several item features (using stimuli ratings collected from independent online 
samples), asking whether any particular feature could explain common activity elicited 
by morals and preferences, relative to facts. We were particularly interested in the ToM 
network, given its role in representing subjective mental states; thus, we used an 
established independent functional localizer to identify regions of interest (ROIs) in this 
network (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Koster-Hale et al., 2013; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Young et al., 2007; 2010; 2011).  
Method 
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 25 right-handed participants (12 
female, 12 male, 1 unspecified; Mage = 27.1 years, SDage = 5.4 years), recruited through an 
online posting for a $65 cash payment (two additional participants were recruited but 
were not analyzed due to excessive movement, which was identified during spatial 
preprocessing, before any analysis was performed). Of these 25 participants, two 
completed only a subset of the scan session runs: one completed only the first five runs 
due to experimenter error, and in another, a movement artifact during run 4 rendered only 
the first three runs useable. These partial cases were included in all analyses except for 
multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), a technique that used iterative combinations across 
the full set of runs to compute correlations, such that any data loss would drastically 
reduce the number of combinations. For another one of the 25 participants, we were 
unable to collect post-scan ratings. Participants were a community sample of native 
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English speakers with no reported history of learning disabilities, previous psychiatric or 
neurological disorders, or a history of drug or alcohol abuse. 
Procedure. Participants completed the study during a single session. Twenty 
were run at the Center for Brain Science Neuroimaging Facility at Harvard University, 
and an additional five were run at the Martinos Imaging Center at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Scanning parameters and equipment were identical between sites 
(see below). Inside the scanner, participants underwent a structural scan and then 
performed the experimental task. Participants read each claim and reported their 
agreement (1 – “strongly agree”; 4 – “strongly disagree”; scores were reverse coded for 
convenience). Participants were also allowed to use their thumb to indicate “don’t know,” 
which was coded as an empty cell3. We presented stimuli across six runs (12 claims per 
run, evenly divided between facts, morals and preferences). Each trial began with the 
presentation of a claim (6 s), followed by an agreement rating (+4 s), followed by fixation 
(+12 s). Each experimental run was 4 min 52 s long, totaling 29 min 12 s across 6 runs; 
the total scan time was 68 min 8 s due to the inclusion of a structural scan (6 min 3 s), a 
functional localizer (two 4 min 46 s runs), and a second study not reported here 
(involving responses to moral dilemmas; 29 min 12 s). Stimuli were presented in white 
text on a black background on a projector, viewable through a mirror mounted on the 
headcoil. The experimental protocol was run on an Apple Macbook Pro using Matlab 
7.7.0 (R2008b) with Psychophysics Toolbox.  
                                                
3 This “don’t know” option was provided to avoid confusion, as a subset of facts was 
designed to be generally unknown to participants, making agreement responses 
ambiguous. The majority (71.6%) of “don’t know” responses were within this sub-group 
category, and the next highest occurrence was 7.3% for an equivalent group of 
preferences, designed to not elicit strong agreement or disagreement. 
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In a post-scan behavioral session, participants re-read all claims on an Apple 
Macbook Pro and provided dimension ratings for each—“To what degree is this 
statement about [facts, morals, preferences]” (1 – “not at all"; 7 – “completely”)? At the 
end of the post-scan session they provided additional demographic information. As in 
Study 1, participants were generally socially liberal (M = 5.3, SD = 2.0, 7-point scale, 
anchored at 1, “Socially Conservative”, and 7, “Socially Liberal”), as indicated by a one-
sample t-test against the scale mid-point, t(22) = 3.18, p = .004, d = .66. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were the same as those described in Study 1 (see Appendix A for 
the full text of all stimuli). As in Study 1, content categories also contained consensus 
sub-categories. ROI activity in response to these subcategories is explored in greater 
detail elsewhere (Theriault et al., under review). 
fMRI imaging and analysis. Scanning was performed using a 3.0 T Siemens 
Tim Trio MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) and a 12-
channel head coil at both the Center for Brain Science Neuroimaging Facility at Harvard 
University, and the Martinos Imaging Center at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Thirty-six slices with 3mm isotropic voxels, with a 0.54mm gap between 
slices to allow for full brain coverage, were collected using gradient-echo planar imaging 
(TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 216 x 216 mm; interleaved 
acquisition). Anatomical data were collected with T1-weighted multi-echo magnetization 
prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo image (MEMPRAGE) sequences (TR = 2530 
ms, TE = 1.64 ms, FA = 7°, 1mm isotropic voxels, 0.5mm gap between slices, FOV = 
256 x 256 mm). Data processing and analysis were performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and custom software. The data were motion-corrected, 
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realigned, normalized onto a common brain space (Montreal Neurological Institute, 
MNI), and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (full-width half-maximum = 8 mm 
kernel), and high-pass filtered (128 Hz). Whole-brain conjunction analyses and MVPA 
were performed using a GLM with three regressors of interest: fact, moral, and 
preference categories. Analyses within functional ROIs are described in detail below.  
Whole-brain conjunction analysis. Whole-brain conjunction analyses compared 
two whole-brain random effects contrasts, examining activity elicited in common 
between two content categories compared to the one remaining content category—e.g. 
(Moral > Fact) + (Preference > Fact). Contrasts were first modeled for each participant, 
then entered into a second level random effects analysis across all participants. 
Conjunction analyses compared two of these contrasts at a time, providing a visualization 
of the voxels that were significant for both contrasts. Following recent recommendations 
(Eklund, Nichols, & Knutson, 2016), we performed permutation tests (5000 samples) to 
achieve a cluster-corrected familywise error rate of α = .05 in each contrast, while 
thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected; recommended by Woo, Krishnan & Wager, 
2014). Permutation tests were performed using SnPM 13 (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; 
Nichols & Holmes, 2001), 
 ToM localizer task. We used an independent functional localizer to identify 
ROIs associated with ToM (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). The task consisted of 20 scenarios 
presented across two 4 min 46 s scans: 10 stories about mental states (false-belief 
condition) and 10 stories about physical representations (false-photograph condition). 
Stimuli were matched in complexity; see http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php for the 
complete set. Each story was presented for 10 s and was followed by a statement about 
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the story that was judged as true or false (4 s). A boxcar for the full duration (14 s) was 
used to model stories in both conditions. Activity was estimated in each voxel for both 
conditions, and a simple contrast was performed to estimate voxels showing significantly 
greater activity for mental stories than physical stories (p < .001, k > 10). ROIs were 
defined as contiguous voxels in a 9mm-radius of the peak voxel that passed the contrast 
threshold (for peak coordinates, see Table S2 of the online supplemental materials). 
 It was possible that the cluster extent threshold chosen for our functional localizer 
was too liberal, as it was derived from an arbitrary 10 voxel threshold (with voxels 
thresholded at p < .001). We used this arbitrary threshold was so that our results could be 
easily compared with prior work, which has used the same parameters (Dodell-Feder et 
al., 2011; Koster-Hale et al., 2013; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2007; 2010; 
2011); however, we also wanted to ensure that our findings were not dependent on it. 
How best to balance Type I and Type II error when selecting functional ROIs is an open 
question (Degryse et al., 2017), so we selected ROIs based on the peak coordinates from 
a whole brain random effects contrast (belief > photograph) across all participants, and 
replicated the central analyses below (see supplemental analyses in the online 
supplemental materials; for peak coordinates, see Table S3 of the online supplemental 
materials). The results of this analysis are identical to the ROI analyses reported below 
(Figure S2 of the online supplemental materials).  
Functional ROI response magnitude analysis. For our experimental task, we 
used a slow event-related design to model blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity 
in each functional ROI. Events were defined as beginning when text first appeared and 
continuing for the length of the claim and agreement response (10 s). The time-window 
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was adjusted for hemodynamic lag so that data were collected at 4–14 seconds from onset 
(Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). To model neural activity in each ROI, we transformed BOLD 
activity at each time point of the experimental task into percent signal change (PSC = raw 
BOLD magnitude for (condition – fixation)/fixation). The data at each time point were 
centered at the mean PSC of the run. Given that we center PSC for each run, there is no 
simple interpretation of our ROI findings with respect to the x-axis; this is not a concern, 
as the comparisons of interest are between conditions. Averaging run-centered PSC 
across the duration of the scenario provided a single PSC value for each ROI, for each 
participant, for each condition.  
ROI multi-voxel pattern analysis. For each functional ROI, MVPA compared 
spatial patterns of activity between two conditions. We used the Haxby split half method 
(Haxby et al., 2001), splitting each participant’s unsmoothed BOLD activity into two 
equal sets of runs (partitions). A vector of βs represented the voxels in each ROI, and this 
vector was averaged separately in each partition. MVPA compared correlations within 
and between conditions. Within correlations correlated vectors across partitions within 
one condition, while between correlations correlated vectors across partitions between 
the two conditions being compared. Correlations were Fisher transformed and calculated 
across all possible iterations of partitions (e.g. 1, 2, 3 vs. 4, 5, 6; 1, 2, 4 vs. 3, 5, 6; etc.). 
Subject-wise classification accuracy within a contrast was calculated across iterations by 
summing cases in which the within correlation exceeded the between correlation and 
dividing by the total number of comparisons. A contrast was significant if, across 
participants, classification accuracy exceeded chance (50%) in a one-tailed, one sample t-
test. Note that our approach to MVPA relied on correlational distance (as opposed to 
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Euclidean distance, Mahalanobis distance, etc.), meaning that any observed differences 
are independent of condition differences in the ROI response magnitude analyses 
described above (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). 
Item analyses. We performed mixed effects analyses using R (R Core Team, 
2016), the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), the Kenward-Roger approximation of 
degrees of freedom (lmerTest, Kuznetsova et al., 2015; pbkrtest, Halekoh & Højsgaard, 
2014), and the maximal justified random-intercepts structure (Baayen et al., 2008; Barr, 
et al., 2013). Several item features were used as covariates, which might rule out 
alternative hypotheses. These included features explored in prior work (Dodell-Feder et 
al., 2011): arousal/valence (NSubjects = 17), ratings (NSubjects = 18), the presence of a person 
(NSubjects = 20), and arousal/valence (NSubjects = 17; note that arousal and valence were 
measured using two unipolar positivity and negativity scales—based on prior work, 
arousal was the sum of these scales and valence was the difference; Kron, Goldstein, Lee, 
& Gardhouse, 2013). These data were collected from independent online samples in 
which participants read the complete set of stimuli from Study 1. We also examined 
mean Study 1 item-wise agreement ratings (as opposed to in-scanner ratings from Study 
2, where the range of response was restricted to a 4-point scale). Additional covariates 
measured syntactic and semantic features of claims—i.e. word count, reading ease, 
anaphor reference, intention verb incidence, causal verb incidence, causal verb ratio, 
noun concreteness, noun familiarity, noun imageability, negation density, number of 
modifiers, and left embeddedness (see Table S8 for covariate summary statistics; see 
Appendix B for complete descriptions of covariates). Syntactic and semantic covariates 
were collected using Coh Metrix 3.0 (http://cohmetrix.com), an online linguistic analysis 
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tool (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004). Finally, we collected reaction times 
in response to the in-scanner rating task, and this was included as a nuisance parameter in 
all final models. 
Results 
Behavioral results. We collected fact-like, moral-like, and preference-like ratings 
for each claim in a post-scan behavioral session. These ratings were consistent with the 
patterns observed in Study 1. In a maximal mixed effects analysis, people perceived 
morals as more preference-like than fact-like, z = 4.4, p < .001 (for full results, see Table 
S4 of the online supplemental materials).  
Neural results. Study 1 and the behavioral results from Study 2 suggest that 
morals are generally perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Here, we asked 
whether morals and preferences, relative to facts, also elicit neural activity in common. 
First, we performed a series of whole-brain conjunction analyses, mapping common 
activity across two contrasts. Of these, the conjunction of (Moral > Fact) + (Preference > 
Fact) revealed the most activity in common (Figure 3a), with overlap in both DMPFC 
(peak coordinates: moral > fact [-4, 56, 30], preference > fact [-2, 54, 24]) and VMPFC 
(peak coordinates: moral > fact [2, 48, -12], preference > fact [4, 40, -20]). By contrast, 
the conjunction of (Moral > Preference) + (Fact > Preference) revealed no activity in 
common (Figure 3b). Notably, although less relevant to our key questions, we found that 
preferences and facts, relative to morals, elicited common activity in left middle frontal 
gyrus, and bilateral superior parietal lobule (Figure S1 of the online supplemental 
materials); this was notable because, in terms of whole-brain neural activity, facts 
appeared to have more in common with preferences than with morals (for peak cortical 
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coordinates of each contrast, see Table S5 of the online supplemental materials). Thus, 
morals and preferences, relative to facts, appear to elicit neural activity in common, 
particularly within medial prefrontal cortex.  		
 
Figure 3. Whole-brain Conjunction Analyses. (a) Morals and preferences, relative to 
facts, elicited common activity in DMPFC and VMPFC. (b) Morals and facts, relative to 
preferences, did not elicit any activity in common. Permutation tests (5000 samples) were 
used to achieve a cluster-corrected familywise error rate of α = .05 in each contrast, while 
thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected). Permutation testing was performed using 
SnPM 13 (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; Nichols & Holmes, 2001). Peak coordinates for 
each contrast are reported in Table S5 of the online supplemental materials. 
 
To more directly probe neural activity related to ToM, we performed analyses 
within ToM ROIs (DMPFC, VMPFC, PC, RTPJ, LTPJ) identified for each individual in 
an independent functional localizer task. This analysis depended on observing a 
significant contrast between localizer conditions for each ROI, meaning that N for each 
ROI varied based on successful localization (NDMPFC = 20/25; NVMPFC = 20/25; NPC = 
23/25; NRTPJ = 25/25; NLTPJ = 24/25). For each ROI, we performed a repeated measures 
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ANOVA comparing neural activity for morals, facts, and preferences, followed by 
condition contrasts. Contrast p values are corrected for three comparisons to achieve a 
familywise α of .05 within each ROI (pcorrected = .0167). In Item Analysis, we also present 
linear mixed effects analyses, which are capable of generalizing beyond our sample of 
stimuli.  
ROI analyses were consistent with the whole-brain analyses. Morals and 
preferences, relative to facts, both elicited greater activity in DMPFC and VMPFC 
(Figure 4). One-way ANOVAs revealed a main effect of content in DMPFC, F(2, 38) = 
33.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, where both morals, z = 7.65, p < .001, d = 1.71, and 
preferences, z = 6.32, p < .001, d = 1.41, elicited greater activity than facts. Likewise, in 
VMPFC, F(2, 38) = 12.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, both morals, z = 3.87, p < .001, d = 1.09, 
and preferences, z = 3.01, p = .006, d = 0.68, elicited greater activity than facts. In both 
DMPFC and VMPFC, there was no significant difference in neural activity elicited by 
morals and preferences: DMPFC, z = 1.33, p = .377, d = 0.30; VMPFC, z = 1.81, p = 
.166, d = 0.40. Thus, in DMPFC and VMPFC, morals and preferences appear to elicit 
common neural activity. 
In PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, morals elicited greater activity than both facts and 
preferences. In LTPJ preferences also elicited greater activity than facts; this contrast was 
marginal in PC and non-significant in RTPJ (Figure 4). One-way ANOVAs revealed a 
main effects of content in: (a) PC, F(2, 44) = 25.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, such that morals 
elicited greater activity than both facts, z = 6.99, p < .001, d = 1.46, and preferences, z = 
4.84, p < .001, d = 1.01, while preferences elicited marginally more activity than facts, z 
= 2.15, p = .080, d = 0.45; (b) RTPJ, F(2, 48) = 10.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, such that 
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morals elicited greater activity than both facts, z = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.91, and 
preferences, z = 3.17, p = .004, d = 0.63, while preferences and facts did not differ, z = 
1.37, p = .355, d = 0.27; and (c) LTPJ, F(2, 46) = 32.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, such that 
morals elicited greater activity than both facts, z = 8.01, p < .001, d = 1.63, and 
preferences, z = 4.43, p < .001, d = 0.90, while preferences also elicited greater activity 
than facts, z = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.73. Thus, in PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, morals appear to 
elicit greater activity than both facts and preferences.  
	
Figure 4. Response Magnitude Across Content (fact/moral/preference) and ROIs. Morals 
and preferences both elicit greater activity than facts in DMPFC and VMPFC, whereas 
morals elicit greater activity than both facts and preferences in PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ. 
ROIs were identified for each individual using an independent functional localizer 
(Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), meaning that N for each ROI varies based on successful 
localization. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of condition means. *** p < 
 114 
.001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. For mixed effects regression analysis coefficients, 
see Table 1 and Table S6 of the online supplemental materials. 
 
To test the specificity of the effects we observed in the ToM ROIs, we also 
explored a set of ROIs hypothesized to have no unique relation to social cognition. It was 
possible that morals could elicit activity more similar to facts in these non-social brain 
regions. We defined seven ROIs using peak coordinates from the reverse inference map 
for the term “working memory” at neurosynth.org (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van 
Essen, & Wager, 2011; for peak coordinates, see Table S7 of the online supplemental 
materials). ROIs were: left/right anterior middle frontal gyrus; left/right posterior middle 
frontal gyrus; left/right supramarginal gyrus; and medial superior frontal gyrus. For each, 
we defined a 9mm spheres around the peak coordinate. PSC was extracted using the same 
method as for functional ROIs. Across these ROIs, there was no evidence that moral 
claims were processed as more similar to facts, compared to preferences (see 
supplemental analyses and Figure S3 of the online supplemental materials).  
MVPA provided us with an additional method of comparing neural 
representations of morals to facts and preferences: it allowed us to examine how easily 
categories could be distinguished by spatial correlations between their voxel-wise 
activity. We tested whether MVPA could more easily distinguish between morals and 
facts, or between morals and preferences. Importantly, we conducted MVPA using a 
correlational distance metric, meaning that the analysis was independent of overall mean 
differences (i.e. independent of the ANOVA analyses above). For each ROI within each 
participant, we used iterative split-half correlations (Haxby et al., 2001) to generate 
discrimination accuracy scores for the two contrasts (Moral-versus-Fact, Moral-versus-
Preference). In each ROI, paired sample t-tests compared contrast discrimination 
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accuracy (Figure 5). P values reflect significance after Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons to achieve familywise α = .05 across five comparisons (pcorrected = .01). The 
classifier was significantly more accurate at discriminating between morals and facts, 
compared to morals and preferences in three of our five ROIs: DMPFC, t(18) = 4.30, p = 
.002, d = 0.99, PC, t(20) = 5.81, p < .001, d = 1.27, and LTPJ, t(21) = 2.99, p = .035, d = 
0.64; the effect was marginal in RTPJ, t(22) = 2.04, p = .266, d = 0.43, and VMPFC, 
t(17) = 1.90, p = .370, d = 0.45. Thus, independent of mean differences in the magnitude 
of neural activity, morals are represented as more similar to preferences than to facts in 
DMPFC, PC, and LTPJ.  
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Figure 5. MVPA Discrimination Accuracy for Morals Versus Facts and Preferences. In 
DMPFC, PC, and LTPJ, morals and facts are more accurately discriminated than morals 
and preferences, based on the spatial correlation of voxel-wise activity (i.e. independent 
of mean differences in neural activity, presented in Figure 4). ROIs were identified for 
each individual using an independent functional localizer (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), 
meaning that N for each ROI varies based on successful localization. Two participants 
had partial data and were excluded from this analysis. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. 
 
Item Analysis 
Our analyses above demonstrated that morals, facts, and preferences elicit 
different magnitudes and patterns of activity in ToM ROIs. Item analyses using linear 
mixed effects models allowed us to improve on these analyses in two ways: a) by 
modeling by-item random effects, allowing us to generalize beyond our specific sample 
of items¾a step that has rarely been taken in prior work (c.f. Judd et al., 2012), and b) by 
including covariates measuring item features (collected in independent samples; see 
Appendix B), allowing us to address why morals and preferences elicited activity in 
common. For each ROI, mixed effects models were built in three steps (Table 1 & Table 
S6 of the online supplemental materials). First, we replicated the ROI analyses reported 
above: dummy coding morals and preferences against facts while controlling for the 
maximal by-subject and by-item random effects structure. Next, we identified which item 
features were viable covariates: we dropped the dummy coded categories from our model 
and modeled each covariate as a single fixed effect predicting ROI activity, controlling 
for by-subject and by-item random intercepts. (Alternatively, we could choose covariates 
by identifying which item features differ across domains; for this analysis, see Tables S8 
and S9 of the online supplemental materials). Finally, significant covariates were entered 
as fixed effects (Barr et al., 2013) one at a time to the initial model, in the order of their 
significance (noting if and when categorical effects of morals and preferences became 
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marginal or non-significant). Reaction time was considered a nuisance parameter and was 
always controlled for after accounting for significant covariates.  
Mixed effects analyses within ROIs were consistent with the ANOVAs reported 
above (Table 1 & Table S6 of the online supplemental materials). Both morals and 
preferences elicited greater activity than facts in DMPFC (morals, b = 0.222, t(35.1) = 
5.94, p < .001; preferences, b = 0.182, t(40.1) = 5.14, p < .001), VMPFC (morals, b = 
0.159, t(32.8) = 3.91, p < .001; preferences, b = 0.098, t(33.8) = 2.15, p = 0.039), and 
LTPJ (morals, b = 0.148, t(49.5) = 5.00, p < .001; preferences, b = 0.066, t(56.3) = 2.40, 
p = .020). Morals, but not preferences, elicited greater activity than facts in PC (morals, b 
= 0.158, t(58.9) = 4.70, p < .001; preferences, b = 0.051, t(58.9) = 1.53, p = .132), and in 
RTPJ (morals, b = 0.072, t(31.9) = 3.55, p = .001; preferences, b = 0.023, t(34.6) = 1.35, 
p = .187). 
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Table 1. Mixed effects analysis for DMPFC across all claims, examining ROI percent signal change (PSC) for 
morals and preferences relative to facts.  
ROI Step Model: R Syntax Coefficients 
DMPFC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.222, t(35.1) = 5.94, p = 9.1 x 10-7 
***Preference: 
     β = 0.182, t(40.1) = 5.14, p = 7.5 x 10-6 
 Identify potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) ***Mental States: 
     β = 0.078, t(70.0) = 8.74, p = 7.9 x 10-13 
  lmer(PSC ~ Arousal + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) ***Arousal: 
     β = 0.069, t(70.1) = 4.33, p = 4.9 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ NounFamiliarity + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) *Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.002, t(70.1) = 2.38, p = .020 
  lmer(PSC ~ NounConcreteness + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) *Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0005, t(69.8) = 2.27, p = .026 
  lmer(PSC ~ PersonPresent + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) *Person Present: 
     β = 0.077, t(70.0) = 2.19, p = .032 
  lmer(PSC ~ NounImageability + (1|Item) + (1|ID)) *Noun Imageability: 
     β = -0.0005, t(69.8) = 2.05, p = .044 
 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState + Moral + Preference + 
(1|Item) + (Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.119, t(74.6) = 1.58, p = .118  
Preference: 
     β = 0.098, t(71.2) = 1.54, p = .129 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.039, t(68.0) = 1.57, p = .120 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + NounImageability + 
PersonPresent + NounConcreteness + 
NounFamiliarity + Arousal +  MentalState + Moral 
+ Preference + (1|Item) + (Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral:  
     β = 0.118, t(67.4) = 1.52, p = .132 
Preference: 
     β = 0.097, t(64.8) = 1.43, p = .157 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.037, t(62.2) = 1.30, p = .200 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.004, t(62.5) = 0.19, p = .849 
**Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.002, t(60.8) = 2.70, p = .008 
Noun Concreteness: 
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     β = -0.00006, t(60.5) = 0.12, p = .904 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.003, t(60.8) = 1.13, p = .262 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = -0.00007, t(61.0) = 0.01, p = .990 
Reaction Time: 
     β = -0.0009, t(1325.0) = 0.08, p = .940 
Remaining ROIs are presented in Table S6 of the online supplemental materials. Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 
2016), and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), using the Kenward-Roger approximation of degrees of freedom (lmerTest, 
Kuznetsova et al., 2015; pbkrtest, Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. β represent standardized 
regression coefficients. 
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Covariate analyses in DMPFC, VMPFC, and LTPJ all indicated that the neural 
activity elicited by morals and preferences was almost entirely accounted for by their 
common tendency to evoke thoughts about an agent’s mental states—i.e. beliefs, desires, 
thoughts, experiences (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; see Appendix B for complete 
descriptions of covariates). All covariates were individually entered as fixed effects 
predicting neural activity, and significant covariates were noted: (a) in DMPFC these 
were mental state ratings, p < 1.0 x 10-12, arousal, p < 1.0 x 10-4, noun familiarity, p < .05, 
noun concreteness, p < .05, the presence of a person, p < .05, and noun imageability, p < 
.05; (b) in VMPFC these were mental state ratings, p < 1.0 x 10-4, arousal, p < .001, the 
presence of a person, p < .05, and reaction time, p < .05; (c) in LTPJ these were mental 
state ratings, p < 1.0 x 10-6, the presence of a person, p < 1.0 x 10-4, arousal, p < .01, 
intentional verb incidence, p < .05, negation density, p < .05, reading ease, p < .05, and 
number of modifiers, p < .05. We added these potential covariates to our initial model, 
testing if and when effects of content became marginal or non-significant (Table S6 of 
the online supplemental materials). (a) In DMPFC, after controlling for mental state 
ratings, both morals, b = 0.119, t(74.6) = 1.58, p = .118, and preferences, b = 0.098, 
t(71.2) = 1.54, p = .129, dropped to marginal significance, and remained marginal after 
controlling for arousal, noun familiarity, noun concreteness, the presence of a person, 
noun imageability, and reaction time (Table 1). (b) In VMPFC, after controlling for 
mental state ratings, both morals, b = 0.091, t(70.6) = 0.91, p = .368, and preferences, b = 
0.043, t(70.9) = 0.48, p = .629, dropped to non-significance. (c) In LTPJ, after controlling 
for mental state ratings, both morals, b = 0.051, t(74.3) = 0.77, p = .443, and preferences, 
b = -0.013, t(74.5) = 0.23, p = .819, dropped to non-significance. Thus, the common 
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neural activity that morals and preferences elicit appears to stem from their tendency to 
evoke mental state representations. 
Covariate analyses revealed that PC and RTPJ activity, elicited by morals, could 
be explained to some extent by item features related to social cognition. Potential 
covariates were identified as described above: (a) in PC these were mental state ratings, p 
< 1.0 x 10-4, the presence of a person, p < 1.0 x 10-4, intentional verb incidence p < .01, 
arousal, p < .05, and reading ease, p < .05; (b) in RTPJ, these were mental state ratings, 
reaction time, p < .001, mental state ratings, p < .001, and noun familiarity, p < .05. We 
added these potential covariates to a model for each ROI, testing if and when the 
coefficient for morals, dummy coded against facts and preferences, became marginal or 
non-significant (Table S6 of the online supplemental materials). (a) In PC, morals only 
dropped to marginal significance after controlling for mental state ratings, the presence of 
a person, intention verb incidence, and arousal, b = 0.067, t(63.6) = 1.95, p = .055, and 
PC remained marginal after adding reading ease and reaction time to the model, b = 
0.064, t(61.0) = 1.64, p = .068. (b) In RTPJ, after controlling for mental state ratings and 
reaction time, morals dropped to non-significance, b = 0.030, t(43.6) = 1.63, p = .110. 
Thus, the activity elicited by moral claims in PC and RTPJ can be explained to some 
extent by their tendency to evoke mental state representations, although in PC this may 
not completely explain the observed effect. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 examined (a) whether perceived behavioral similarities among morals, 
facts, and preferences, initially observed in Study 1, were also reflected in brain regions 
associated with ToM, and (b) if they were reflected, what underlying processes might be 
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responsible for that similarity. Generally, across the ToM network morals were 
represented as more similar to preferences than to facts. This was particularly true in 
medial prefrontal cortex: in both whole-brain and ROI analyses, morals and preferences 
elicited common activity in DMPFC and VMPFC. Furthermore, in DMPFC, morals were 
more easily distinguished from facts than from preferences, based on the voxel-wise 
patterns of activity (an independent metric from overall BOLD differences). In DMPFC, 
VMPFC, and LTPJ, common activity elicited by morals and preferences, relative to facts, 
stemmed from both morals and preferences eliciting mental state inferences (i.e. 
inferences about agents’ beliefs, thoughts, and desires). Note that it was exclusively this 
difference in mental state content that accounted for DMPFC and VMPFC activity in 
response to morals and preferences, as opposed to any other intrinsic differences between 
categories that we tested for (e.g. valence, arousal; Tables S8–S9 of the online 
supplemental materials). Surprisingly, we also observed greater activity in PC, RTPJ, and 
LTPJ for moral claims relative to both facts and preferences. We speculate on the 
meaning of this finding in the General Discussion, below. 
General Discussion 
 Two studies examined metaethical judgment, testing whether morals are 
represented as objective or subjective. If people represents morals as subjective, then they 
should perceive morals as relatively more preference-like and morals should elicit more 
neural activity in common with preferences, particularly within brain regions associated 
with mental state representation. This is what we observed. In Study 1, participants read 
claims about morals, facts, and preferences, and rated each claim on the extent that it was 
about morals, about facts, and about preferences (Figures 1–2). Morals were perceived as 
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relatively more preference-like than fact-like across our sample of moral claims (and in 
an independent set of moral claims, adapted from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire—
Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; see Figure S4 of the online supplemental 
materials). In Study 2, participants read the original set of claims while undergoing fMRI, 
allowing us to compare neural activity elicited by morals, facts, and preferences. Here 
too, morals were represented as more similar to preferences than to facts—morals and 
preferences elicited overlapping activity (and voxel-wise patterns of activity) across ROIs 
in the ToM network, and particularly within DMPFC (Figures 3–5). In a subsequent item 
analysis, we observed that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences 
could be almost entirely explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of 
mental states (e.g. experiences, beliefs, thoughts, & desires; Dodell-Feder et al, 2011). 
Initially we had anticipated that preferences would act as a high water mark for activity in 
brain regions for social processing, and that activity for moral claims would fall 
somewhere between activity for facts and preferences. However, we were surprised to 
find that moral claims actually elicited greater activity than both facts and preferences in 
PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, all critical nodes in the ToM network; that is, based on neural 
activity, moral claims were processed as more social than preferences, a category selected 
for its social relevance. Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that (a) people represent 
morals as largely similar to preferences, and (b) this common representation stems from 
both morals’ and preferences’ tendency to evoke mental state representations; that is, 
morals are seen as social information. 
Morals are represented as preference-like 
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In the present work, people reported that morals are more similar to preferences 
than prior work has emphasized (Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 2012; Nichols 
& Folds-Bennett, 2003; Smetana, 1981; Tisak & Turiel 1988; Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et 
al., 2004; Wright et al., 2013). The present work also seems to contradict a position 
expressed by some philosophers; namely, that the majority of non-philosophers are moral 
objectivists; that they believe morals are fact-like; that “… moral questions have correct 
answers; that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts … [and that] 
we can discover what these objective moral facts determined by circumstance are” 
(Smith, 1994, p. 6). Non-philosophers may be moral objectivists—our research cannot 
rule this out—however, our results should also give some pause to those who claim that 
similarity to facts is a central feature of the moral domain. In the present work, neural and 
behavioral evidence consistently demonstrates that morals share more in common with 
preferences than with facts. 
Several methodological advances may explain the discrepancy between prior 
work and our own findings. First, our behavioral analyses avoid imposing categorical or 
one-dimensional distinctions (i.e. we do not require that fact-like morals necessarily be 
less preference-like). This approach avoids constraining comparisons, which could 
exaggerate categorical differences. If prior work correctly concluded that people 
represent morals as preeminently fact-like, then this saliency should emerge naturally in 
our method; however, the similarity between morals and preferences emerged instead. 
Second, our work can make statistical generalizations in a way that prior work could not. 
We used a large sample of stimuli, but critically, we analyzed these stimuli using mixed 
effects analyses, modeling by-item random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Barr et al., 2013; 
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Judd et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2014), a method that allows for statistical 
generalizations beyond our specific items. Prior work targeting morality as a separable 
domain from other sorts of information (e.g. conventional norms) has been criticized for 
its selection of examples (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Smetana, 1981; Tisak & Turiel 
1988; Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004; for criticism, see Gabennmesch, 1990; Kelly et 
al., 2007; Machery, 2012), but this criticism has typically been made on the grounds of 
conceptual generalizability: critics charge that the work has focused on “prototypical” 
moral issues—e.g., inflicting harm—with only an occasional nod to “non-prototypical” 
moral issues—e.g. abortion (Turiel et al., 1991). These conceptual criticisms, valid as 
they may be, put the cart before the horse: conceptual criticisms are typically applied to 
conclusions with statistical support (Cornfield & Tukey, 1956), and if items are not 
treated as random effects then researchers are not licensed to make any generalization 
beyond the examples they have tested (Judd et al., 2012). Note that conceptual criticisms 
could be applied to our own results (as they could be applied to any statistical inference). 
We intentionally omitted controversial moral issues, and our results cannot directly speak 
to their properties (e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage; for a more thorough treatment of 
these topics see Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). It is possible that the general trends we 
have identified will carry over into this domain (and other sub-domains of morality, see 
supplemental study in the online supplemental materials), but additional work is 
necessary to confirm our supposition. 
Morals are socially informative 
So far we have shown that moral claims are not represented as objective to the 
extent that prior work has asserted, but the positive case is equally important: Can the 
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present work say anything about what morals are? Behaviorally, morals are perceived as 
far more similar to preferences than has been previously suggested, but neurally, morals 
actually outstripped preferences, eliciting greater activity across several social brain 
regions, such as PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ. Note that the present study is not equipped to 
speak to the function of specific brain regions, but by drawing on prior work we can 
speculate on what the observed activity implies about the nature of moral content. The 
DMPFC, where the greatest overlap in activity between morals and preferences emerged, 
is a key region implicated in social cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 
2005; Ochsner et al., 2005) and has been implicated in processing stable personal traits 
(Harris et al., 2005; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010), even in the absence of explicit instruction 
(Ma et al., 2012). That is, DMPFC activity has been associated with learning something 
about a person. Morals and preferences may be perceived as similar on account of their 
both being rich sources of social information.  
Brain regions where morals elicited more activity than preferences have been 
implicated in processing beliefs and intentions (e.g. innocent intentions following an 
accident; Young & Saxe, 2009). However, recent accounts have moved to consider these 
findings in a more general framework of hierarchical predictive coding (Koster-Hale & 
Saxe, 2013). In this hierarchical predictive coding framework, it is presumed that the 
brain works to build a stable model of the world, issuing predictions about incoming 
sensory information (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Social 
predictions, processed in the ToM network, are abstracted from sensory information and 
situated near the top of this hierarchy (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). When a prediction is 
violated, the model must be updated to account for this prediction error (for review, see 
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Clark, 2013). Consistent with this, the same regions that we have examined (i.e. the ToM 
network) also support impression updating, showing increased activity when inconsistent 
information about a known social agent is presented (Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & 
Todorov, 2013). If activity in these regions roughly reflects the magnitude of prediction 
error (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013), then moral claims may elicit greater activity 
(compared to preferences) in PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ because morals license stronger social 
predictions. That is, when participants received moral information they are able to make a 
stronger prediction about the anonymous speaker (e.g. what other moral beliefs they may 
have, whether the participant would like or dislike this person). Consistent with this, 
recent work has shown that people perceive moral beliefs (compared to preferences) as 
more central to identity—e.g. a brain injury that alters one’s moral beliefs changes one’s 
identity more than a brain injury altering preferences (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; 
2015). According to this hypothesis—which we are testing in ongoing work—the 
observed discrepancy between morals and preferences does not reflect a difference in 
kind, but rather a difference in degree: both morals and preferences can provide social 
information (violating social predictions about an anonymous speaker), but morals are 
more informative—in part because there are certain moral beliefs that we expect 
everyone to endorse (e.g. slavery is wrong). In sum, moral beliefs appear to be 
distinguished (from facts, but possibly even from preferences) by their salience as social 
information. 
Future Directions 
 “Which” actions people moralize is an area of heated debate within moral 
psychology (e.g. Fiske & Rai, 2014; Graham et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012; Janoff-
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Bulman & Carnes, 2013), and while the present work cannot directly address the 
controversy, it may help to contextualize it. Behaviorally, we allowed participants to rate 
the extent that moral claims were fact-like, moral-like, and/or preference-like. In Study 1, 
people rated moral claims as more moral-like than preference-like, but this difference 
was slight (just past the threshold of significance in a full mixed effects analysis). It was 
possible that people would view more prototypical moral claims as more moral-like, 
more fact-like, and less preference-like. However, in a supplemental study (Figure S4 & 
Table S10 of the online supplemental materials), using claims adapted from the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2012), we found that this was 
not the case: across all domains (e.g. harm, fairness, purity, authority, loyalty), people 
(regardless of political ideology) viewed moral claims as more preference-like than fact-
like. Furthermore, and surprisingly, moral claims were only rated as more moral-like than 
preference-like in the harm domain. Based on this, one might conclude that harm is the 
most prototypical moral domain, and that other domains are only moralized to the extent 
they involve harm (Gray et al., 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015). However, an alternative is 
also possible. All domains were moralized to some extent, and to focus on relative moral-
like and preference-like ratings would overlook that fact that all moral claims were 
perceived as highly preference-like. This, combined with our neuroimaging finding that 
morals are salient sources of social information, suggests that morality may be best 
understood as rooted in predictions about social relationships. Fortunately, several 
theories have advanced the argument that morality is embedded in social contexts and 
relationships (Carnes, Lickel, & Janoff-Bulman, 2015; Fiske & Rai, 2014; Janoff-Bulman 
& Carnes, 2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2017; 
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Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; 2015). Future work could apply our method to a broader 
sample of stimuli to test the relative prominence of features in a given claim (e.g. “To 
what degree is this statement about… [morality/social relationships/etc.]”. 
 Separately, there remains the interesting question of why moral claims have been 
thought to be objective in such a wide range of prior work. Moral conviction researchers 
have emphasized that people can be motivated to avoid compromise for their most 
strongly held moral beliefs (e.g. Skitka et al., 2005). Likewise, communities enshrine 
certain moral beliefs as laws or ethical codes, making them a social reality. If people are 
pushed to defend their moral beliefs, then they may express that they are more fact-like 
then they would under other circumstances (Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017). 
For this reason, future work might benefit from distinguishing moral processing from the 
defense of moral beliefs. The former may address the representation of moral 
information, while the latter is more relevant to motivated cognition and communication.  
Conclusion 
 Questions about the metaethical status of moral claims are questions about how 
moral information is represented. Moral objectivists have argued that people represent 
morals as fact-like (Railton, 1986; Shafer-Landau, 2003; Smith, 1994) and prior work in 
psychology and experimental philosophy has generally favored this objectivist view 
(Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004) with the recent caveat that some moral claims may 
be more objective than others (Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 2012; Heiphetz & 
Young, in press; Sarkissian et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2013). Evidence from the present 
work favors the alternative, subjectivist view: that behaviorally and neurally, people 
represent moral claims as largely preference-like. This evidence speaks to philosophical 
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debates about the metaethical status of moral claims, and while it certainly cannot 
conclude them, it demonstrates that the social relevance of moral claims is more salient 
than their objectivity—specifically, across a wide range of stimuli, morals and 
preferences both elicit activity in brain regions associated with social cognition and 
mental state representations. The social nature of moral claims is consistent with recent 
theoretical work, which has argued that morals are fundamentally about regulating social 
relationships (Fiske & Rai, 2014; Heiphetz et al., 2017; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; 
Rai & Fiske, 2011). Taken together, our findings help to situate the moral domain within 
the broader constellation of social and non-social information, bringing into focus the 
underlying cognitive processes that support moral cognition. 
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Supplemental Materials 
Supplemental Study 
 In Study 1, we observed that moral claims were perceived as more preference-like 
than fact-like. However, it is critical to replicate this finding with a separate set of moral 
stimuli. Below we analyze a secondary set of moral claims, adapted from the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Iyer, 
Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), which provide a taxonomy of the moral space, 
with domains related to harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity, and economic / lifestyle 
liberty. In every domain, moral claims were perceived as more preference-like than they 
were fact-like, by both liberals and conservatives in our sample, suggesting that the 
observations in the main paper are not simply a consequence of our stimuli sample. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited participants online using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) at an approximate rate of $5/hour, in line with standard AMT compensation rates. 
Our final sample consisted of 100 adults (49 female, 50 male, 1 unspecified; MAge = 36.4 
years, SD Age = 12.5 years), after excluding 2 participants for failing a simple attention 
check that asked them to describe any claim they had read. The Boston College 
Institutional Review Board approved this study, and each participant provided consent 
before beginning. 
 Procedure. The procedure was identical to that described for Study 1. Participants 
rated their agreement with claims and the extent that each was about facts, about morals, 
and about preferences: “To what degree is this statement about [facts, morals, 
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preferences]” (1 – “not at all"; 6 – “completely”)? Following these questionnaires, 
participants provided demographic information.  
As a group, participants were neither liberal or conservative (M = 3.8, SD = 2.0, 
7-point scale anchored at 1, “Socially Conservative”, and 7, “Socially Liberal”), as 
indicated by a one-sample t-test against the scale mid-point, t(98) = 0.76, p = . 451. To 
achieve a politically neutral sample, we recruited in two batches, approximately one 
month apart. First, we collected a sample of 50 participants, which leaned liberal (as in 
Study 1); then, for our second sample of 50 participants, we advertised that we were 
specifically interested in people with conservative political views. We were explicit that 
we would not screen participants by ideology in either sample (doing so would 
incentivize lying about political beliefs to qualify).  
 Stimuli. As in Study 1, participants read claims about facts, morals and 
preferences. Fact and preference claims were the same as in Study 1(24 facts, 24 
preferences; see Appendix A). Study 1 moral claims were replaced with claims drawn 
from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011), and additional 
items related to economic and personal liberty (Iyer et al., 2012). These questionnaires 
break up moral concerns into distinct domains: e.g. harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and 
purity. Harm and fairness are endorsed most strongly by political liberals, whereas 
political conservatives endorse a combination of all domains. The economic and personal 
liberty domains were added to explore libertarian morality.  
From the MFQ, we selected items where participants were asked to rate their 
agreement. These items were either used verbatim or minimally edited to remove the 
first-person perspective, making them consistent with our stimuli (e.g. “I think it’s 
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morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit 
nothing.” became “It’s wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing.”, whereas “It is more important to be a team player than to express 
oneself.” was unchanged; see Appendix C for all stimuli and alterations). We used 22 
moral claims in total: 3 harm, 3 fairness, 3, loyalty, 3 authority, 3 purity, 4 economic 
liberty, 2 lifestyle liberty, and 1 control item (“It is better to do good than to do bad.”).  
 Statistical methods. Our primary motivation for this study was to confirm that the 
high preference-like ratings we observed in Study 1 were not simply due to our selection 
of moral claims. Thus, for our purposes it was enough to examine contrasts within the 
sample of stimuli, rather than to generalize beyond it (as in Study 1). For this reason, we 
performed repeated measures ANOVAs within each moral domain, using a by-participant 
average across stimuli in each (as opposed to a full mixed effects analysis, crossing by-
subject and by-item random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Judd et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 
2014). We followed up ANOVAs with condition contrasts, comparing the extent to 
which people perceived examples in each domain as fact-like, moral-like, and preference-
like (p values are corrected for three comparisons, pcorrected = .0167).  
Results and Discussion 
 Within morals, repeated measures ANOVAs identified a significant main effect of 
dimension (fact-like/moral-like/preference-like) within each domain: Harm, F(2, 198) = 
122.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .458, Fairness, F(2, 198) = 67.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .325, Purity, F(2, 
198) = 148.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .501, Loyalty, F(2, 198) = 192.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .558, 
Authority, F(2, 198) = 47.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .236, Economic Liberty, F(2, 198) = 133.48, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .482, Lifestyle Liberty, F(2, 198) = 135.97, < .001, ηp2 = .481, Control, 
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F(2, 198) = 85.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .371. We followed up these main effects with contrasts, 
comparing the extent that examples in each domain were relatively perceived as fact-like, 
moral-like and preference-like. Contrasts are presented in Figure S4 and Table S10. In 
every domain, people perceived moral claims as more preference-like than fact-like. 
Given that endorsement of moral domains differs between liberals and conservatives, we 
explored whether relative dimension ratings differed in politically defined subgroups. For 
the question “Please indicate your political orientation relating to social issues” [1 – Very 
Conservative; 7 – Very Liberal], we categorized participants answering above the 
midpoint as liberal (n = 37), and those answering below as conservative (n = 46). For 
both groups, all domains were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like (Figure 
S4; Table S10).  
 These findings are intriguing, and leave open many questions for future research. 
For instance, among the moral domains, the only examples that were perceived as more 
moral-like than preference-like were within the harm domain (and the control statement). 
How this relates to ongoing debates regarding how claims are moralized (e.g. Graham et 
al., 2011; Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012) is beyond the scope of the present paper. For 
present purposes, these findings demonstrate that people generally perceive moral claims, 
both the sample used in the main paper and the independent sample used here, as more 
preference-like than fact-like. 
Supplemental Analysis For fMRI Study 
Working memory ROI analysis. In all working memory ROIs where we 
observed a difference between conditions, morals elicited less activity than facts, and in 
several cases morals also elicited less activity than preferences (Figure S3 of the online 
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supplemental materials). We performed a repeated measures ANOVA within each ROI, 
observing a main effect of content in five of seven ROIs: (a) left anterior middle frontal 
gyrus, F(2, 48) = 5.80, p = .006, ηp2 = .015; (b) right anterior middle frontal gyrus, F(2, 
48) = 9.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .060; (c) left supramarginal gyrus, F(2, 48) = 3.52, p = .037, 
ηp2 = .029; (d) right supramarginal gyrus, F(2, 48) = 6.34, p = .004, ηp2 = .062; and (e) 
medial superior frontal gyrus, F(2, 48) = 3.61, p = .035, ηp2 = .009. There was no 
significant main effects in either left, F(2, 48) = 0.06, p = .940, ηp2 = .0002, or right 
posterior middle frontal gyrus, F(2, 48) = 0.46, p = .633, ηp2 = .001.  
We followed up significant main effects with contrast analyses (contrast p values 
are corrected for multiple comparisons within each ROI). In (a) left anterior middle 
frontal gyrus, morals elicited less activity than both facts, z = 3.03, p = .007, d = 0.61, and 
preferences, z = 2.86, p = .012, d = 0.57, while preferences and facts did not differ, z = 
0.17, p = 0.984, d = 0.03. In (b) right anterior middle frontal gyrus, morals also elicited 
less activity than both facts, z = 4.42, p < .001, d = 1.01, and preferences, z = 2.51, p = 
.032, d = 0.57, while preferences and facts did not differ, z = 1.91, p = .136, d = 0.44. In 
(c) left supramarginal gyrus, morals elicited less activity than facts, z = 2.58, p = .027, d = 
.78, but there was no difference in activity between morals and preferences, z = 0.71, p = 
.755, d = .22, or between preferences and facts, z = 1.86, p = .151, d = .56. In (d) right 
supramarginal gyrus, facts elicited greater activity than both morals, z = 3.09, p = .006, d 
= .818, and preferences, z = 3.08, p = .006, d = .816, while morals and preferences did not 
differ, z = 0.01, p = .999, d = .003. Finally, in (e) medial superior frontal gyrus, morals 
elicited less activity than preferences, z = 2.67, p = .021, d = .60, but there was no 
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difference in activity between morals and facts, z = 1.59, p = .248, d = .36, or between 
facts and preferences, z = 1.08, p = .528, d = .24.  
Anatomically defined ToM ROI analysis. Anatomically defined ToM ROIs 
were each defined as a 9mm sphere surrounding a peak coordinate identified in a whole 
brain random effects analysis of the functional localizer contrast (false belief > false 
photograph) across all participants. Peak coordinates are reported in Table S3 of the 
online supplemental materials. For each ROI, we performed a repeated measures 
ANOVA comparing neural activity for morals, facts, and preferences, followed by 
condition contrasts. Contrast p values are corrected for three comparisons to achieve a 
familywise α of .05 within each ROI (pcorrected = .0167). 
As in the ROI analysis reported in the main paper, morals and preferences, 
relative to facts, both elicited greater in DMPFC and VMPFC (Figure S2 of the online 
supplemental materials). Main effects of content were significant in both ROIs: DMPFC, 
F(2, 48) = 40.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .326, VMPFC, F(2, 48) = 9.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .108. 
Within DMPFC, both morals, z = 7.95, p < .001, d = .1.59, and preferences, z = 7.67, p < 
.001, d = .1.53, elicited greater activity than facts, but were not distinguishable from each 
other, z = 0.28, p = .957, d = .0.06. Likewise, within VMPFC, both morals, z = 6.01, p < 
.001, d = 1.20, and preferences, z = 4.04, p < .001, d = 0.81, elicited greater activity than 
facts, but were not distinguishable from each other, z = 1.97, p = .120, d = 0.39. 
Results for PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ were also identical to the results for the 
individually localized functional ROIs reported in the main paper. We observed main 
effects of content within PC, F(2, 48) = 22.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .197, RTPJ, F(2, 48) = 
10.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .058, and LTPJ, F(2, 48) = 16.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .132. Within PC, 
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morals elicited greater activity than both facts, z = 6.56, p < .001, d = 1.31, and 
preferences, z = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.88, while preferences elicited marginally more 
activity than facts, z = 2.17, p = .077, d = 0.43. In RTPJ, morals elicited greater activity 
than both facts, z = 4.34, p < .001, d = .0.87, and preferences, z = 3.61, p < .001, d = .72, 
while preferences and facts were indistinguishable, z = 0.73, p = .747, d = .15. Finally, in 
LTPJ, morals elicited greater activity than both facts, z = 5.80, p < .001, d = .1.16, and 
preferences, z = 2.93, p = .010, d = .59, while preferences also elicited greater activity 
than facts, z = 2.87, p = .011, d = .57. Thus, our findings from anatomically defined ToM 
ROIs (based on the peak coordinates of the localizer contrast, within our sample) are 
identical to those reported using individually, functionally defined ROIs. Morals and 
preferences both elicited greater activity relative to facts across the medial prefrontal 
cortex, while morals elicited greater activity than both facts and preferences in the 
posterior ToM ROIs: precuneus, and bilateral temporoparietal junction. 	
Alternative Item Analysis. In the main body, we performed an item analysis to 
better characterize ROI activity in response to morals, facts, and preferences. In the 
second step of this item analysis, we identified potential covariates, by testing which item 
features were associated with ROI activity, in the absence of fixed effects of category. 
Here, we take an alternative approach; for each item feature, we tested for 
differences across categories to identify what intrinsic differences existed between 
morals, facts, and preferences. Table S8 of the online supplemental materials displays 
descriptive statistics for each feature and category, along with the results of a one-way 
ANOVA across categories. Among syntactic and semantic covariates, there were 
significant differences across categories in noun concreteness, F(2, 69) = 4.90, p = .010 
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and noun imageability, F(2, 69) = 3.94, p = .024, and a marginal difference in left 
embeddedness, F(2, 69) = 2.76, p = .070. Among online norming measures, there were 
significant differences across categories in valence, F(2, 69) = 6.88, p = .002, arousal, 
F(2, 69) = 19.52, p < .001, whether a person was present, F(2, 69) = 4.46, p = .015, 
whether claims evoked mental states, F(2, 69) = 196.4, p < .001, and agreement F(2, 69) = 
3.20, p = .047.  
We flagged these item features as potential covariates and used in the subsequent 
analysis of ROI activity.  As in the main body, we added each covariate as a fixed effect, 
one at a time in the order of their significance.  However, as mental state ratings were 
entered first in all prior ROI analyses, adding them first here would simply replicate the 
analysis presented in Table S6; thus, we held out mental state ratings and entered them as 
the final covariate. This allowed us to test whether the categorical effects for morals and 
preferences could survive correction for all other intrinsic differences. If they could, then 
the inclusion of mental states as a covariate would be necessary to explain their effect 
(rather than only sufficient).  
We focus here on DMPFC for demonstration purposes, (but see Table S9 for 
analyses of other ROIs). The analysis confirmed that mental state ratings were 
responsible for the neural activity elicited by morals, as opposed to other intrinsic 
differences between categories. In DMPFC, morals and preferences remained significant 
when controlling for all intrinsic differences but mental states: Morals, β = 0.205, t(43.1) 
= 4.65, p < .001, Preferences, β = 0.159, t(46.4) = 3.66, p < .001; when mental states 
were added to the model these effects were reduced to non-significance: Morals, β = 
0.100, t(69.2) = 1.25, p = .214, Preferences, β = 0.068, t(67.7) = 0.94, p = .350. Thus, our 
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conclusion that morals and preferences elicit common activity given that both elicit 
mental state representations is supported by this alternative method of covariate selection, 
in addition to the method used in the main body.
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Appendix A. Experimental Stimuli. 
Studies 1-2. 
Fact Moral Preference 
High-agreement   
In sports-based afterschool 
programs children participate in 
sports such as baseball or 
basketball to name a few. 
The goal of sports should be to 
teach children that respect for 
others is more important than 
winning. 
Afterschool programs involving 
sports are more fun than most of 
the alternatives available to 
children. 
In a full-term human pregnancy, 
babies spend nine months in a 
woman's womb. 
Parents should be willing to 
make sacrifices for the benefit 
of their baby. 
Babies that are temperamental 
are aggravating to spend time 
around. 
Airplanes have wings that 
enable the plane to lift upwards. 
It is irresponsible for airlines to 
risk the safety of their 
passengers. 
Going through airport security 
is an unpleasant experience. 
University professors teach 
classes but also conduct 
research. 
Professors should not tolerate 
students cheating on their 
exams. 
Professors who play videos 
make their classes more 
entertaining. 
A breathalyzer is used to 
determine whether a driver is 
intoxicated. 
Driving after drinking heavily is 
a stupid and selfish way to 
behave. 
Having a drink every now and 
then is a good way to relax. 
Touchscreens are used in a 
variety of electronics, including 
smartphones. 
The deplorable conditions of 
Chinese electronics workers 
should not be ignored. 
Using touchscreens is a much 
more satisfying way to interact 
with computers. 
Low-agreement   
Medical students at hospitals 
are able to perform surgeries 
with little to no training. 
It is fine for doctors to 
accidentally kill a small number 
of patients per year. 
Having a doctor listen 
attentively to your medical 
concerns is awful. 
Coffee beans grow particularly 
well in freezing cold climates, 
such as Alaska and Russia. 
Child labor in coffee bean 
farming is acceptable because it 
lowers the market price. 
Drinking coffee is a miserable 
experience when you are tired 
and need energy. 
The sand on beaches is usually 
transported there from nearby 
deserts. 
Private beaches are immoral, as 
everyone should be able to 
share the space. 
While at a hot beach, it is 
agonizing to dip your toes in the 
cool water. 
Fish are able to live outside of 
water for an extended time. 
Sport fishing to kill and eat fish 
is barbaric and evil. 
Nothing is more appealing than 
the smell of rotting fish. 
In humans, the liver pumps 
blood throughout the body. 
Universal donors should be 
obligated to donate their blood. 
Having blood drawn is a 
pleasurable experience. 
Cockroaches are a type of cold-
blooded reptiles related to 
snakes. 
It is wrong to harm cockroaches 
just because humans find them 
disgusting. 
Cockroaches are delicious to eat 
because of their hard and 
crunchy shell. 
Mid-agreement   
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The very first waffle cone was 
invented in Chicago, Illinois, at 
a state fair. 
It is unethical for businesses to 
promote sugary products to 
children. 
Any ice cream flavor tastes 
better when served in a crunchy 
waffle cone. 
Monopoly pieces were made 
from wood, not metal, during 
WWI. 
It is wrong to cheat when 
playing games such as 
Monopoly. 
Many games are better than 
Monopoly, which is incredibly 
boring. 
The author J.K. Rowling has 
two younger siblings, one 
brother and one sister. 
Harry Potter should be banned 
from school libraries for 
idolizing witchcraft. 
The Harry Potter books are 
engaging and delightful to read, 
even for adults. 
A town in North Dakota holds 
the world record for the tallest 
snowman. 
People should help their elderly 
neighbors clear snow from their 
driveway. 
In the wintertime, it is fun to 
catch snowflakes on the tip of 
your tongue. 
The oldest sandals in the world 
were found in Oregon's Paisley 
Caves. 
It is wrong to knowingly buy 
sandals made using sweatshop 
labor. 
Because sandals have fewer 
styles, they are less fun to go 
shopping for. 
Hummer trucks were first 
marketed to civilians in 1990. 
Good Americans buy American 
cars, such as Hummers. 
Nothing is more awesome than 
driving in a Hummer. 
There are more fish species in 
the Amazon River than in the 
Atlantic Ocean. 
Eating fish is acceptable if they 
were treated humanely when 
caught or raised. 
Sitting in a boat and fishing all 
day long is boring and a waste 
of time. 
The first CD made for 
commercial release was the 
rock CD: "Born in the USA". 
Music stores should prevent 
children from buying CDs with 
violent or sexist lyrics. 
Rock music is pleasing to the 
ear, and much more agreeable 
than rap music. 
Newtown Pippin was the first 
apple variety exported from the 
US. 
It is unjust for businesses to 
allow apples to rot rather than 
giving them to the needy. 
Green apples are too sour to be 
an enjoyable lunchtime snack. 
Of all types of birds, owls are 
the ones that can see the color 
blue. 
Destroying the habitats of owls 
through deforestation is 
deplorable. 
The "hoots" of owls in the 
woods make camping more 
enjoyable. 
The dog breed, Basenji, is the 
world's only barkless dog breed. 
Dog racing is harmful and 
exploitative to the dogs being 
raced. 
Dogs are not worth the stress 
and aggravation it takes to own 
them. 
Saturn’s moon, Titan, is the 
only moon known to have 
clouds. 
It is wrong to use animals as 
disposable space shuttle test 
pilots. 
Gazing at planets through a 
telescope is a satisfying activity. 
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Supplemental Study. 
Facts and preferences are unchanged from Studies 1 & 2.  
Moral  
Modifications from Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et 
al.,2012) are bolded 
Original Adapted 
Control (Good)  
It is better to do good than to do bad. It is better to do good than to do bad. 
Harm  
Compassion for those who are suffering is the 
most crucial virtue. 
Compassion for those who are suffering is the 
most crucial virtue. 
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a 
defenseless animal. 
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a 
defenseless animal. 
It can never be right to kill a human being. It can never be right to kill a human being. 
Fairness  
When the government makes laws, the number 
one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
When the government makes laws, the number 
one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
Justice is the most important requirement for a 
society. 
Justice is the most important requirement for a 
society. 
I think it’s morally wrong that rich children 
inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
It’s wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money 
while poor children inherit nothing. 
Purity  
People should not do things that are disgusting, 
even if no one is harmed. 
People should not do things that are disgusting, 
even if no one is harmed. 
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that 
they are unnatural. 
Some acts are wrong on the grounds that they are 
unnatural. 
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
Authority  
Respect for authority is something all children 
need to learn.  
Respect for authority is something all children 
need to learn.  
Men and women each have different roles to play 
in society.  
Men and women each have different roles to play 
in society.  
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my 
commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
If a soldier disagreed with his commanding 
officer’s orders, he should obey anyway 
because that is his duty. 
Loyalty  
 I am proud of my country’s history. Citizens should be proud of their country’s history. 
People should be loyal to their family members, 
even when they have done something 
wrong.  
People should be loyal to their family members, 
even when they have done something 
wrong.  
It is more important to be a team player than to 
express oneself. 
It is more important to be a team player than to 
express oneself. 
Economic Liberty  
People who are successful in business have a right 
to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. 
People who are successful in business have a right 
to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. 
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Society works best when it lets individuals take 
responsibility for their own lives without 
telling them what to do. 
Society works best when it lets individuals take 
responsibility for their own lives without 
telling them what to do. 
The government interferes far too much in our 
everyday lives. 
The government interferes far too much in our 
everyday lives. 
Property owners should be allowed to develop 
their land or build their homes in any way 
they choose, as long as they don't endanger 
their neighbors. 
Property owners should be allowed to develop 
their land or build their homes in any way 
they choose, as long as they don't endanger 
their neighbors. 
Lifestyle Liberty  
I think everyone should be free to do as they 
choose, so long as they don't infringe upon 
the equal freedom of others. 
Everyone should be free to do as they choose, so 
long as they don't infringe upon the equal 
freedom of others. 
People should be free to decide what group norms 
or traditions they themselves want to 
follow. 
People should be free to decide what group norms 
or traditions they themselves want to 
follow. 
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Appendix B. List of covariates with descriptions. 
Question 
name 
Source Description 
Word count Coh Metrix 
3.0  
Number of words in statement. 
Flesch reading 
ease 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures reading difficult through the average 
sentence length and number of syllables per word. 
Higher scores indicate more difficulty. 
Anaphor 
reference 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures the number of times a single idea is 
referenced by counting the use of anaphors (e.g. 
pronouns: he, she, it; ellipsis markers: did, was). 
Intentional 
verb incidence 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures intentional information by counting verbs 
categorized as intentional by Wordnet ratings 
(Fellbaum, 1998; Miller et al., 1990). 
Causal verb 
incidence 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures causal information by counting verbs 
categorized as causal by WordNet ratings. 
Causal verb 
ratio 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures the cohesion of causal events to actors 
through the ratio of causal particles (e.g. because, if) 
to causal verbs. Higher scores indicate increased 
cohesion and easier readability. 
Noun 
concreteness 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures concreteness of content words (e.g. chair 
is high in concreteness, democracy is low) using the 
mean concreteness ratings of content words, taken 
from human ratings in the MRC Psycholinguistics 
Database (Coltheart, 1981). 
Noun 
familiarity 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures the familiarity of content words using the 
mean familiarity ratings of all content words, taken 
from human ratings in the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database. 
Noun 
imageability 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Measures the imageability of content words using 
the mean familiarity ratings of all content words, 
taken from human ratings in the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database. 
Negation 
density 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. 
working memory load) through the count of 
negative expressions in the text (e.g. not, un-). 
Number of 
modifiers 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. 
working memory load) through the mean number of 
modifiers per noun phrase. 
Left 
embeddedness 
Coh Metrix 
3.0 
Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. 
working memory load) through the mean number of 
words before the main verb in a sentence. 
Agreement Scores 
taken from 
Study 1     
“To what extent do you agree / disagree with this 
statement?” (1-7; “strongly disagree”-“strongly 
agree”). 
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N = 68 
Valence Scores taken 
from online 
norming 
study. 
N = 17 
Valence was the difference between unipolar 
positive and negative ratings (Kron et al., 2013), 
described below:  
 
Instructions: “Please rate your feelings regarding 
this statement using the following two scales. An 
extreme unpleasant rating means you feel 
completely unpleasant, unhappy, annoyed, 
unsatisfied, melancholic, or despaired. An extreme 
pleasant rating means you feel completely pleased, 
happy, satisfied, content or hopeful.” 
Ratings: Negative valence (1-8; “no unpleasant 
feelings”-“strong unpleasant feelings”) and positive 
valence (1-8; “no pleasant feelings”-“strong pleasant 
feelings”). 
Arousal Scores taken 
from online 
norming 
study. 
N = 17 
Arousal was the sum of unipolar positive and 
negative ratings, described above. 
 
Recent work has demonstrated that summed 
unipolar valence ratings are highly correlated with 
physiological measures of arousal, and may be 
superior to separately measuring arousal (Kron et 
al., 2013). 
Mental 
imagery 
Scores taken 
from online 
norming 
study. 
N = 20 
“To what extent did you picture or imagine what the 
statements described as you read?” (1-7; “very 
little”-“very much”; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). 
Mental state Scores taken 
from online 
norming 
study. 
N = 18 
“To what extent did this statement make you think 
about someone’s experiences, thoughts, beliefs 
and/or desires?” (1-7; “very little”-“very much”; 
Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). 
Person 
present 
Scores taken 
from online 
norming 
study. 
N = 20 
“Does this statement mention people or a person?” 
(“Yes” / “No”). 
Reaction time In-scanner 
N = 20 
The time from the appearance of the in-scanner 
agreement rating prompt to the input of a response 
by the participant. 
Coh Metrix ratings are calculated using an online tool at http://cohmetrix.com (Graesser et al., 2004; 
McNamara et al., 2014). In online samples, participants who did not correctly answer a catch question 
(asking them to describe any of the 72 statements they had read) were excluded from analysis. This caused 
some variability in N across covariates. 
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Supplemental Materials 
 
Figure S1. Whole-brain Conjunction Analysis for Preferences and Facts Relative to 
Morals. Preferences and facts, relative to morals, elicited common activity in left middle 
frontal gyrus, peak coordinates: preference >moral [38, 44, 8], fact > moral [38, 42, 10]; 
left superior parietal lobule, peak coordinates: preference >moral [-10, -66, 58], fact > 
moral [-8, -68, 60]; and right superior parietal lobule, peak coordinates: preference 
>moral [8, -58, 66], fact > moral [10, -68, 60]. Permutation tests (5000 samples) were 
used to achieve a cluster-corrected familywise error rate of α = .05 in each contrast, while 
thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected). Permutation testing was performed using 
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SnPM 13 (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; Nichols & Holmes, 2001). Coordinates are 
reported in MNI space. Peak coordinates for each contrast are reported in Table S5. 
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Figure S2. Response Magnitude Across Content (fact/moral/preference) and anatomically 
defined ToM ROIs. ROIs were identified using the peak coordinates of a whole brain 
contrast of the localizer contrast (false belief > false photograph) across all participants. 
Each ROI is defined as a 9mm sphere around these peak coordinates. Coordinates are 
reported in Table S3. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of condition means. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. 	
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Figure S3. Response Magnitude Across Content (fact/moral/preference) and working 
memory ROIs. ROIs were identified using the reverse inference map for “working 
memory” at neurosynth.org (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). 
MFG = middle frontal gyrus; SMG = supramarginal Gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus. 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of condition means. *** p < .001; ** p < 
.01; * p < .05; † p < .10. Any contrasts not marked are non-significant. 
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Figure S4. Supplemental Study MFQ Behavioral Ratings. Across all domains, morals 
were rated as more preference-like than fact-like. This pattern held even when splitting 
the sample based on political orientation. Participants were grouped as liberal or 
conservative based on their response to the question: “Please indicate your political 
orientation relating to social issues” [1 – Very Conservative; 7 – Very Liberal]. Liberals 
answered above the midpoint (> 4) and conservatives answered below the midpoint (< 4); 
16 participants answered at the midpoint and were not grouped, while 1 participant gave 
no answer. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. For contrast values and 
associated significance, see Table S10.		
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Table S1. Study 1 behavioral results. 
Category: Morals    
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (Dimension | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 48.4)† = 114.1 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Moral-like > Fact-like z = 14.5 <.001* 2.70 (0.19) 
     Moral-like > Preference-like z = 2.02 .043* 0.61 (0.30) 
     Preference-like > Fact-like z = 7.45 <.001*** 2.10 (0.28) 
Morals are perceived as more moral-like and preference-like than fact-like. 
Category: Preferences    
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (Dimension | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 67.9)† = 817.1 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Preference-like > Fact-like z = 29.7 p < .001 4.11 (0.14) 
     Preference-like > Moral-like z = 39.8 p < .001 4.47 (0.11) 
     Fact-like ~> Moral-like z = 4.8 p < .001 0.36 (0.08) 
Preferences are perceived as more preference-like than they are moral-like or fact-like. 
Category: Facts 
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (Dimension | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 34.3)† = 350.5 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Fact-like > Moral-like z = 26.3 <.001*** 4.33 (0.16) 
     Fact-like > Preference-like z = 23.7 <.001*** 4.18 (0.18) 
     Preference-like > Moral-like z = 2.7 .007** 0.15 (0.06) 
Facts are perceived as more fact-like than they are moral-like or preference-like.  
Post-hoc tests are uncorrected for multiple comparisons. †In these analyses we used the Satterthwaite 
approximation of degrees of freedom for reasons of computational expense. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
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Table S2. Study 2 peak individual ROI coordinates for ToM functional localizer. 
Region N x y z k 
RTPJ 25/25 51 +/- 6 -53 +/- 4 25 +/- 5 263 +/- 84 
LTPJ 24/25 -49 +/- 7 -57 +/- 4 26 +/- 5 214 +/- 80 
PC 23/25 1 +/- 4 -56 +/- 5 37 +/- 5 262 +/- 81 
DMPFC 20/25 2 +/- 4 56 +/- 5 26 +/-7 128 +/- 86 
VMPFC 20/25 1 +/- 4 56 +/- 4 -8 +/- 6 120 +/- 72 
Mean and standard deviation, across participants, of peak coordinates for false belief > false 
photo contrast (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). All coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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Table S3. Theory of Mind network peak coordinates – group analysis 
Region x y z T score 
DMPFC 0 58 22 5.62 
VMPFC 0 44 -20 7.69 
PC 0 -52 40 10.81 
RTPJ 52 -60 24 10.55 
LTPJ -56 -56 28 9.69 
ROIs were a 9mm sphere around the reported coordinates. T scores represent difference scores in the false 
belief > false photograph contrast, in a random effects analysis across all subjects (df = 24). Permutation 
testing (5000 samples) ensured that this analysis was cluster-corrected to achieve a familywise error rate of 
α = .05, holding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected). All coordinates are reported in MNI space.
 168 
Table S4. Study 2 behavioral results. 
Category: Morals    
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (Dimension | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 34.2) = 46.7 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Moral-like > Fact-like z = 9.7 <.001 3.56 (0.37) 
     Moral-like > Preference-like z = 4.0 <.001 1.70 (0.43) 
     Preference-like > Fact-like z = 4.4 <.001 1.86 (0.42) 
Morals are perceived as more moral-like and preference-like than fact-like. 
Category: Preferences    
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (Dimension | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 27.6) = 73.8 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Preference-like > Fact-like z = 12.0 p < .001 4.34 (0.36) 
     Preference-like > Moral-like z = 11.6 p < .001 4.60 (0.40) 
     Fact-like ~> Moral-like z = 1.4 p = .307 0.27 (0.19) 
Preferences are perceived as more preference-like than they are moral-like or fact-like. 
Category: Facts 
Model: lmer(DV ~ Dimension + (Dimension | ID) + (0 + Moral-like + Preference-like | Item) 
 F statistic p  
Dimension (main effect) F(2, 21.9) = 107.4 <.001  
     Post-hoc paired t-tests z ratio p Mean Diff (SE) 
     Fact-like > Moral-like z = 14.4 <.001*** 5.14 (0.36) 
     Fact-like > Preference-like z = 13.6 <.001*** 5.00 (0.37) 
     Preference-like > Moral-like z = 2.0 .094 0.15 (0.07) 
Facts are perceived as more fact-like than they are moral-like or preference-like.  
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Table S5. Study 2 whole-brain random effects contrasts: peak coordinates.  
Contrast Name Cluster  
Size 
Peak T x y z 
(Moral > Fact) L Superior Frontal Gyrus 4020 10.14 -4 56 30 
   9.01 -16 38 48 
   8.48 -20 48 34 
 L Precentral Gyrus 1142 8.39 -48 2 36 
   7.02 -64 -18 -14 
   6.72 -58 -16 -24 
 M Precuneus 828 7.05 -8 -48 32 
   5.95 -6 -56 36 
   5.36 6 -50 24 
 L Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
666 
6.67 -40 -56 28 
   5.68 -50 -60 38 
   5.48 -52 -64 26 
 R Cerebellum 486 8.99 26 -78 -34 
 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 341 5.67 -32 24 -18 
   5.21 -50 18 4 
   4.28 -52 22 12 
 R Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus 
158 
5.64 36 14 -44 
   5.58 50 0 -34 
   4.75 44 10 -36 
 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 143 7.33 16 24 62 
   6.02 14 36 54 
 L Cerebellum 139 5.23 -24 -80 -34 
   3.82 -34 -84 -30 
 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 121 5.3 -40 10 50 
   4.4 -26 2 44 
 L Pons 121 4.61 -12 -40 -26 
   4.32 -10 -30 -36 
   3.65 -4 -24 -38 
       
(Moral > 
Preference) 
M Precuneus 1055 
5.7 -4 -54 30 
   5.64 14 -44 26 
   5.49 -10 -44 32 
 L Medial Temporal Gyrus 1047 7.05 -52 -4 -30 
   6.38 -62 -18 -12 
   6.16 -62 -14 -20 
 L Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
850 
6.51 -44 -60 32 
   5.42 -54 -68 30 
   5.34 -40 -68 42 
 L Occipital Gyri 331 5.11 -20 -92 2 
   4.9 -12 -94 6 
   4.85 -18 -88 -10 
 L Superior Frontal Gyrus 198 5.74 -18 36 46 
   4.61 -4 48 44 
   4.49 -10 42 52 
 R Medial Temporal Gyrus 172 5.97 50 -2 -34 
   5.02 58 -6 -34 
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   4.13 62 -6 -26 
 L Medial Temporal Gyrus 159 5.79 -52 -44 10 
   4.42 -52 -34 -4 
   4.02 -54 -48 0 
 R Precentral Gyrus 109 4.99 12 -14 66 
   4.49 16 -18 56 
   4.47 24 -20 54 
 L Superior Frontal Gyrus 100 5.3 -8 32 54 
   4.98 -12 24 52 
   4.05 -12 18 44 
       
(Preference > 
Fact) 
M Superior Frontal Gyrus 1762 
9.61 -2 54 24 
   8.4 2 52 16 
   8.17 -22 48 34 
 R Cerebellum 565 6.97 36 -84 -32 
   6.59 28 -80 36 
   5.06 46 -66 -34 
 M Straight Gyrus 157 4.74 4 40 -20 
   4.65 -2 48 -14 
       
(Preference > 
Moral) 
R/L Superior Parietal 
Lobule 
337 
5.94 -10 -66 58 
   4.83 12 -58 62 
   4.71 -4 -60 62 
 L Supramarginal Gyrus 244 6.75 -58 -28 38 
   4.85 -52 -30 52 
   4.66 -56 -36 48 
 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 199 6.24 38 44 8 
   3.93 42 52 -4 
   3.72 52 36 2 
 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 184 5.75 -40 48 14 
   4.86 -38 42 30 
   4.73 -44 42 22 
       
(Fact > 
Preference) 
L Angular Gyrus 364 
5.37 -32 -76 42 
   5.11 -28 -74 50 
   5.02 -30 -66 48 
 L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 287 5.76 -56 -60 -8 
   5.25 -62 -52 -10 
   4.71 -46 -54 -18 
 R Angular Gyrus 218 5.43 30 -50 36 
   5.04 36 -66 42 
   4.28 34 -74 38 
 R Intraparietal Sulcus 155 5.74 18 -58 26 
   4.18 20 -66 38 
 R Middle Temporal Gyrus 154 5.01 62 -42 -8 
   4.97 58 -48 -14 
   4.56 60 -40 16 
 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 123 6.25 44 30 24 
       
(Fact > Moral) L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 618 6.52 -58 -56 -20 
   5.89 -50 -48 -26 
   5.65 -58 -62 2 
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 R Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus 
552 
6.35 56 -50 -20 
   6.21 64 -38 -16 
   5.91 60 -56 -16 
 R Parietooccipital 
Transition Zone 
455 6.2 12 -68 42 
  5.84 16 -62 24 
   5.47 8 -56 70 
 L Parietooccipital 
Transition Zone 
455 5.45 -10 -74 46 
  5.35 -8 -68 60 
   4.95 -30 -74 42 
 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 318 5.28 38 42 10 
   5.08 46 38 12 
   4.9 50 32 24 
 R Angular Gyrus 282 5.5 38 -56 54 
   4.76 38 -50 44 
   4.43 36 -70 44 
 R Parietal Operculum 187 5.12 62 -30 30 
   4.75 62 -30 42 
Contrasts were first modeled for each participant, and entered into a random effects analysis across all 
participants. Permutation tests (5000 samples) were used to achieve a cluster-corrected familywise error 
rate of α = .05 in each contrast, while thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected). Permutation testing 
was performed using SnPM 13 (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; Nichols & Holmes, 2001). All coordinates 
reported in MNI space. 
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Table S6. Study 2 mixed effects analysis across all claims, examining ROI percent signal 
change (PSC) for morals and preferences relative to facts. 
ROI Step Model: R Syntax Coefficients 
DMPFC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.222, t(35.1) = 5.94, p = 9.1 x 10-7 
***Preference: 
     β = 0.182, t(40.1) = 5.14, p = 7.5 x 10-6 
 Identify 
potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ (1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Mental States: 
     β = 0.078, t(70.0) = 8.74, p = 7.9 x 10-13 
  lmer(PSC ~ Arousal + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Arousal: 
     β = 0.069, t(70.1) = 4.33, p = 4.9 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NounFamiliarity + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.002, t(70.1) = 2.38, p = .020 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NounConcreteness + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0005, t(69.8) = 2.27, p = .026 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
PersonPresent + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
*Person Present: 
     β = 0.077, t(70.0) = 2.19, p = .032 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NounImageability + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Noun Imageability: 
     β = -0.0005, t(69.8) = 2.05, p = .044 
 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-
significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ Moral + Preference + 
(1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
†Moral: 
     β = 0.119, t(74.6) = 1.58, p = .118  
†Preference: 
     β = 0.098, t(71.2) = 1.54, p = .129 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.039, t(68.0) = 1.57, p = .120 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
NounImageability + 
PersonPresent + 
NounConcreteness + 
NounFamiliarity + 
Arousal +  MentalState + 
Moral + Preference + 
(1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral:  
     β = 0.118, t(67.4) = 1.52, p = .132 
Preference: 
     β = 0.097, t(64.8) = 1.43, p = .157 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.037, t(62.2) = 1.30, p = .200 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.004, t(62.5) = 0.19, p = .849 
**Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.002, t(60.8) = 2.70, p = .008 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.00006, t(60.5) = 0.12, p = .904 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.003, t(60.8) = 1.13, p = .262 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = -0.00007, t(61.0) = 0.01, p = .990 
Reaction Time: 
     β = -0.0009, t(1325.0) = 0.08, p = .940 
 
VMPFC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.159, t(32.8) = 3.91, p = 4.3 x 10-4 
*Preference: 
     β = 0.098, t(33.8) = 2.15, p = .039 
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 Identify 
potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ (1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Mental States: 
     β = 0.050, t(70.1) = 4.15, p = 9.1 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ Arousal + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
**Arousal: 
     β = 0.054, t(70.0) = 2.99, p = .004 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
PersonPresent + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
*Person Present: 
     β = 0.087, t(69.9) = 2.30, p = .024 
  lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Reaction Time: 
     β = 0.049, t(1260.4) = 2.24, p = .026 
 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-
significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ Moral + Preference + 
(1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.091, t(70.6) = 0.91, p = .368 
Preference: 
     β = 0.043, t(70.9) = 0.48, p = .629 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.025, t(68.4) = 0.74, p = .464 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
PersonPresent + Arousal 
+ MentalState + Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.095, t(68.3) = 0.90, p = .372 
Preference: 
     β = 0.066, t(69.8) = 0.70, p = .489 
Mental States: 
     β = 0.014, t(67.9) = 0.34, p = .739 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.013, t(67.8) = 0.52, p = .606 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.055, t(66.4) = 1.37, p = .176 
*Reaction Time: 
     β = 0.036, t(1222.7) = 2.11, p = .035 
 
LTPJ Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.148, t(49.5) = 5.00, p = 7.5 x 10-6 
*Preference: 
     β = 0.066, t(56.3) = 2.40, p = .020 
 Identify 
potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ (1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Mental States: 
     β = 0.047, t(70.0) = 5.63, p = 3.4 x 10-7 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
PersonPresent + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
***Person Present: 
     β = 0.113, t(69.9) = 4.53, p = 2.4 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ Arousal + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
**Arousal: 
     β = 0.040, t(70.0) = 3.03, p = .003 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
IntentionVerb + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
*Intentional Verb Incidence: 
     β = 0.001, t(70.1) = 2.58, p = .012 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NegationDense + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
**Negation Density: 
     β = 0.001, t(69.9) = 2.57, p = .012 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
ReadingEase + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
*Flesch Reading Ease: 
     β = -0.001, t(69.9) = 2.55, p = .013 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NumModifiers + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Number of Modifiers: 
     β = -0.050, t(69.8) = 2.28, p = .026 
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 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-
significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ Moral + Preference + 
(1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral: 
    β = 0.051, t(74.3) = 0.77, p = .443 
Preference: 
    β = -0.013, t(74.5) = 0.23, p = .819 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.036, t(68.5) = 1.61, p = .111 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
NumModifiers + 
ReadingEase + 
NegationDense + 
IntentionVerb  + Arousal 
+ PersonPresent + 
MentalState + Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
Moral: 
    β = 0.092, t(62.5) = 1.47, p = .146 
Preference: 
    β = 0.052, t(53.0) = 0.98, p = .330 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.015, t(62.8) = 0.65, p = .518 
*Person Present: 
    β = 0.063, t(61.7) = 2.56, p = .013 
Arousal: 
    β = -0.009, t(62.5) = 0.66, p = .511 
Intentional Verb Incidence: 
    β = -0.00005, t(60.5) = 0.14, p = .887 
*Negation Density: 
    β = 0.001, t(64.1) = 2.59, p = .012 
Flesch Reading Ease 
    β = -0.0006, t(60.9) = 1.17, p = .245 
Number of Modifiers: 
    β = -0.023, t(61.5) = 1.35, p = .181 
Reaction Time 
    β = 0.006, t(1578.0) = 0.50, p = .495 
 
PC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.158, t(58.9) = 4.70, p = 1.63 x 10-5 
Preference: 
     β = 0.051, t(58.9) = 1.53, p = .132 
  lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.133, t(61.8) = 4.60, p = 2.1 x 10-5 
 Identify 
potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ (1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Mental States: 
     β = 0.047, t(70.0) = 4.47, p = 2.9 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
PersonPresent + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
***Person Present: 
     β = 0.125, t(70.0) = 4.14, p = 9.7 x 10-5 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
IntentionVerb + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
**Intentional Verb Incidence: 
     β = 0.001, t(70.1) = 2.79, p = .007 
  lmer(PSC ~ Arousal + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Arousal: 
     β = 0.038, t(70.0) = 2.44, p = .017 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
ReadingEase + (1|Item) 
+ (1|ID)) 
*Flesch Reading Ease: 
     β = -0.002, t(69.9) = -2.20, p = .031 
 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-
significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~Arousal + 
IntentionVerb +  
PersonPresent + 
MentalState + Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
†Moral: 
     β = 0.067, t(63.6) = 1.95, p = .055  
†Mental States: 
     β = 0.029, t(66.2) = 1.87, p = .066 
*Person Present: 
     β = 0.069, t(66.0) = 2.19, p = .032 
Intention Verb Incidence: 
     β = 0.0004, t(66.2) = 1.18, p = .241 
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Arousal: 
     β = -0.010, t(66.2) = 0.55, p = .584 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
ReadingEase + Arousal 
+ IntentionVerb + 
PersonPresent + 
MentalState + Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
†Moral: 
     β = 0.064, t(61.0) = 1.64, p = .068 
*Mental States: 
     β = 0.035, t(66.7) = 1.89, p = .027 
†Person Present: 
     β = 0.056, t(64.5) = 1.82, p = .081 
Intention Verb Incidence: 
     β = 0.0004, t(63.6) = 1.24, p = .249 
Arousal: 
     β = -0.012, t(65.5) = 0.63, p = .502 
Flesch Reading Ease: 
     β = -0.0006, t(64.1) = 0.79, p = .354 
Reaction Time: 
     β = -0.003, t(1489.0) = 0.48, p = .796 
  
RTPJ Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
**Moral: 
      β = 0.072, t(31.9) = 3.55, p = .001 
Preference: 
      β = 0.023, t(34.6) = 1.35, p = .187 
  lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
**Moral: 
      β = 0.060, t(32.9) = 3.61, p = .001 
 Identify 
potential 
covariates 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Reaction Time: 
     β = 0.028, t(1633.5) = 3.82, p = 1.3 x 10-
4 
  lmer(PSC ~ MentalState 
+ (1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
***Mental States: 
     β = 0.021, t(70.1) = 4.02, p = 1.4 x 10-4 
  lmer(PSC ~ 
NounFamiliarity + 
(1|Item) + (1|ID)) 
*Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.001, t(70.0) = 2.06, p = .043 
 Attempt to 
disprove 
hypothesis 
Marginal/non-
significant model: 
lmer(PSC ~ RT + 
MentalState + Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.030, t(43.6) = 1.63, p = .110 
**Mental States: 
     β = 0.017, t(63.3) = 7.92, p = .008 
***Reaction Time: 
     β = 0.027, t(1615.0) = 3.69, p = 2.3 x 10 
-4 
  Full model: 
lmer(PSC ~ 
NounFamiliarity + RT + 
MentalState + Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
†Moral: 
     β = 0.035, t(41.4) = 1.91, p = .063 
*Mental States: 
     β = 0.016, t(79.4) = 2.52, p = .014 
***Reaction Time: 
     β = 0.027, t(1604.0) = 3.71, p = 2.2 x 10 
-4 
*Noun Familiarity: 
     β = 0.0008, t(69.4) = 2.53, p = .014 
Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2016), and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), using 
the Kenward-Roger approximation of degrees of freedom (lmerTest, Kuznetsova et al., 2015; pbkrtest, 
Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. β represent standardized 
regression coefficients.
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Table S7. Working memory network ROI coordinates. 
Region x y z Z ratio 
L Anterior MFG -42 30 26 9.81 
R Anterior MFG 42 34 28 10.24 
L Posterior MFG -28 0 54 8.84 
R Posterior MFG 32 4 52 10.37 
L SMG -36 -50 44 11.14 
R SMG 40 -50 46 9.50 
Medial SFG 0 16 48 8.16 
ROIs were a 9mm sphere around the reported coordinates. Z ratios correspond to the reverse inference map 
for “working memory” at neurosynth.org (Yarkoni et al., 2011). The Z ratio represents the extent that this 
voxel is preferentially related to the term “working memory”. All coordinates are reported in MNI space. 
MFG = middle frontal gyrus; SMG = supramarginal Gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus. 
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Table S8 Item-wise covariates: descriptive statistics and ANOVAs. 
Question name Descriptive Statistics: M (S.D.) ANOVA 
 Facts 
NItems = 24 
Morals 
NItems = 24 
Preferences 
NItems = 24 
 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures 
Word count 12.1 (2.3) 12.0 (2.4) 11.8 (2.4) F(2, 69) = 0.09, p = .912 
Flesch reading ease 62.0 (21.6) 55.8 (17.0) 61.2 (23.4) F(2, 69) = 0.62, p = .542 
Anaphor reference 65.7 (9.8) 69.2 (10.7) 68.8 (13.0) F(2, 69) = 0.70, p = .502 
Intentional verb 
incidence 
14.8 (35.5) 25.8 (46.2) 8.80 (29.8) F(2, 69) = 1.26, p = .292 
Causal verb 
incidence 
38.3 (43.8) 23.8 (42.6) 18.8 (38.0) F(2, 69) = 1.43, p = .246 
Causal verb ratio 0.10 (0.29) 0.19 (0.38) 0.12 (0.30) F(2, 69) = 0.41, p = .663 
Noun concreteness 438.2 (62.8) 406.2 (62.3) 379.1 (71.1) F(2, 69) = 4.90, p = .010 ** 
Noun familiarity 574.0 (18.8) 573.2 (15.8) 578.2 (21.5) F(2, 69) = 0.49, p = .615 
Noun imageability 466.8 (56.4) 439.2 (57.6) 420.4 (58.8) F(2, 69) = 3.94, p = .024 * 
Negation density 7.1 (24.6) 8.4 (28.7) 3.2 (15.7) F(2, 69) = 0.32, p = .729 
Number of 
modifiers 
1.01 (0.52) 0.71 (0.58) 0.86 (0.52) F(2, 69) = 1.94, p = .151 
Left embeddedness 3.54 (2.06) 2.50 (2.13) 3.96 (2.44) F(2, 69) = 2.76, p = .070 † 
Online Norming Measures  
Agreement 4.11 (1.36) 3.96 (1.47) 3.96 (1.29) F(2, 69) = 3.20, p = .047 * 
Valence 0.91 (1.75) -1.47 (2.24) 0.38 (2.86) F(2, 69) = 6.89, p = .002 ** 
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Arousal 5.42 (0.75) 6.60 (0.78) 6.50 (0.66) F(2, 69) = 19.57, p < .001 *** 
(Positive Rating) 3.16 (0.88) 2.57 (1.04) 3.44 (1.47) F(2, 69) = 3.57, p = .033 * 
(Negative Rating) 2.26 (1.02) 4.04 (1.32) 3.06 (1.47) F(2, 69) = 11.60, p < .001 *** 
Mental imagery 4.18 (0.74) 4.20 (0.62) 4.36 (0.71) F(2, 69) = 0.47, p = .629 
Mental state 2.14 (0.54) 4.70 (0.50) 4.24 (0.38) F(2, 69) = 196.4, p < .001 *** 
Person present 0.31 (0.44) 0.57 (0.43) 0.23 (0.39) F(2, 69) = 4.46, p = .015 * 
In-scanner 
Reaction time 1.26 (0.17) 1.38 (0.25) 1.27 (0.22) F(2, 69) = 2.06, p = .135 
Coh Metrix ratings are calculated using an online tool at http://cohmetrix.com (Graesser et al., 2004; McNamara et al., 2014). Online samples were collected 
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. All measures are described in detail in appendix B.  
 179 
Table S9. Supplemental analysis mixed effects analysis across all claims, examining ROI 
percent signal change (PSC) for morals and preferences relative to facts, and intrinsic 
differences between categories. 
ROI Step Model: R Syntax Coefficients 
DMPFC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.222, t(35.1) = 5.94, p = 9.1 x 10-7 
***Preference: 
     β = 0.182, t(40.1) = 5.14, p = 7.5 x 10-6 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
except for 
mental states 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement +  (1|Item) 
+ 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.205, t(43.1) = 4.65, p = 3.2 x 10-5 
***Preference: 
     β = 0.159, t(46.4) = 3.66, p = 6.5 x 10-4 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.005, t(63.7) = 0.31, p = .759 
Valence: 
     β =0.005, t(63.0) = 0.74, p = .461 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β =-0.0004, t(62.9) = 0.84, p = .406 
†Person Present: 
     β = 0.049, t(63.2) = 1.77, p = .082 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0002, t(62.8) = 0.44, p = .663 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.011, t(62.9) = 1.10, p = .277 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + 
MentalStates (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.100, t(69.2) = 1.25, p = .214 
Preference: 
     β = 0.068, t(67.7) = 0.94, p = .350 
Arousal: 
     β = -0.009, t(62.4) = 0.46, p = .647 
Valence: 
     β = 0.005, t(62.0) = 0.85, p = .400 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0005, t(61.9) = 0.99, p = .328 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.041, t(62.2) = 1.47, p = .147 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0003, t(61.8) = 0.62, p = .540 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.016, t(61.9) = 1.48, p = ..145 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.047, t(62.0) = 1.56, p = .124 
    
VMPFC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.159, t(32.8) = 3.91, p = 4.3 x 10-4 
*Preference: 
     β = 0.098, t(33.8) = 2.15, p = .039 
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 All intrinsic 
differences 
except for 
mental states 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
**Moral: 
     β = 0.141, t(56.7) = 2.70, p = .009 
Preference: 
     β = 0.067, t(49.8) = 1.17, p = .247 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.017, t(63.5) = 0.76, p = .448 
Valence: 
     β = 0.009, t(62.9) = 1.07, p = .287 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0006, t(62.3) = 0.92, p = .360 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.055, t(62.8) = 1.42, p = .160 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0007, t(62.1) = 0.86, p = .394 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.015, t(62.7) = 1.04, p = .305 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + 
MentalStates + (1|Item) 
+ 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
 
Moral: 
     β = 0.105, t(63.8) = 0.97, p = .337 
Preference: 
     β = 0.036, t(66.2) = 0.36, p = .719 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.013, t(62.0) = 0.49, p = .624 
Valence: 
     β = 0.009, t(61.9) = 1.09, p = .281 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0007, t(61.3) = 0.95, p = .348 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.052, t(62.0) = 1.32, p = .192 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0007, t(61.1) = 0.89, p = .378 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.016, t(61.7) = 1.09, p = .280 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.016, t(62.0) = 0.38, p = .708 
    
LTPJ Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.148, t(49.5) = 5.00, p = 7.5 x 10-6 
*Preference: 
     β = 0.066, t(56.3) = 2.40, p = .020 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
except for 
mental states 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement +  (1|Item) 
+ 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.128, t(60.2) = 3.70, p = 4.7 x 10-4 
†Preference: 
     β = 0.006, t(64.0) = 1.75, p = .085 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.002, t(63.4) = 0.14, p = .891 
Valence: 
     β = 0.005, t(62.7) = 0.90, p = .374 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0001, t(62.7) = 0.29, p = .774 
***Person Present: 
     β = 0.086, t(63.0) = 3.59, p = 6.4 x 10-4 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.00003, t(62.5) = 0.06, p = .949 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.005, t(62.9) = 0.62, p = .540 
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 All intrinsic 
differences 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + Arousal + 
Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + 
MentalStates (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID) 
Moral: 
     β = 0.066, t(67.7)  = 0.98, p = .331 
Preference: 
     β = 0.051, t(65.9)  = 0.09, p = .933 
Arousal: 
     β = -0.005, t(62.2)  = 0.39, p = .701 
Valence: 
     β = 0.005, t(62.1)  = 0.96, p = .339 
Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0002, t(61.7)  = 0.38, p = .702 
**Person Present: 
     β = 0.081, t(62.1)  = 3.33, p = .001 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.00003, t(62.0)  = 0.06, p = .956 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.008, t(62.0) = 0.87, p = .385 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.028, t(62.2)  = 1.08, p = .287 
 
PC Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
***Moral: 
    β = 0.158, t(58.9) = 4.70, p = 1.63 x 10-5 
Preference: 
    β = 0.051, t(58.9) = 1.53, p = .132 
  lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
***Moral: 
     β = 0.133, t(61.8) = 4.60, p = 2.1 x 10-5 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
except for 
mental states 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Arousal + Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + (1|Item) + 
(Moral |ID) 
**Moral: 
     β = .106, t(61.8)  = 3.12, p = .003 
Arousal: 
     β = .011, t(64.0)  = 0.76, p = .448 
Valence: 
     β = .003, t(63.8)  = 0.46, p = .648 
*Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.001, t(63.5)  = 2.05, p = .045 
**Person Present: 
     β = 0.090, t(63.8)  = 3.07, p = .003 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.001, t(63.5)  = 1.61, p = .113 
Agreement: 
     β = .000008, t(63.7) = 0.001, p = .999 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Arousal + Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + 
MentalStates + (1|Item) 
+ (Moral |ID) 
†Moral: 
     β = 0.076, t(64.6) = 1.94, p = .057 
Arousal: 
     β = -0.007, t(63.0) = 0.37, p = .714 
Valence: 
     β = 0.002, t(62.9) = 0.25, p = .805 
†Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.001, t(62.6) = 1.92, p = .059 
**Person Present: 
     β = 0.090, t(62.8) = 3.09, p = .003 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.001, t(62.5) = 1.68, p = .097 
Agreement: 
     β = 0.002, t(62.8) = 0.19, p = .851 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.024, t(63.2) = 1.43, p = .157 
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RTPJ Hypothesis 
testing 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Preference + (1|Item) + 
(Moral+Preference|ID)) 
**Moral: 
      β = 0.072, t(31.9) = 3.55, p = .001 
Preference: 
      β = 0.023, t(34.6) = 1.35, p = .187 
  lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
(1|Item) + (Moral|ID)) 
**Moral: 
      β = 0.060, t(32.9) = 3.61, p = .001 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
except for 
mental states 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Arousal + Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + (1|Item) + 
(Moral |ID) 
**Moral: 
     β = 0.067, t(47.4) = 3.40, p = .001 
Arousal: 
     β = 0.004, t(64.3) = 0.50, p = .619 
Valence: 
     β = 0.004, t(64.1) = 1.03, p = .306 
*Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0002, t(63.4) = 2.01, p = .048 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.001, t(64.0) = 0.08, p = .927 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0005, t(63.4) = 1.58, p = .119 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.005, t(63.9) = 0.88, p = .380 
 All intrinsic 
differences 
lmer(PSC ~ Moral + 
Arousal + Valence + 
NounConcreteness + 
PersonPresent + 
NounImageability + 
Agreement + 
MentalStates + (1|Item) 
+ (Moral |ID) 
*Moral: 
     β = 0.054, t(57.1) = 2.38, p = .020 
Arousal: 
     β = -0.004, t(64.5) = 0.42, p = .673 
Valence: 
     β = 0.003, t(63.2) = 0.85, p = .400 
†Noun Concreteness: 
     β = -0.0005, t(62.6) = 1.89, p = .063 
Person Present: 
     β = 0.001, t(63.1) = 0.07, p = .942 
Noun Imageability: 
     β = 0.0005, t(63.0) = 1.63, p = .106 
Agreement: 
     β = -0.004, t(63.0) = 0.72, p = .475 
Mental States: 
    β = 0.011, t(63.7) = 1.21, p = .230 
Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2016), and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), using 
the Kenward-Roger approximation of degrees of freedom (lmerTest, Kuznetsova et al., 2015; pbkrtest, 
Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. β represent standardized 
regression coefficients.
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Table S10. Dimension Rating Contrasts Across MFQ Domains. 
  
Full Sample 
(N = 100) 
Liberal 
(n = 37) 
Conservative 
(n = 46) 
     
(Moral-like – Fact-like) 
 MFQ 
Domain Diff (SE) z ratio Diff (SE) z ratio 
Diff 
(SE) z ratio 
 Good 
(Control) 
2.79 
(0.22) 
12.67 
*** 
3.30 
(0.33) 
10.04 
*** 
2.33 
(0.34) 
6.83 *** 
Harm 3.01 
(0.19) 
15.73 
*** 
3.34 
(0.30) 
11.33 
*** 
2.91 
(0.28) 
10.20 
*** 
Fairness 2.05 
(0.19) 
10.74 
*** 
2.21 
(0.32) 
6.85 
*** 
2.04 
(0.28) 
7.33 *** 
Purity 2.62 
(0.18) 
14.43 
*** 
2.77 
(0.28) 
9.93 
*** 
2.51 
(0.27) 
9.19 *** 
Authority 1.26 
(0.19) 
6.74 
*** 
1.34 
(0.30) 
4.52 
*** 
1.20 
(0.28) 
4.26 *** 
Loyalty 1.79 
(0.16) 
10.95 
*** 
1.89 
(0.25) 
7.66 
*** 
1.80 
(0.24) 
7.37 *** 
Economic 
Liberty 
0.88 
(0.17) 
5.25 
*** 
0.98 
(0.24) 
4.00 
*** 
0.88 
(0.26) 
3.38 ** 
Lifestyle 
Liberty 
2.26 
(0.18) 
12.27 
*** 
2.64 
(0.32) 
8.25 
*** 
2.08 
(0.27) 
7.57 *** 
(Preference-like – Fact-like) 
 MFQ Domain 
Diff (SE) z ratio Diff (SE) z ratio 
Diff 
(SE) z ratio 
 Good 
(Control) 
2.12 
(0.22) 
9.63 
*** 
2.49 
(0.33) 
7.57 
*** 
1.59 
(0.34) 
4.66 *** 
 Harm 1.80 
(0.19) 
9.43 
*** 
2.12 
(0.30) 
7.18 
*** 
1.52 
(0.28) 
5.33 *** 
 Fairness 1.90 
(0.19) 
9.92 
*** 
2.22 
(0.32) 
6.88 
*** 
1.54 
(0.28) 
5.53 *** 
 Purity 2.80 
(0.18) 
15.41 
*** 
3.23 
(0.28) 
11.58 
*** 
2.37 
(0.27) 
8.65 *** 
 Authority 1.76 
(0.19) 
9.43 
*** 
2.31 
(0.30) 
7.77 
*** 
1.20 
(0.28) 
4.29 *** 
 Loyalty 3.20 
(0.16) 
19.55 
*** 
3.50 
(0.25) 
14.16 
*** 
3.00 
(0.24) 
12.30 
*** 
 Economic 
Liberty 
2.72 
(0.17) 
16.28 
*** 
3.15 
(0.24) 
12.87 
*** 
2.31 
(0.26) 
8.85 *** 
 Lifestyle 
Liberty 
2.91 
(0.18) 
15.80 
*** 
3.06 
(0.32) 
9.60 
*** 
2.78 
(0.27) 
10.15 
*** 
(Moral-like – Preference-like) 
 MFQ Domain 
Diff (SE) z ratio Diff (SE) z ratio 
Diff 
(SE) z ratio 
 Good 
(Control) 
0.67 
(0.22) 
3.04 ** 0.81 
(0.81) 
2.47 * 0.74 
(0.34) 
2.17 † 
 Harm 1.20 
(0.19) 
6.30 
*** 
1.23 
(0.30) 
4.15 
*** 
1.39 
(0.28) 
4.87 *** 
 Fairness -0.16 
(0.19) 
0.82 -0.01 
(0.32) 
0.03 0.50 
(0.28) 
1.80 
 Purity -0.18 
(0.18) 
0.98 0.46 
(0.28) 
1.64 0.15 
(0.27) 
0.54 
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 Authority -0.50 
(0.19) 
2.69 * -0.96 
(0.30) 
3.25 ** -0.01 
(0.28) 
0.03 
 Loyalty -1.41 
(0.16) 
8.60 -1.60 
(0.25) 
6.50 
*** 
-1.20 
(0.24) 
4.93 *** 
 Economic 
Liberty 
-1.84 
(0.17) 
11.04 
*** 
-2.17 
(0.24) 
8.86 
*** 
-1.43 
(0.26) 
5.48 *** 
 Lifestyle 
Liberty 
-0.65 
(0.18) 
3.53 ** -0.43 
(0.32) 
1.35 -0.71 
(0.27) 
2.58 * 
Participants were grouped as liberal or conservative based on their response to the question: “Please 
indicate your political orientation relating to social issues” [1 – Very Conservative; 7 – Very Liberal]. 
Liberals answered above the midpoint (> 4) and conservatives answered below the midpoint (< 4); 16 
participants answered at the midpoint and were not grouped, while 1 participant gave no answer. All p 
values are corrected for three multiple comparisons (contrasts within each domain and sample grouping; 
pcorrected = .0167). pfamily-wise = .05, pcorrected = .00208. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
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Abstract 
A single claim can be interpreted at multiple levels: it can be interpreted as correct or 
incorrect, or it can be interpreted in terms of the information it has expressed (a second-
order judgment). For instance, facts provide objective information about some state of the 
world, whereas preferences provide subjective information about beliefs. For moral 
claims, second-order judgments (i.e. metaethical judgments) occupy a special case, in 
that metaethical judgments are variable—some morals are perceived as more objective 
than others. The present work examined this second-order variability across a set of 
claims about morals, facts, and preferences—first behaviorally (Study 1), then using 
fMRI (Study 2). Because subjective claims involve referencing one’s own and others’ 
beliefs, we predicted that subjective moral claims would elicit greater activity in the 
Theory of Mind (ToM) network, a set of regions consistently associated with mental state 
processing. Using linear mixed effects models, we compared by-stimuli estimates of 
behavioral ratings (Study 1) with ToM network activity (Study 2). Subjective (i.e. 
preference-like) moral claims elicited greater activity in the ToM network, and objective 
(i.e. fact-like) moral claims elicited less activity in this network. Whole brain correlation 
analyses confirmed that the overlap of these two effects was specific to bilateral TPJ, key 
nodes in the ToM network. Effects could not be attributed to semantic or syntactic 
differences across stimuli. Exploratory analyses also identified discrepancies between 
processing for facts, morals, and preferences; particularly, ToM network activity for facts 
and preferences was associated with the tendency to consider mental states, but this was 
not the case for morals. Thus, the present work provides evidence for the representation 
of metaethical judgment, i.e. second-order judgment in the moral domain. We briefly 
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speculate on how our findings might apply to accounts of ToM network activity, drawing 
on recent theories of predictive coding. 
 
Highlights: 
• Perceived moral subjectivity is positively associated with ToM network activity. 
• Perceived moral objectivity is negatively associated with ToM network activity. 
• Relationship between metaethical judgment and BOLD is strongest in bilateral 
TPJ. 
• Multiple by-stimuli, continuous relationships with ToM network were identified. 
• Mixed effects analysis compared BOLD activity to independent behavioral 
estimates. 
Keywords: morality, social cognition, metaethics, theory of mind, fMRI, mixed effects 
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1. Introduction 
A single claim can be interpreted at multiple levels. For instance, at one level, 
people can interpret the claim “Mount Whitney is the tallest mountain in the United 
States” as correct or incorrect (a first-order judgment; and it is incorrect—the tallest is 
Mount McKinley). However, on another level (a second-order judgment) people can 
interpret the claim based on the nature of the information it has expressed: does the claim 
contain objective information about some state of the world, or subjective information 
about what someone believes? Facts and preferences are generally taken to represent 
opposite extremes of second-order judgment (Goodwin & Darley, 2010; Sayre-McCord, 
1986), and the second-order status of other claims can fall between these two extremes—
e.g. judgments about morality, aesthetics, or social norms can blur the line between what 
is objective and what is socially arbitrary. In the present work, we examine metaethical 
judgement (i.e. second-order judgments about morality), and their relationship with 
activity in the ToM network.  
Whether morality is objective or subjective is an area of unresolved debate in 
moral philosophy, but, when asked, non-philosophers will not give a unified response: 
they will report that some moral claims are more objective (e.g. “slavery is wrong”), and 
that others are more subjective (e.g. “eating meat is wrong”). A number of studies have 
recently highlighted this variability, (Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 2012; 
Heiphetz & Young, in press; Sarkissian et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2013), but the 
cognitive and neural processes underlying it are not well understood. Moral judgment is 
not a singular process, and almost certainly draws on a number of more basic processes 
(Dungan & Young, 2012). We assume that the same is true for metaethical judgment, 
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which means that an understanding of the processes underlying metaethical variability 
would not limit conclusions to the moral domain—it could potentially be extended to 
other domains where second-order status is variable (e.g. social norms; Ruff et al., 2013; 
Zaki et al., 2011). Thus, in the present work, we are concerned with the nature of the 
information conveyed by moral claims: is objectivity/subjectivity related to neural 
activity in known networks of brain regions? And can this activity help us understand 
what is being represented by this variance?   
 Because subjective claims involve referencing one’s own and others’ beliefs, we 
examined activity in the theory of mind (ToM) network, using a region of interest (ROI) 
analysis. The ToM network is comprised of brain regions implicated in the representation 
of internal mental states (e.g. beliefs, intentions; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Dodell-Feder 
et al., 2011; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Ruby & 
Decety, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001; 
Young et al., 2007; 2010; for review see Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). If 
reading subjective moral claims requires that participants represent the speaker’s beliefs, 
then activity in the ToM network may track with this perceived subjectivity. Furthermore, 
if some moral claims are perceived as more objective or subjective than others, then the 
most powerful way to examine metaethical variability would be to use an item analysis 
(e.g. Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Bedny et al., 2007) to test the relationship between ToM 
network by-stimuli ratings of perceived objectivity and subjectivity. In Study 1, we 
collect independent measurements of these by-stimuli rating in an online sample, then 
compare them with ROI activity in Study 2.  
1.1. Present Work 
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 In prior work, moral claims were rated as more objective when supported by a 
social consensus (Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, in press), and consistent 
with this, the present work used claims that were designed to vary on the dimension of 
consensus. Participants read facts, morals, and preferences, that were designed to fit 
within consensus sub-categories, eliciting either positive-consensus, where most people 
would agree, negative consensus, where most people would disagree, or no-consensus, 
where neither agreement nor disagreement was strong (Figure 1; also see 2.1.2). In Study 
1, we validated the stimuli and collected behavioral ratings in an online sample, 
demonstrating that positive-consensus moral claims were perceived as more fact-like, and 
that metaethical judgments were much more variable among moral claims, compared to 
facts and preferences. In Study 2, participants read the same set of claims in the scanner. 
We broke from our a priori consensus sub-categories and performed an item analysis 
across all stimuli, using ToM network activity from Study 2 to predict the by-stimuli 
variance in the behavioral ratings collected in Study 1. This analysis required that we 
compare our two samples, and this was made possible by extracting item estimates from 
maximal mixed effects models in each sample (best linear unbiased predictors; BLUPs; 
Baayen et al., 2008; Westfall et al., 2017), predicting behavioral ratings, or BOLD 
(blood-oxygen-level dependent) activity, for each claim. Together, these studies show 
that metaethical judgments can be predicted by activity throughout the ToM network.  
2. Study 1 
Study 1 validated our stimuli set in an online sample, and allowed us to extract 
by-stimuli behavioral rating BLUPs from a sample that was approximately twice the size 
of our fMRI sample. To measure metaethical judgment, we asked participants to rate 
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each claim on the extent that it was about facts, about morals, and/or about preferences 
(Theriault et al., in press). This method has several advantages: (a) It validates stimuli 
conditions—facts should be rated as most strongly fact-like, morals as most moral-like, 
and preferences as most preference-like; and b) It avoids artificially imposing 
relationships among ratings—for instance, positive-consensus moral claims may be 
perceived as more fact-like, less preference-like, or both. 
2.1. Method 
 2.1.1. Participants. Participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) at an approximate rate of $6/hour, in line with standard AMT compensation 
rates. The final sample consisted of 49 adults (25 female, 1 unspecified; MAge = 35.5 
years, SDAge = 10.7 years), after excluding two participants for failing an attention check 
that asked them to describe any claim they had read. The Boston College Institutional 
Review Board approved Studies 1 and 2, and each participant provided consent before 
beginning. 
 2.1.2. Procedure. Participants read a series of claims (e.g., “It is irresponsible for 
airlines to risk the safety of their passengers”; see Appendix A for all claims), and, for 
each, rated a) their agreement (“To what extent do you disagree/agree; 1–7, “completely 
disagree”—“completely agree”), and b) the extent that the claim was about facts, about 
morals, and about preferences (Rating-type: fact-like/moral-like/preference-like; “To 
what degree is this statement about … [facts, morality, preferences]”; 1–7, “not at all”—
“completely”). The order of rating-types was counterbalanced across participants. Claims 
were designed to be interpreted as either facts, morals, or preferences and were evenly 
divided between categories (nFact = 24, nMoral = 24, nPreference = 24). Each category 
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included three consensus subcategories: a) positive-consensus, where most people would 
agree with the claim (n = 6); b) negative-consensus, where most people would disagree (n 
= 6); and c) no-consensus, where there would be no strong positive or negative consensus 
(n = 12). No-consensus claims (as opposed to controversial claims) were used because 
the feature of interest was consensus; in other words, no-consensus claims were intended 
to elicit a unipolar, non-skewed distribution of agreement. By contrast, controversial 
claims (e.g. “abortion is wrong”) would presumably produce a bimodal distribution of 
agreement, introducing strong individual differences that could decrease the power of our 
item analyses. The no-consensus subcategory was also larger relative to other 
subcategories on account of an uninformative distinction that was irrelevant to the final 
design: six no-consensus facts were true, and six were false. Critically, claims did not 
contain any mental state markers (e.g., “She thinks,” “He believes”) that could have 
elicited neural activity related to mental state processing (i.e. ToM network activity).  
	
Figure 1. Sample stimuli. Claims varied in content (fact/moral/preference) and agreement 
(positive-consensus/no-consensus/negative-consensus). See Appendix A for the full text 
of all stimuli. 
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 2.1.3. Statistical Methods. Studies 1 and 2 used mixed effects analyses to model 
crossed by-subject and by-item random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Judd et al., 2012; 
Westfall et al., 2014). This analysis allowed for generalizations beyond our sample of 
participants and stimuli, compared to standard analyses (e.g. ANOVA), which limit 
conclusions to the specific stimuli tested. It also allowed us to extract BLUPs for stimuli, 
predicting stimuli ratings while controlling for variance that could be attributed to 
subjects in the Study 1 sample (Westfall et al., 2017). Analysis was conducted in R (R 
Core Team, 2015, using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), and p values for fixed 
effects were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation of degrees of freedom, 
implemented in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2015).  
2.2. Results 
 2.2.1. Agreement Validation. Agreement ratings were fit with a maximal mixed 
effects model: Fixed Effects: intercept, category (fact/moral/preference) x consensus 
(positive-/no-/negative-consensus); Random Effects (by-subject): random intercepts, 
category x consensus; Random Effects (by-stimuli): random intercepts (for condition 
means see Table S1 of the online supplemental materials). In this model, we observed a 
main effect across category, F(2, 72.15) = 7.35, p = .001, and consensus, F(2, 55.11) = 
55.1, p < .001, but no interaction, F(4, 66.5) = 0.35, p = .843. In follow-up contrasts, 
agreement was greater, relative to preferences, for facts, z = 3.27, p = .003, and morals, z 
= 3.33, p = .002, which did not significantly differ from each other, z = 0.01, p = .999 (p 
values corrected for 3 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method; multcomp 
package, Hothorn et al., 2008). Critically, agreement was greater for positive-consensus 
claims, relative to no-consensus claims, z = 6.48, p < .001, and negative-consensus 
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claims, z = 10.26, p < .001, and agreement was greater for no-consensus claims relative 
to negative-consensus claims, z = 6.80, p < .001. Thus, agreement ratings were consistent 
with our design. While preferences elicited less agreement in general, we observed no 
significant interaction between category and consensus, meaning that differences between 
consensus sub-categories were comparable across facts, morals, and preferences.  
2.2.2. Fact-/moral-/preference-like ratings. First, we attempted to fit a maximal 
mixed effects model—Fixed Effects: intercept, category (fact/moral/preference) x rating-
type (fact-/moral-/preference-like) x consensus (positive-/no-/negative-consensus); 
Random Effects (by-subject): random intercepts, category x rating-type x consensus; 
Random Effects (by-stimuli): random intercepts, rating-type—but this failed to converge 
(10,000 iterations). We simplified the model, removing consensus sub-categories from 
by-subject random effects. In this model, we observed a significant 3-way interaction, 
F(8, 63.0) = 4.06, p < .001 (for condition means see Table S1 of the online supplemental 
materials). We performed contrasts within this model to compare consensus sub-
categories within each category x rating-type grouping (p values corrected for 27 
comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method). Among morals, positive-consensus 
claims were perceived as more fact-like than no-consensus, z = 5.70, p < .001, and 
negative-consensus claims, z = 6.26, p < .001. Among facts, negative-consensus claims 
were perceived as less fact-like than no-consensus, z = 5.43, p < .001, and negative-
consensus claims, z = 4.72, p < .001. Among preferences, there were no significant 
differences between consensus categories (Figure 2b).  
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Figure 2. Post-scan behavioral ratings. Participants rated each scenario on the extent that 
it was fact-like, moral-like, and preference-like (1–7; “not at all” – “completely”). (a) 
Collapsing across consensus subcategories, ratings were consistent with our a priori 
categories: facts were largely fact-like (left), preferences were largely preference-like 
(right), and morals were largely moral-like (center). Moral claims were also perceived as 
largely preference-like (a pattern explored further in Theriault et al., in press). (b) Across 
consensus subcategories, positive-consensus morals were perceived as more fact-like 
than no-consensus or negative-consensus morals (center; blue). Note that variance across 
items was markedly greater for moral claims than for facts or preferences (dots represent 
item averages for each rating; 72 stimuli x 3 ratings). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval. For condition means, see Table S1 of the online supplemental 
materials.  
 
 Variance across stimuli appeared to be greater among moral claims than among 
facts and preferences (Figure 2b), so we explored model fit in both the maximal model, 
and in models limited to each category (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2012; implemented in 
MuMin package; Bartoń, 2016). Model fit is represented by R2marginal, which denotes 
variance accounted for by fixed effects, and R2conditional, which denotes variance accounted 
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for by both fixed and random effects. Model fit was high in the overall model, R2marginal = 
0.683, R2conditional = 0.838, and marginal fit was high in the fact-only model, R2marginal = 
0.803, R2conditional = 0.887, and preference-only model, R2marginal = 0.821, R2conditional = 
0.913, meaning that variance within facts and preferences was largely explained by fixed 
effects. Marginal fit was much lower in the moral-only model, R2marginal = 0.331, 
R2conditional = 0.666. Likewise, dropping by-stimuli random effects from each model 
significantly reduced model fit, but the difference was markedly greater for moral claims: 
facts, χ2 (6) = 96.81, p < .001; preferences, χ2 (6) = 23.59, p < .001; morals, χ2 (6) = 
631.35, p < .001. Thus, the rating-type and consensus fixed effects could largely account 
for the responses within facts and preferences, but among moral claims fixed effects were 
less able to account for the observed variance, which was particularly strong across 
stimuli. 
2.3. Discussion 
 Consistent with prior work (Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, in 
press), people rated positive-consensus moral claims as more fact-like (i.e. more 
objective) than no-consensus and negative-consensus moral claims. Ratings for moral 
claims also varied more than for either facts or preferences. Study 2 tested whether this 
variance among ratings for moral claims could be accounted for by activity in the ToM 
network, given the hypothesis that evaluating subjective claims would elicit mental state 
processing4. 
                                                
4 fMRI data used in Study 2 is also used in a separate study (Theriault et al., in press). 
Analyses are not repeated between the two studies: the present study focuses on by-
stimuli relationships between BOLD activity and metaethical judgment. The separate 
study focuses on contrasts between facts, morals, and preferences, examining why morals 
and preferences elicit overlapping BOLD activity relative to facts.  
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3. Study 2 
 Objective claims refer to some state of the world, whereas subjective claims are 
mind-dependent: they refer to beliefs (Goodwin & Darley, 2010; Sayre-McCord, 1986). 
Moral claims can be perceived as both subjective and objective (Goodwin & Darley, 
2012; Wright et al, 2013) and Study 1 demonstrated that this variability is not well 
captured by behavioral measures. In Study 2 we examined the relationship between 
perceived objective/subjectivity and its relationship to BOLD activity in the ToM 
network. Discovering a relationship here could provide insight into the neural 
representation of metaethical judgment, and second-order judgment more generally.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1. Participants. Participants were a community sample, recruited through an 
online posting and paid $65. The final sample consisted of 25 right-handed adults (12 
female, 12 male, 1 unspecified; Mage = 27.0 years, SDage = 5.2 years). Two more 
participants were recruited but not analyzed due to excessive movement, identified during 
spatial preprocessing. Of these 25 participants, two completed only a subset of the scan 
session runs: one completed five of six runs due to experimenter error, and for the other a 
movement artifact rendered only the first three runs usable. We were unable to collect 
post-scan ratings for another of the 25 participants. All participants were native English 
speakers with no reported history of learning disabilities, previous psychiatric or 
neurological disorders, or a history of drug or alcohol abuse.  
3.1.2. Procedure. Participants completed the study in a single session. Twenty 
participated at Harvard University’s Center for Brain Science Neuroimaging Facility, and 
five at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Martinos Imaging Center. Scanning 
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parameters and equipment were identical between sites (see 3.1.4). In the scanner, 
participants read claims and rated their agreement with each (ratings were consistent with 
consensus subcategories; see Table S2). Claims were shown across six runs (12 per run; 
items were randomized; conditions were counterbalanced to appear equally in each run). 
Participants read each claim (6 s), rated their agreement (+4 s), and waited during fixation 
(+12 s). Agreement was provided with a button box (1–4; “Strongly Agree”—“Strongly 
Disagree”). A thumb press indicated “Don’t Know”, which was coded as an empty cell. 
This option was provided to avoid confusion, particularly for no-consensus facts where 
the answer was generally unknown (across our complete sample, 71.6% of “don’t know” 
responses were for no-consensus facts, followed by 7.3% for no-consensus preferences). 
Stimuli were presented in white text on a black background using a projector, viewable 
through a mirror mounted on the headcoil. The experimental protocol was run on an 
Apple Macbook Pro using Matlab 7.7.0 (R2008b) with Psychophysics Toolbox. Each 
experimental run was 4 min 52 s long, totaling 29 min 12 s across six runs. The in-
scanner experiment was preceded by a structural scan (6 min 3 s) and a functional 
localizer (two 4 min 46 s runs; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; see 3.1.5). The total scan time 
was 68 min 8 s due to a second study not reported here involving responses to moral 
dilemmas (29 min 12 s); runs for both studies were interleaved, so that stimuli in the 
present work were equally likely to appear early or late in the session, across participants. 
Post-scan, participants gave behavioral ratings for all claims (i.e. fact-/moral-/preference-
like ratings) on an Apple Macbook Pro and completed a brief demographics 
questionnaire.  
  201 
 
 3.1.3. Stimuli and Measures. Stimuli were identical to those described in Study 1 
(see Appendix A). Ratings concerning additional item features were collected in an 
online sample, in order to explore their relation to ToM network activity. These included 
several questions used in a prior item analysis of the ToM network (Dodell-Feder et al., 
2011), as well as measures of arousal and valence (Kron et al., 2013; see Appendix B). In 
these online samples, participants were asked one of the following questions: Mental 
States (n = 48; “To what extent did this statement make you think about someone’s 
experiences, thoughts, beliefs, and/or desires?”; 1–7; “Not at all”–“Very Much”), Mental 
Imagery (n = 46; “To what extent did you picture or imagine what the statement 
described as you read?”; 1–7–; “Not at all”–“Very much”), Person Present (n = 48; 
“Does this statement mention people or a person?”; 0–1; “No”–“Yes”), Valence (n = 42; 
the difference between 8-point positive and negative unipolar scales; Kron et al., 2013), 
Arousal (n = 42; the sum of both 8-point positive and negative unipolar scales; Kron et 
al., 2013).  
 To ensure that effects were not driven by semantic/syntactic differences across 
stimuli, several item characteristics were collected using Coh-Metrix 3.0 (Graesser et al., 
2004; McNamara et al., 2014). These included features such as word length, reading ease, 
noun concreteness, familiarity, and imageability, among others (see Appendix B).  
3.1.4. fMRI Imaging and Analysis. Scanning was performed using a 3.0 T 
Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) and a 
12-channel head coil at the Center for Brain Science Neuroimaging Facility at Harvard 
University and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Martinos Imaging Center. 
Thirty-six slices with 3mm isotropic voxels, with a 0.54mm gap between slices to allow 
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for full brain coverage, were collected using gradient-echo planar imaging (TR = 2000 
ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 216 x 216 mm; interleaved acquisition). 
Anatomical data were collected with T1-weighted multi-echo magnetization prepared 
rapid acquisition gradient echo image (MEMPRAGE) sequences (TR = 2530 ms, TE = 
1.64 ms, FA = 7°, 1mm isotropic voxels, 0.5mm gap between slices, FOV = 256 x 256 
mm). Data processing and analysis were performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and custom software. The data were motion-corrected, 
realigned, normalized onto a common brain space (Montreal Neurological Institute, 
MNI), spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (full-width half-maximum = 5 mm 
kernel), and high-pass filtered (128 Hz). 
3.1.5. ToM Localizer Task. An independent functional localizer task identified 
ToM ROIs (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). The task consisted of ten stories about mental 
states (false-belief) and ten about physical representations (false-photograph). Stories 
were matched in complexity across conditions; see http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php 
for the complete set. Each story appeared (10 s) and was followed by a statement about it, 
rated true or false (+4 s). Typically, to increase power, this contrast is used to select ROIs 
individually for each participant. However, this approach also means that ROI 
coordinates cannot be reported in normalized space. Alternatively, we could select ROIs 
using the peak voxels of a whole brain random effects contrast (belief > photograph) 
across all participants. Both approaches returned the same results, and so in the interest of 
providing replicable coordinates we used the latter approach, defining each ROI as a 
9mm-radius sphere around the peak voxel (for coordinates see Table S3 of the online 
supplemental materials).  
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3.1.6. ROI Analysis. BOLD activity for each functional ROI was estimated using 
a boxcar regressor, beginning with the appearance of the text, and ending after the 
agreement rating (10 s total). The time-window was adjusted for hemodynamic lag so 
that data were collected at 4–14 seconds from onset (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). To model 
activity in each ROI, we transformed BOLD activity at each time point of the 
experimental task into percent signal change (PSC = raw BOLD magnitude for (condition 
– fixation)/fixation), centering each run at mean PSC.  
3.1.7. Whole Brain Correlation Analysis. Whole-brain analyses were performed 
by estimating beta maps for each item, then correlating these with estimates of behavioral 
ratings (derived from Study 1, see 3.1.8). For each subject, three models correlated beta 
estimates with fact-like, moral-like, and preference-like ratings. Subject-level beta maps 
of each correlation were entered into separate second-level analyses across subjects. Each 
second-level contrast was cluster-corrected by permutation (5000 samples) to achieve a 
familywise error rate of α = .05, thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected; 
recommended by Woo et al., 2014). Permutation tests were performed using SnPM 13 
(http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; Nichols & Holmes, 2001).	
3.1.8. Statistical Methods. We used mixed effects analyses to model behavioral 
responses and PSC. Model specification and simplification is described below (3.2.2). 
For ToM ROIs, we identified the model then extracted BLUPs (best linear unbiased 
predictors) to compare by-stimuli ROI activity with behavioral BLUPs extracted from 
Study 1 (see Appendix A). BLUPs were desirable for a number of reasons. First, they 
have the property of shrinkage, i.e. each estimate accounts for the sample distribution and 
consequently anticipates regression to the mean (Baayen et al., 2008). Second, by-stimuli 
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BLUPs are estimated separate from by-subject variance, allowing us to use Study 1 
estimates that control for by-subject variance. Leveraging these properties allowed us to 
take advantage of Study 1’s larger sample size, providing more accurate estimates of by-
stimuli behavioral ratings. Study 1 BLUPs were extracted from the model described in 
2.2.2, dropping the fixed effect of consensus categories to minimize the projection of a 
priori categories onto the data (for model details, see Table S4 of the online supplemental 
materials). 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Behavioral Results. First, we estimated behavioral ratings from our Study 
2 sample, to ensure that the patterns in Study 1 were replicated. The maximal mixed 
effects model used in Study 1 (2.2.2) did not converge, most likely because of Study 2’s 
smaller sample size. There were no parameters which could clearly be dropped (e.g. 
parameters with zero unique variance, in a model with uncorrelated random effects), so 
by-stimuli random effects were dropped instead, as we simply wanted to confirm that 
ratings were similar to those observed in Study 1. We performed contrasts for all 
comparisons of interest (p values corrected for 27 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-
step method), and, consistent with Study 1, people rated positive-consensus morals as 
more fact-like than no-consensus morals, z = 6.82, p < .001, and negative-consensus 
morals, z = 7.92, p < .001, whereas no significant difference emerged between no-
consensus and negative-consensus morals, z = 2.33, p = .378. The decreased fact-like 
ratings for negative-consensus facts did not replicate (for condition means see Table S5 
of the online supplemental materials).  
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3.2.2. ToM network model. Initially, a maximal mixed effects model, predicing 
PSC, was fit across all functional ROIs—Fixed Efffects: intercept, ROI 
(DMPFC/VMPFC/PC/RTPJ/LTPJ) x category (fact/moral/preference); Random Effects 
(by-subject): random intercepts, ROI x category; Random Effects (by-stimuli): random 
intercepts, ROI—however, this maximal model failed to converge and had to be 
simplified. Interactions between random effects were temporarily removed, and all 
random effects components with zero unique variance were removed (Random Effects 
(by-subject): moral x (PC/RTPJ), preference x (VMPFC/PC/RTPJ/LTPJ); Random 
Effects (by-stimuli): PC, RTPJ, LTPJ). The final model included: Fixed Effects: ROI x 
category; Random Effects (by-subject): random intercepts, moral, preference, VMPFC, 
PC, RTPJ, LTPJ, moral x (VMPFC/LTPJ); Random Effects (by-stimuli): random 
intercepts, VMPFC (for model details, see Table S6 of the online supplemental 
materials).  
It is worth noting that simplifying the model provided information about the 
relations among ROIs. For by-stimuli random effects, we observed high correlations 
between DMPFC (i.e. intercept), PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ. These correlations precluded 
calculating unique variances for each ROI, but they also demonstrated that these regions 
respond in tandem, at least across our set of stimuli. Thus, our mixed effects analysis 
provided a data driven rationale to treat these regions as a network, while estimating by-
item variance for VMPFC separately. In analyses below, we average estimates of 
DMPFC, PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, and refer to them collectively as the ToM network; ROI 
interactions below, therefore, explore differences between the ToM network, and 
VMPFC.  
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3.2.3. ToM–behavioral analysis. BLUPs estimating by-stimuli behavioral ratings 
were extracted from the Study 1 model (see 3.1.8). BLUPs estimating by-stimuli PSC 
were extracted from the Study 2 model (3.2.2; PSC BLUPs were centered and 
normalized). Behavioral ratings were fit with a linear model, including the three-way 
interaction of PSC x category (fact/moral/preference) x rating-type (fact-like/moral-
like/preference-like), and the interaction of ROI (ToM/VMPFC) with all other terms. The 
main effect of ROI was not included in the model, as behavioral ratings were identical 
across levels (for details, see Table S7 of the online supplemental materials). We 
observed a 4-way interaction, F(4, 405) = 5.73, p < .001 between PSC, category, rating-
type, and ROI. Follow-up ANOVAs demonstrated that 4-way interactions were 
significant between morals and facts, F(2, 270) = 7.42, p < .001, and between morals and 
preferences, F(2, 270) = 6.64, p = .002, but non-significant between preferences and 
facts, F(2, 270) = 0.01, p = .986.  
Within facts, averaging across ToM and VMPFC, PSC did not interact with 
rating-type, F(2, 138) = 0.24, p = .788, and its main effect was non-significant, F(1, 140) 
= 0.002, p = .966. Likewise, within preferences, averaging across ToM and VMPFC, 
PSC did not interact with rating type, F(2, 138) = 0.61, p = .543, and its main effect was 
also non-significant, F(1, 140) = 2.67, p = .104.  
Within morals, we observed a 3-way interaction between PSC, rating-type, and 
ROI, F(2, 135) = 6.03, p = .003. Follow-up ANOVAs demonstrated that the 3-way 
interactions were significant between preference-like and fact-like ratings, F(1, 90) = 
13.8, p < .001, and between preference-like and moral-like ratings, F(1, 90) = 5.55, p = 
.022, but non-significant between fact-like and moral-like ratings, F(1, 90) = 0.81, p = 
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.371. The 2-way interaction between PSC and ROI was significant for preference-like 
ratings, F(1, 45) = 4.57, p = .038, and for fact-/moral-like ratings, F(1, 92) = 8.80, p = 
.004. Thus, among moral claims, the behavioral-BOLD relationship differed between 
preference-like ratings and fact-/moral-like ratings; however, in both cases, the 
relationship differed between ToM and VMPFC ROIs. Based on this, our final model 
included terms for PSC, PSC x preference-like ratings, and their interactions with 
VMPFC (in addition to a main effect of rating-type; see Table S7 of the online 
supplemental materials).  
Contrasts in the final model demonstrated that, within the ToM network, PSC was 
negatively related to fact-/moral-like ratings, B = -1.01, t(140) = 4.32, p < .001, and 
positively related to preference-like ratings, B = 0.94, t(140) = 2.85, p = .020. Within 
VMPFC, PSC was also negatively related to fact-/moral-like ratings, B = -0.28, t(140) = 
3.18, p = .007, and marginally positively related to preference-like ratings, B = 0.31, 
t(140) = 2.48, p = .055 (p values corrected for 4 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step 
method). Thus, among moral claims, ToM activity was negatively related to fact-/moral-
like ratings, and positively related to preference-like ratings, although both relationships 
were present to a lesser extent in VMPFC (Figure 3).  
  208 
 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral–BOLD relationships. BLUPs estimating behavioral ratings were 
extracted from Study 1 and compared with BLUPs estimating PSC in Study 2. ToM 
includes averaged estimates for DMPFC, PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ (all by-stimuli random 
effects were perfectly correlated). (a) Within moral claims, PSC for ToM was positively 
related to preference-like ratings, and negatively related to fact-/moral-like ratings. These 
relationships were present to a lesser extent in VMPFC. (b) Within facts and preferences, 
there was no relationship with PSC. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.2.4. Model fit comparison. In Study 1, by-stimuli variance in behavioral 
ratings was high. We tested whether adding the behavioral–BOLD relationships 
identified in 3.2.3 could partially account for this variance. One linear model predicted 
behavioral BLUPs (for facts, morals, and preference) using designed contrasts: category 
x consensus x rating-type. A second model added the four relevant terms identified for 
moral claims in 3.2.3—a) ToM activity predicting preference-like ratings, b) VMPFC 
activity predicting preference-like ratings, c) ToM activity predicting fact-/moral-like 
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ratings, and d) VMPFC activity predicting fact-/moral-like ratings. The model 
comparison was significant, F(4, 401) = 15.92, p = 4.2 x 10 -12, and remained significant 
when both models were restricted to only include moral claims, F(4, 131) = 6.00, p = 1.8 
x 10 -4, demonstrating that measures of BOLD activity could account for some of the 
observed variability.  
3.2.5. Whole brain correlation analysis. A whole brain random effects analysis 
within moral claims clarified whether the observed behavioral–BOLD relationships were 
specific to the ToM network. We performed three whole brain correlation analyses, 
testing the relationship between by-stimuli PSC and fact-like, moral-like, and preference-
like ratings BLUPs, derived from Study 1 (see 3.1.8). Preference-like ratings were 
positively correlated with activity in bilateral TPJ (peak coordinates: right [54, -60, 34]; 
left [-36, -70, 48]), and fact-like ratings were negatively correlated in overlapping regions 
of bilateral RTPJ (peak coordinates: right [44, -68, 46]; left [-44, -62, -48]). These 
regions of overlap were slightly dorsal and anterior to the functionally defined ROI 
positions; however, they did overlap—particularly in RTPJ (Figure 4). Surprisingly, fact-
like ratings were negatively correlated with activity in the superior and bilateral middle 
frontal gyri, and positively correlated with activity in the parietooccipital sulcus. No 
voxels showed negative associations with preference-like ratings, and no voxels showed 
either positive or negative associations with moral-like ratings. Thus, fact-like ratings are 
negatively correlated with activity in several regions, but both fact-like and preference-
like ratings were correlated with activity in bilateral TPJ. 
  210 
 
 
Figure 4. Whole brain behavioral–BOLD correlations, within moral claims. In three 
separate models, BOLD estimates were correlated with fact-like, moral-like, and 
preference-like ratings, extracted from Study 1. ToM ROIs are pictured for reference. 
Fact-like ratings were negatively related to activity in bilateral TPJ, overlapping with 
regions showing positive correlations with preference-like ratings. These areas of overlap 
included areas within the defined TPJ ROIs in both hemispheres. Fact-like ratings were 
also negatively related to BOLD estimates in superior and middle frontal gyri, and 
positively related in parietooccipital sulcus. For peak coordinates see Table S8 of the 
online supplemental materials.  
 
3.2.6. ToM–behavioral analysis: controlling for semantic/syntactic features. 
Our stimuli could have varied on some other dimension that was not of experimental 
interest, which could be driving the observed behavioral–BOLD relationship observed in 
3.2.3. We collected 13 semantic/syntactic features of our stimuli (e.g. reading ease, noun 
concreteness; see Appendix B), using Coh-Metrix 3.0 (Graesser et al., 2004; McNamara 
et al., 2014), as well as in-scanner reaction time. Starting with the ToM network model 
identified in 3.2.2 (with uncorrelated random effects), we added all features as fixed 
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effects, including their interactions with ROI and category. Features were dropped from 
the model step-wise. BLUPs were extracted from the resulting model, and the analyses in 
3.2.3 were repeated. The results were consistent with the patterns observed in 3.2.3, 
although we no longer observed an interaction between ToM and VMPFC (for full 
analysis, see Table S9 of the supplemental online materials)—among moral claims, 
positive ToM/VMPFC activity was associated with increased preference-like ratings, B = 
1.02, t(70) = 2.81, p = .013, and decreased fact-like/moral-like ratings, B = -0.97, t(70) = 
3.79, p < .001 (p values corrected for 2 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method).  
3.2.7. ToM–behavioral analysis: additional item features. The analyses above 
demonstrated that, among moral claims, ToM network activity predicts metaethical 
judgments. Although these findings allow us to examine patterns of ToM network 
activity within the moral domain, they do not allow us to distinguish between processing 
for morals, facts, and preferences. Behavioral ratings used in the analyses above simply 
did not vary across facts and preferences, which precluded comparisons between 
categories.  
Fortunately, claims in all categories were designed to elicit a range of agreement, 
meaning that categories could be compared along this dimension. BLUPs estimating by-
stimuli agreement ratings were extracted from Study 1 (from a maximal model, including 
category x rating-type and all appropriate random effects; consensus sub-categories were 
not included in the model), and compared with by-stimuli BLUPs estimating ToM 
network activity (3.2.2). Agreement was fit with a linear model, including the two-way 
interaction of PSC x category, and the interaction of ROI (ToM/VMPFC) with all other 
terms. ROI interactions were non-significant and PSC was averaged between ToM and 
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VMPFC (see Table S10 of the online supplemental materials). We observed an 
interaction between PSC and category, F(2, 66) = 5.92, p = .004. Follow-up ANOVAs 
indicated that relationship between agreement and PSC was significantly different 
between morals and preferences, F(1, 44) = 11.78, was marginal between morals and 
facts, F(1, 44) = 3.71, p = .061, and was non-significant between facts and preferences, 
F(1, 44) = 2.32, p = .135. Contrasts indicated that ToM (and VMPFC) activity had a 
negative relationship with agreement among moral claims, B = -1.46, t(69) = 2.57, p = 
.037, a marginally positive relationship among preferences, B = 1.01, t(69) = 2.30, p = 
.072, and a non-significant relationship among facts B = 0.02, t(69) = 0.04, p = 1.00 (p 
values corrected for 3 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method). Thus, for moral 
claims, agreement was negatively related to PSC across claims and for preferences this 
relationship was significantly different, and nearly reversed (Figure 5a).  
Additional item features, collected in separate online samples (see 3.1.3) 
contextualized this effect further. These included ratings of mental states (n = 48), mental 
imagery (n = 46), person present (n = 48), valence (n = 42), and arousal (n = 42). BLUPs 
for these ratings were extracted from maximal mixed effects models, except for person 
present, which used a generalized linear mixed effects binomial regression, with by-
subject random slopes for preferences removed (due to a model conversion failure, 
stemming from a high correlation with by-subject random intercepts).  
For ratings of mental state inference, after collapsing across ROIs (see Table S10 
of the online supplemental materials), we observed an interaction between PSC and 
category, F(2, 66) = 5.92, p = .004. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that the relationship 
was significantly different between morals and preferences, F(1, 44) = 12.33, p = .001, 
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and between morals and facts, F(1, 44) = 5.07, p = .029, but non-significant between 
facts and preferences, F(1, 44) = 1.06, p = .309. Based on this, we created a model 
including terms for PSC and PSC x moral-like ratings (in addition to a main effect of 
category). According to contrasts, for facts and preferences that elicited mental state 
inferences elicited greater activity throughout the ToM network, B = 0.30, t(67) = 3.64, p 
= .001, but moral claims did not, B = -0.24, t(67) = 1.70, p = .178 (p values corrected for 
2 comparisons; α familywise = .05; single-step method). The model interaction term 
indicated that the mental-state–ToM relationship was significantly less positive among 
moral claims, B = -0.53, t(67) = 3.30, p = .001. This was surprising given that the ToM 
network has been repeatedly shown to be active in response to stories containing 
information about mental states (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; 
Saxe & Powell, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). However, here we 
found that ToM activity was related to by-stimuli differences in mental state inference for 
facts and preferences, but not for morals (Figure 5b). We discuss this finding further in 
the general discussion.  
Of our remaining item features, only the presence of a person was related to ToM 
network activity (Figure 5c)—we observed a main effect, such that ToM network activity 
was greater when a person was present, across facts, morals, and preferences, B = 1.49, 
t(68) = 2.28, p = .026. Other measures were not significantly related to ToM network 
activity (Figure 5d–e; for analyses, see Table S10 of the online supplemental materials). 
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Figure 5. Additional, exploratory behavioral–BOLD relationships. By-stimuli BLUPs 
predicting agreement were extracted from Study 1, and from independent online studies 
for the remaining measures. BLUPs estimating ToM and VMPFC activity were extracted 
from Study 2 (3.2.2) (a) Agreement was negatively associated to ToM/VMPFC activity 
within moral claims. (b) Mental state inferences were positively associated with 
ToM/VMPFC activity within facts and preferences, but not within moral claims. (c) The 
presence of a person in the statement was positively associated with ToM/VMPFC 
activity for facts, morals, and preferences. (d–f) ToM/VMPFC activity was unrelated to 
mental imagery, arousal, and valence. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
4.1 General Discussion 
How is metaethical judgment related to neural activity? We hypothesized that 
subjective moral claims, which refer to the speaker’s beliefs, would elicit greater activity 
in the ToM network, a set of brain regions active during social cognition and mental state 
inference (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
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Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Consistent with this, preference-like moral 
claims elicited greater activity throughout the ToM network (Figure 3). Likewise, fact-
like moral claims elicited less ToM network activity. Interestingly, some moral claims 
were rated as more moral-like than others (see Appendix A), and these also elicited less 
activity throughout the ToM network. In Study 1, by-stimuli variance was high across 
moral claims (Figure 2b), and the behavioral–neural associations identified in Study 2 
explained a significant portion of this variance when added to the model (3.2.4). Whole 
brain analyses confirmed that these findings were not dependent on our ROI approach: 
within moral claims, BOLD activity correlated positively with preference-like ratings and 
negatively with fact-like ratings within overlapping clusters in bilateral TPJ (Figure 4). 
These findings were also robust to controls for semantic/syntactic features that were not 
of experimental interest (e.g. reading ease, noun concreteness). Finally, in an exploratory 
analysis, we observed several distinctions between processing for moral claims, 
compared to facts and preferences: ToM activity for moral claims, but not facts and 
preferences, was negatively related to agreement (Figure 5a). Furthermore, for facts and 
preferences, but not for morals, ToM activity was positively related to mental state 
inference (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; To what extent did this claim make you think about 
someone’s beliefs, thoughts, experiences, or desires?). This last finding is exploratory, 
but could be consequential if confirmed in future work, as it suggests that the ToM 
network may be sensitive to the degree of mental state inference in some domains but not 
others.  
This exploratory finding aside, a great deal of work has established that the ToM 
network is involved in representing mental states (Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 
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2009), and we take our findings as support for the reverse inference that mental state 
representation is associated with metaethical judgment. Notably, however, the present 
work is the first to identify continuous associations between behavioral ratings and by-
stimuli ToM network activity: among morals, activity was positively related to 
preference-like ratings, and negatively related to fact-/moral-like ratings. In prior item 
analyses bilateral TPJ activity was best accounted for by the belief > photograph contrast 
used in our functional localizer (PC was related to the number of people per story; 
DMPFC activity could not be accounted for by any feature; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). It 
would be a mistake to conclude from our findings that the function of the ToM network is 
for metaethical judgment (or that any brain region serves a unique function for moral 
cognition; Young & Dungan, 2012). However, it has recently been argued that a 
scientific understanding of ToM could be advanced by “deconstructing and 
reconstructing” the concept (Schaafsma et al., 2014). ToM network activity tracks with 
metaethical judgment (a special case of second-order judgment, i.e. judgments about the 
nature of information expressed), and this relationship may provide clues for future 
research, taking more direct aim at the underlying cognitive processes represented in the 
ToM network. 
 To this end, and in line with the recommendation that ToM be characterized with 
greater precision (Schaafsma et al., 2014), we briefly speculate about how else to 
interpret the relationship between ToM network activity and metaethical judgment. 
Several recent reviews have proposed that activity in social brain regions may be 
consistent with a prediction error framework (Joiner et al., 2017; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 
2013). For instance, social and reinforcement learning may share common mechanisms 
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(Joiner et al., 2017). Alternatively, prediction error could represent a generalized 
hierarchical framework, where social information is a high-level abstraction in a system 
oriented toward predicting incoming sensory information (Clark, 2013; Barrett, 2017; 
Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). In either case, predicted information should elicit less neural 
activity, while unexpected information should elicit more (in relevant brain 
regions/networks). Consistent with this, objective, fact-like moral claims may generally 
be more predictable than subjective, preference-like morals, or preferences. For instance, 
most people would predict that others hold certain common moral beliefs (e.g. that 
drinking and driving is bad, that slavery is wrong, etc.). If someone endorses a 
predictable moral belief, then incoming sensory information matches the prediction, and 
there is no prediction error to account for (see also Dungan et al., in press).  
 While promising, this hypothesis must be directly tested in future work. In 
particular, it is worth exploring the extent that abstract predictions differ between 
domains (e.g. morals vs. preferences). We observed some evidence of a domain 
distinction (Figure 5); however, these analyses were exploratory, and outside of 
metaethical judgment, the central focus of the present work. However, it is worth noting 
that our design intentionally presented claims in isolation, without an associated speaker 
or social context. This design feature may be important: moral claims may represent a 
special case of social prediction, in that moral predictions are generalized across people 
and contexts in a way that are preferences are not. Regardless of where you are, or whom 
you are speaking to, you may expect that people will endorse a set of common moral 
beliefs. Morals are strong social predictions.  
4.2 Conclusion 
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We began by suggesting that subjective moral claims may elicit greater activity in 
the ToM network, given that they refer to the speaker’s beliefs (Goodwin & Darley, 
2010; Sayre-McCord, 1986). Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis, but also 
leave open the possibility that the ToM network implements a more fundamental feature 
of social processing, such as social prediction error (Joiner et al., 2017; Koster-Hale & 
Saxe, 2013). Thus, the present work provides evidence for the neural representation of 
metaethical judgment. We believe that these findings, and our methodological approach, 
can be harnessed in future work to sharpen accounts of the underlying components of 
social cognition.  
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Appendix A. Experimental Stimuli and BLUPs estimates. 
Morals 
Positive-consensus ToM 
BLUPs 
VMPFC 
BLUPs 
Fact-like 
BLUPs 
Moral-like 
BLUPs 
Preference-
like BLUPs 
The goal of sports should 
be to teach children that 
respect for others is more 
important than winning. 
0.011 1.1269 3.0221 6.2564 3.8453 
Parents should be willing 
to make sacrifices for the 
benefit of their baby. 
-0.5251 0.5227 3.9144 5.9972 4.0798 
It is irresponsible for 
airlines to risk the safety 
of their passengers. 
0.2148 0.2742 3.2157 5.9815 4.303 
Professors should not 
tolerate students cheating 
on their exams. 
-0.7352 -0.0465 3.8749 6.2122 3.2389 
Driving after drinking 
heavily is a stupid and 
selfish way to behave. 
0.1883 1.5678 3.0313 5.7222 4.8858 
The deplorable conditions 
of Chinese electronics 
workers should not be 
ignored. 
0.0277 0.9978 2.0062 4.5673 5.3466 
No-consensus      
It is unethical for 
businesses to promote 
sugary products to 
children. 
0.3939 1.7801 2.5669 6.14 4.6066 
It is wrong to cheat when 
playing games such as 
Monopoly. 
-0.2061 1.1528 3.3337 5.9298 4.1966 
Harry Potter should be 
banned from school 
libraries for idolizing 
witchcraft. 
-0.229 0.9305 2.497 6.1893 3.9591 
People should help their 
elderly neighbors clear 
snow from their driveway. 
0.4754 0.8605 2.13 6.0441 4.4336 
It is wrong to knowingly 
buy sandals made using 
sweatshop labor. 
0.9306 2.5563 1.9186 5.1095 5.2449 
Good Americans buy 
American cars, such as 
Hummers. 
-0.0027 0.4265 1.947 5.4241 5.0757 
Eating fish is acceptable if 
they were treated 
humanely when caught or 
raised. 
0.371 2.2236 1.4816 2.6911 6.4033 
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Music stores should 
prevent children from 
buying CDs with violent 
or sexist lyrics. 
0.0083 0.2 2.1262 6.1149 4.5567 
It is unjust for businesses 
to allow apples to rot 
rather than giving them to 
the needy. 
1.0134 1.664 2.0092 5.6906 4.6681 
Destroying the habitats of 
owls through deforestation 
is deplorable. 
0.673 2.6323 1.2825 3.9891 5.6957 
Dog racing is harmful and 
exploitative to the dogs 
being raced. 
-0.0669 -0.0154 2.1859 6.1189 4.2002 
It is wrong to use animals 
as disposable space shuttle 
test pilots. 
0.0183 2.0761 2.1744 5.8517 4.3915 
Negative-consensus      
It is fine for doctors to 
accidentally kill a small 
number of patients per 
year. 
0.6888 1.2232 1.6661 5.3421 4.8423 
Child labor in coffee bean 
farming is acceptable 
because it lowers the 
market price. 
0.4606 1.284 1.6699 4.8386 4.805 
Private beaches are 
immoral, as everyone 
should be able to share the 
space. 
-0.07 1.4002 2.0179 5.5038 5.1079 
Sport fishing to kill and 
eat fish is barbaric and 
evil. 
-0.0172 0.6177 1.7373 4.6917 5.2054 
Universal donors should 
be obligated to donate 
their blood. 
-0.0665 1.8448 2.5858 5.7527 4.0372 
It is wrong to harm 
cockroaches just because 
humans find them 
disgusting. 
0.3621 -0.1727 1.5847 6.0397 3.8442 
Preferences 
Positive-consensus      
Afterschool programs 
involving sports are more 
fun than most of the 
alternatives available to 
children. 
-0.9189 0.1251 1.8004 1.1998 6.6632 
Babies that are 
temperamental are 
aggravating to spend time 
around. 
0.6489 1.6982 1.9433 1.7279 6.4285 
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Going through airport 
security is an unpleasant 
experience. 
-0.1557 1.3853 1.9827 1.2996 6.4646 
Professors who play 
videos make their classes 
more entertaining. 
0.3005 1.2072 2.372 1.3584 6.3961 
Having a drink every now 
and then is a good way to 
relax. 
-0.5007 0.7931 1.971 1.4424 6.2982 
Using touchscreens is a 
much more satisfying way 
to interact with computers. 
-0.4045 1.4263 1.9626 1.3536 6.4338 
No-consensus      
Any ice cream flavor 
tastes better when served 
in a crunchy waffle cone. 
-0.1058 0.6164 1.8833 1.3411 6.5164 
Many games are better 
than Monopoly, which is 
incredibly boring. 
0.0287 0.648 1.5868 1.4261 6.5202 
The Harry Potter books 
are engaging and 
delightful to read, even for 
adults. 
-0.9634 0.5373 1.6953 1.2657 6.5675 
In the wintertime, it is fun 
to catch snowflakes on the 
tip of your tongue. 
-0.5099 0.4378 1.7474 1.1547 6.6263 
Because sandals have 
fewer styles, they are less 
fun to go shopping for. 
0.5904 1.8393 1.4535 1.195 6.5902 
Nothing is more awesome 
than driving in a Hummer. 0.3776 1.0699 1.4302 1.2174 6.665 
Sitting in a boat and 
fishing all day long is 
boring and a waste of 
time. 
-0.573 1.0348 1.423 1.1657 6.7799 
Rock music is pleasing to 
the ear, and much more 
agreeable than rap music. 
-0.985 0.4179 1.8624 1.2667 6.5586 
Green apples are too sour 
to be an enjoyable 
lunchtime snack. 
-0.5057 0.6827 1.93 1.2962 6.3668 
The "hoots" of owls in the 
woods make camping 
more enjoyable. 
0.8586 1.1436 2.0413 1.3028 6.6514 
Dogs are not worth the 
stress and aggravation it 
takes to own them. 
-0.0913 1.3158 1.4839 1.2129 6.6934 
Gazing at planets through 
a telescope is a satisfying 
activity. 
-1.2491 -1.05 1.6208 1.2306 6.5764 
Negative-consensus      
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Having a doctor listen 
attentively to your medical 
concerns is awful. 
-0.4857 -0.5003 1.6712 1.3205 6.6532 
Drinking coffee is a 
miserable experience 
when you are tired and 
need energy. 
-0.4634 -0.2433 1.5413 1.3137 6.3696 
While at a hot beach, it is 
agonizing to dip your toes 
in the cool water. 
-1.413 -1.4443 1.4348 1.3312 6.5875 
Nothing is more appealing 
than the smell of rotting 
fish. 
-1.3909 -0.9091 1.8264 1.2195 6.301 
Having blood drawn is a 
pleasurable experience. -0.2406 0.8269 1.5902 1.178 6.478 
Cockroaches are delicious 
to eat because of their hard 
and crunchy shell. 
-0.0912 1.4404 1.4676 1.5881 6.3524 
Facts 
Positive-consensus      
In sports-based afterschool 
programs children 
participate in sports such 
as baseball or basketball to 
name a few. 
-1.3451 -1.1744 6.689 1.1949 1.4992 
In a full-term human 
pregnancy, babies spend 
nine months in a woman's 
womb. 
-1.3908 -1.3893 6.6404 1.5536 1.375 
Airplanes have wings that 
enable the plane to lift 
upwards. 
-0.2091 0.5427 6.3226 1.2109 1.7311 
University professors 
teach classes but also 
conduct research. 
-1.5847 -0.7983 6.6292 1.1615 1.277 
A breathalyzer is used to 
determine whether a driver 
is intoxicated. 
-1.1268 -0.3927 6.7811 1.3927 1.206 
Touchscreens are used in a 
variety of electronics, 
including smartphones. 
-1.5024 -0.9464 6.2851 1.1473 2.0334 
No-consensus      
The very first waffle cone 
was invented in Chicago, 
Illinois, at a state fair. 
-0.8656 -0.2341 6.7416 1.1645 1.2553 
Monopoly pieces were 
made from wood, not 
metal, during WWI. 
-1.9031 -1.3962 6.7146 1.2293 1.3857 
The author J.K. Rowling 
has two younger siblings, 
one brother and one sister. 
-1.2773 -0.0252 6.5033 1.1704 1.221 
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A town in North Dakota 
holds the world record for 
the tallest snowman. 
-0.9766 0.02 6.5508 1.2877 1.3402 
The oldest sandals in the 
world were found in 
Oregon's Paisley Caves. 
-0.7217 0.7578 6.3238 1.2247 1.4223 
Hummer trucks were first 
marketed to civilians in 
1990. 
-1.3589 -1.3786 6.2895 1.2685 1.2493 
There are more fish 
species in the Amazon 
River than in the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
-0.9593 0.3892 6.6263 1.1715 1.3217 
The first CD made for 
commercial release was 
the rock CD: "Born in the 
USA". 
-1.5318 -1.2682 6.5087 1.2753 1.4208 
Newtown Pippin was the 
first apple variety exported 
from the US. 
-0.8145 -0.6858 6.6517 1.1539 1.2155 
Of all types of birds, owls 
are the ones that can see 
the color blue. 
-0.226 0.5963 6.6338 1.2753 1.1995 
The dog breed, Basenji, is 
the world's only barkless 
dog breed. 
-0.699 0.4126 6.6678 1.1593 1.2906 
Saturn’s moon, Titan, is 
the only moon known to 
have clouds. 
-0.8793 -0.0489 6.5895 1.2161 1.3635 
Negative-consensus      
Medical students at 
hospitals are able to 
perform surgeries with 
little to no training. 
-1.7082 -1.072 5.6398 1.2107 1.4144 
Coffee beans grow 
particularly well in 
freezing cold climates, 
such as Alaska and Russia. 
-1.8077 -1.992 5.6126 1.2347 1.2591 
The sand on beaches is 
usually transported there 
from nearby deserts. 
-1.1876 -0.5137 5.7055 1.4063 1.2456 
Fish are able to live 
outside of water for an 
extended time. 
-0.8853 0.0665 6.11 1.2452 1.2927 
In humans, the liver 
pumps blood throughout 
the body. 
-1.4569 -1.0238 5.8752 1.1975 1.4958 
Cockroaches are a type of 
cold-blooded reptiles 
related to snakes. 
-0.2611 0.9317 4.6601 1.734 1.6692 
ToM BLUPs average estimates for DMPFC, PC, RTPJ, and LTPJ, as all by-stimuli random slopes were 
perfectly correlated. For model details, see Tables S4 and S6 of the supplemental online materials. 
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Appendix B. List of covariates, with descriptions. 
Semantic/syntactic measures (2.2.6)  
Question name Source Description 
Word count Coh Metrix 3.0  Number of words in statement. 
Flesch reading 
ease 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures reading difficult through the average sentence 
length and number of syllables per word. Higher scores 
indicate more difficulty. 
Anaphor 
reference 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures the number of times a single idea is referenced 
by counting the use of anaphors (e.g. pronouns: he, she, it; 
ellipsis markers: did, was). 
Intentional verb 
incidence 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures intentional information by counting verbs 
categorized as intentional by Wordnet ratings (Fellbaum, 
1998; Miller et al., 1990). 
Causal verb 
incidence 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures causal information by counting verbs 
categorized as causal by WordNet ratings. 
Causal verb ratio Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures the cohesion of causal events to actors through 
the ratio of causal particles (e.g. because, if) to causal 
verbs. Higher scores indicate increased cohesion and 
easier readability. 
Noun 
concreteness 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures concreteness of content words (e.g. chair is high 
in concreteness, democracy is low) using the mean 
concreteness ratings of content words, taken from human 
ratings in the MRC Psycholinguistics Database (Coltheart, 
1981). 
Noun familiarity Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures the familiarity of content words using the mean 
familiarity ratings of all content words, taken from human 
ratings in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. 
Noun 
imageability 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Measures the imageability of content words using the 
mean familiarity ratings of all content words, taken from 
human ratings in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. 
Negation density Coh Metrix 3.0 Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. working 
memory load) through the count of negative expressions 
in the text (e.g. not, un-). 
Number of 
modifiers 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. working 
memory load) through the mean number of modifiers per 
noun phrase. 
Left 
embeddedness 
Coh Metrix 3.0 Provides a measure of syntactic complexity (i.e. working 
memory load) through the mean number of words before 
the main verb in a sentence. 
Reaction time In-scanner 
N = 25 
The time from the appearance of the in-scanner agreement 
rating prompt to the input of a response by the participant. 
Online Item Features 
Agreement Study 1  
(N = 49)  
“To what extent do you agree / disagree with this 
statement?” (1-7; “strongly disagree”-“strongly agree”). 
Valence Online sample  
(N = 42) 
Valence was the difference between unipolar positive and 
negative ratings (Kron et al., 2013), described below:  
 
Instructions: “Please rate your feelings regarding this 
statement using the following two scales. An extreme 
unpleasant rating means you feel completely unpleasant, 
unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, or despaired. 
An extreme pleasant rating means you feel completely 
pleased, happy, satisfied, content or hopeful.” 
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Ratings: Negative valence (1-8; “no unpleasant feelings”-
“strong unpleasant feelings”) and positive valence (1-8; 
“no pleasant feelings”-“strong pleasant feelings”). 
Arousal Online sample  
(N = 42) 
Arousal was the sum of unipolar positive and negative 
ratings, described above. 
 
Recent work has demonstrated that summed unipolar 
valence ratings are highly correlated with physiological 
measures of arousal, and may be superior to separately 
measuring arousal (Kron et al., 2013). 
Mental imagery Online sample  
(N = 46) 
“To what extent did you picture or imagine what the 
statements described as you read?” (1-7; “very little”-
“very much”; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). 
Mental state Online sample 
(N = 48) 
“To what extent did this statement make you think about 
someone’s experiences, thoughts, beliefs and/or desires?” 
(1-7; “very little”-“very much”; Dodell-Feder et al., 
2011). 
Person present Online sample 
(N = 48) 
“Does this statement mention people or a person?” (“Yes” 
/ “No”). 
Coh Metrix ratings are calculated using an online tool at http://cohmetrix.com (Graesser et al., 2004; 
McNamara et al., 2014). In online samples, participants who did not correctly answer a catch question 
(asking them to describe any of the 72 statements they had read) were excluded from analysis. This caused 
some variability in N across covariates.  
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Table S1. Study 1 condition means. 
Behavioral ratings 
Model:  
Rating ~ Category * Rating-type * Consensus +  
(1+ Category * Rating-type | ID) +  
(1 + Rating-type | Item) 
  Consensus 
  Positive-consensus No- 
consensus 
Negative-
consensus 
Category Rating-type Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Morals About Facts 3.24 (0.21) A 2.13 (0.18) B 1.83 (0.21) B 
 About Morals 5.78 (0.28) 5.46 (0.23) 5.33 (0.28) 
 About Preferences 4.28 (0.28) 4.81 (0.25) 4.59 (0.28) 
Facts About Facts 6.59 (0.17) A 6.59 (0.17) B 5.53 (0.20) B 
 About Morals 1.31 (0.24) 1.19 (0.18) 1.35 (0.24) 
 About Preferences 1.58 (0.21) 1.29 (0.16) 1.36 (0.21) 
Preferences About Facts 2.03 (0.20 1.68 (0.17) 1.57 (0.20) 
 About Morals 1.40 (0.24) 1.26 (0.18) 1.32 (0.24) 
 About Preferences 6.46 (0.22) 6.60 (0.17) 6.64 (0.22) 
Agreement ratings 
Model:  
Agreement ~ Category * Consensus +  
(1+ Category | ID) +  
(1 | Item) 
  Consensus 
  Positive-consensus No- 
consensus 
Negative-
consensus 
 Category Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
 Fact 6.41 (0.40) 4.76 (0.31) 2.46 (0.42) 
 Moral 6.05 (0.40) 4.90 (0.29) 2.66 (0.39) 
 Preference 4.98 (0.40 4.08 (0.28) 1.58 (0.40) 
Mean estimates and standard errors are derived from contrasts within the models described in 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2. Superscripts denote significant differences within each row (p	values	corrected	for	27	comparisons;	single-step	method;	α	familywise	=	.05;	single-step	method).
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Table S2. Study 2 in-scanner agreement ratings. 
 Consensus 
 Positive-consensus No- 
consensus 
Negative-
consensus 
Category Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Facts 3.64 (0.06) 2.68 (0.16) 1.47 (0.11) 
Morals 3.64 (0.07) 2.81 (0.06) 1.89 (0.11) 
Preferences 2.93 (0.07) 2.56 (0.06) 1.46 (0.12) 
Mean and standard error (across participants). All comparisons, within content categories, were significant 
at p < .001.  
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Table S3. Theory of Mind network ROI coordinates. 
Region x y z T score 
DMPFC 0 58 22 5.62 
VMPFC 0 44 -20 7.69 
PC 0 -52 40 10.81 
RTPJ 52 -60 24 10.55 
LTPJ -56 -56 28 9.69 
ROIs were a 9mm sphere around the reported coordinates. T scores represent difference scores in the false 
belief > false photograph contrast, in a random effects analysis across all subjects (df = 24). All coordinates 
are reported in MNI space. 
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Table S4. Study 1 behavioral rating model details.  
ToM network activity 
Model:  
Rating ~ Category * Rating-type + 
(1+ Category * Rating-type | ID) +  
(1 + Rating-type | Item) 
REML criterion at convergence: 32392.5 
Dummy coded control conditions: Facts (category) & Fact-like ratings (rating-type) 
  Random effects structure (by-subject) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations       
   Intercept Moral Pref Moral-
like 
Pref-
like 
M*    
M-like 
M*      
P-like 
P*     
Ml-like 
Intercept 0.08 0.89        
Moral 2.52 1.59 -0.86        
Preference 2.37 1.54 -0.89 0.94       
Moral-like 1.94 1.39 -0.95 0.84 0.90      
Preference-
like 
2.24 1.50 -0.97 0.88 0.94 0.98     
M*Moral-
like 
7.23 2.69 0.84 -0.89 -0.87 -0.88 -0.87    
M*Pref-like 6.85 2.62 0.73 -0.82 -0.84 -0.77 -0.77 0.74   
P*Moral-like 2.34 1.53 0.91 -0.94 -1.00 -0.91 -0.95 0.89 0.85  
P*Pref-like 7.70 2.78 0.89 -0.90 -0.98 -0.94 -0.94 0.88 0.86 0.98 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations       
   Intercept Moral-
like 
      
Intercept .301 .549       
Moral-like .349 .590 -0.58        
Pref-like .750 .866 -0.90 0.27       
 
 
 
Residual  
 Variance St.Dev        
 1.10 1.05         
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Fixed Effects 
Name B (SE) t(df)   p 
Intercept 6.32 ( 0.17) t(101.1) = 36.85 < .001 *** 
Moral -3.99 (0.28) t(88.2) = 14.25 < .001 *** 
Preference -4.58 (0.27) t(90.0) = 16.70 < .001 *** 
Moral-like -5.06 (0.24) t(79.0) = 21.38 < .001 *** 
Preference-like -4.94 (0.28) t(98.6) = 17.59 < .001 *** 
Moral*Moral-like 8.24 (0.42) t(66.1) = 19.40 < .001 *** 
Preference*Moral-like 4.63 (0.28) t(91.9) = 16.32 < .001 *** 
Moral*Preference-like 7.23 (0.45) t(86.2) = 15.93 < .001 *** 
Preference*Preference-
like 
9.72 (0.47) t(82.8) = 20.57 < .001 *** 
St.Dev = standard deviation.  *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
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Table S5. Study 2 behavioral rating means. 
  Consensus 
  Positive-consensus No- 
consensus 
Negative-
consensus 
Category Rating-type Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Morals About Facts 3.14 (0.24) A 2.30 (0.22) B 2.01 (0.24) B 
 About Morals 6.35 (0.18) A 5.88 (0.17) B 5.87 (0.18) B 
 About Preferences 4.23 (0.31) 4.31 (0.30) 4.34 (0.31) 
Facts About Facts 6.59 (0.19) 6.65 (0.18) 6.38 (0.19) 
 About Morals 1.55 (0.21) 1.29 (0.20) 1.57 (0.21) 
 About Preferences 1.85 (0.22) A 1.37 (0.21) B 1.68 (0.22) AB 
Preferences About Facts 2.52 (0.23) 1.95 (0.21) 2.14 (0.23) 
 About Morals 2.11 (0.25) 1.74 (0.24) 1.90 (0.25) 
 About Preferences 6.51 (0.19) A 6.58 (0.18) B 6.32 (0.19) AB 
Mean and standard error are estimated using contrasts within the model defined in 3.2.1. Superscripts 
denote significant differences within each row (p values corrected for 27 comparisons; single-step method; 
α familywise = .05; single-step method).
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Table S6. Study 2 ToM network mixed effects model. 
ToM network activity 
Model:  
PSC ~ Category * ROI +  
(1+ Moral + Preference + VMPFC + PC + RTPJ + LTPJ + Moral*(VMFPC+LTPJ) | ID) +  
(1 + VMPFC | Item) 
REML criterion at convergence: 2271 
Dummy coded control conditions: Facts (category) & DMPFC (ROI) 
  Random effects structure (by-subject) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations       
   Intercept VMPFC PC RTPJ LTPJ Moral Pref M* 
VMPFC Intercept .008 .091        
VMPFC .010 .101 0.01        
PC .008 .090 -0.60 -0.13       
RTPJ .011 .105 -0.57 -0.20 0.71      
LTPJ .007 .085 -0.46 -0.22 0.54 0.53     
Moral .003 .053 -0.27 0.24 -0.34 -0.30 -0.41    
Pref .002 .042 -0.07 0.18 -0.14 0.07 -0.11 0.52   
M*VMPFC .002 .042 -0.14 -0.08 -0.43 -0.18 -0.41 0.62 0.66  
M*LTPJ .002 .041 -0.33 0.30 0.59 0.35 0.64 -0.08 0.37 -0.30 
Random effects structure (by-stimuli) 
 Variance St.Dev Correlations       
   Interc
ept 
       
Intercept .002 .048        
VMPFC .004 .064 .03        
Residual  
 Variance St.Dev        
 .071 .027         
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Fixed Effects 
Name B (SE) t(df)   p 
Intercept -0.147 (0.023) t(46) = 6.27 < .001 *** 
Moral 0.166 (0.023) t(128) = 7.05 < .001 *** 
Preference 0.160 (0.022) t(169) = 7.11  <. 001 *** 
VMPFC 0.084 ( 0.029) t(51) = 2.93 .005 ** 
PC 0.005 (0.024) t(47) = 0.20 .846 
RTPJ 0.005 (0.026) t(42) = 0.18 .858 
LTPJ 0.105 (0.023) t(45) = 4.55 < .001 *** 
Moral*VMPFC -0.035 (0.030) t(97) = 1.18 .241 
Moral*PC -0.059 (0.022) t(844) = 2.68 .007 ** 
Moral*RTPJ -0.113 (0.022) t(844) = 5.12 < .001 *** 
Moral*LTPJ -0.068 (0.024) t(162) = 2.88 .004 ** 
Pref*VMPFC -0.074 (0.029) t(114) = 2.56 .012 * 
Pref*PC -0.123 (0.022) t(844) = 5.56  < .001 *** 
Pref*RTPJ -0.152 (0.022 t(844) = 6.89 < .001 *** 
Pref*LTPJ -0.11 (0.022) t(844) = 5.05 < .001 *** 
 St.Dev = standard deviation. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
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Table S7. Study 2 ToM–behavioral analysis. 
DV: Behavioral ratings (Study 1 BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 2 (ROI: ToM/VMPFC) x 3 (rating-type (fact-/moral-/preference-
like)      x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) 
F(2, 405) = 5.73 < .001 *** 
     PSC x 2 ROI x 3 rating-type x 2 (fact/preference) F(2, 270) = 0.01 .986 
     PSC x 2 ROI x 3 rating-type x 2 (fact/moral) F(2, 270) = 7.42 < .001 *** 
     PSC x 2 ROI x 3 rating-type x 2 (moral/preference) F(2, 270) = 6.64 .002 ** 
     Within moral claims   
     PSC x 2 ROI x 3 rating-type F(2, 135) = 6.03 .003** 
          PSC x 2 ROI x 2 (fact-like/preference-like) F(1, 90) = 13.77 < .001 *** 
          PSC x 2 ROI x 2 (fact-like/moral-like) F(1, 90) = 0.81 .371 
          PSC x 2 ROI x 2 (moral-like/preference-like) F(1, 90) = 5.47 .022 * 
          Within preference-like ratings   
          PSC x ROI F(1, 45) = 4.57 .038 * 
          Within fact-/moral-like ratings   
          PSC x ROI F(1, 92) = 8.80 .004 ** 
  Model: rating-type + (PSC x ROI) + (PSC x ROI x preference-
like) 
B (SE) t statistic p 
          Intercept (Fact-like rating) 2.57 (0.11) t(137) = 
22.80 
< .001 *** 
          Moral-like  3.17 (0.14) t(137) = 
23.00 
< .001 *** 
          Preference-like 1.80 (0.17) t(137) = 
10.62 
< .001 *** 
          PSC (within fact-like/moral-like) -1.01 (0.23) t(137) = 4.32 < .001 *** 
          PSC x preference-like (within ToM) 1.94 (0.40) t(137) = 4.81 < .001 *** 
  PSC x ROI (interaction for VMFPC, within fact-/moral-like) 0.72 (0.23) t(137) = 3.11 .002 ** 
  PSC x preference-like x ROI (interaction for VMPFC, for 
preference-like) 
-1.35 (0.40) t(137) = 3.35  .001 ** 
          Contrasts: B (SE) t statistic p 
  Fact-/moral-like–ToM relationship -1.01 (0.23) t(140) = 4.32 < .001 *** 
  Preference-like–ToM relationship 0.94 (0.33) t(140) = 2.85 .020 * 
  Fact-/moral-like-VMPFC relationship -0.28 (0.09) t(140) = 3.18 .007 ** 
  Preference-like–VMPFC relationship 0.31 (0.12) t(140) = 2.48 .055 † 
Contrast p values corrected for 4 comparisons; single-step method; α familywise = .05; single-step method. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Table S8. Whole brain correlation peak coordinates.  
Contrast Name Cluster  
Size 
Peak T x y z 
Fact-like 
rating 
(negative) 
M Superior frontal gyrus 1037 7.60 -8 24 58 
  
6.76 -18 20 62 
   5.40 16 44 48 
 L Middle frontal gyrus 658 7.22 -28 10 50 
   6.24 -42 12 44 
   5.33 -48 28 24 
 L Angular gyrus 398 6.53 -44 -62 -48 
   5.60 -38 -72 48 
   5.23 -34 -62 48 
 L Middle temporal gyrus 142 6.51 -58 -32 -16 
   5.57 -66 -26 -12 
 R Angular gyrus 412 6.43 44 -68 46 
   5.76 50 -56 32 
   5.74 52 -62 40 
 R Middle frontal gyrus 239 5.58 40 20 44 
   5.14 32 28 42 
 L Medial caudate nucleus 132 5.18 -14 14 10 
   5.16 -12 6 14 
       
Fact-like 
rating 
(positive) 
M Parietooccipital sulcus  145 4.85 8 -78 36 
  
4.83 -6 -80 18 
   4.14 6 -84 44 
       
Preference-like 
rating 
(positive) 
R Angular gyrus 124 5.12 54 -60 34 
  
4.84 50 -62 42 
   3.95 44 -68 46 
 L Angular gyrus 102 4.98 -36 -70 48 
   4.36 -30 -64 54 
   4.14 -30 -76 46 
First level models produced a beta map for each item, for each participant. For each participant, 3 models, 
predicting by-item estimates were created, with fact-like, moral-like, and preference-like ratings as 
respective predictors. Beta maps for ratings from each model were entered into a random effects analysis 
across all participants. Permutation tests (5000 samples) were used to achieve a cluster-corrected 
familywise error rate of α = .05 in each contrast, while thresholding voxels at p < .001 (uncorrected). 
Permutation testing was performed using SnPM 13 (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm; Nichols & Holmes, 2001). 
All coordinates reported in MNI space.
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Table S9. Study 2 ToM–behavioral analysis: controlling for semantic/syntactic features 
Model:  
PSC ~ Category*ROI*NounConcreteness + ROI*LeftEmbeddedness + NounFamiliarity + 
(1+ Moral + Preference + VMPFC + PC + RTPJ + LTPJ + Moral*(VMFPC+LTPJ) | ID) +  
(1 + VMPFC | Item) 
REML criterion at convergence: 2378.2 
Dummy coded control conditions: Facts (category) & DMPFC (ROI) 
DV: Behavioral ratings (Study 1 BLUPs) 
PSC corrected for syntactic/semantic features 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 2 (ROI: ToM/VMPFC) x 3 (rating-type (fact-/moral-/preference-
like)      x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) 
F(4, 405) = 0.86 .486 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 rating-type x category F(4, 198) = 9.54 <.001 *** 
          PSC x 3 rating-type x category (fact/preference) F(2, 132) = 0.61 .542 
          PSC x 3 rating-type x category (fact/moral) F(2, 132) = 9.81 <.001 ** 
          PSC x 3 rating-type x category (moral/preference) F(2, 132) = 14.17 <.001 ** 
          Within moral claims   
          PSC x 3 rating-type F(2, 66) = 9.89 <.001 *** 
               PSC  x 2 (fact-like/preference-like) F(1, 44) = 18.20 <.001 *** 
               PSC x 2 (fact-like/moral-like) F(1, 44) = 0.001 .972 
               PSC x 2 (moral-like/preference-like) F(1, 44) = 13.97 < .001 *** 
       Model: rating-type + PSC + (PSC x preference-like) B (SE) t statistic p 
               Intercept (Fact-like rating) 2.18 (0.14) t(67) = 15.31 < .001 *** 
               Moral-like  3.18 (0.19) t(67) = 16.50 < .001 *** 
               Preference-like 2.61 (0.21) t(67) = 12.72 < .001 *** 
               PSC (within fact-like/moral-like) -0.97 (0.26) t(67) = 3.79 < .001 *** 
               PSC x preference-like  1.99 (0.44) t(67) = 4.48 < .001 *** 
               Contrasts: B (SE) t statistic p 
       Fact-/moral-like–ToM relationship -0.97 (0.26) t(70) = 3.79 < .001 *** 
       Preference-like–ToM relationship 1.02 (0.36) t(70) = 2.81 .013 * 
Contrast p values corrected for 2 comparisons; single-step method; α familywise = .05; single-step method. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Table S10. Model simplification for item features. 
DV: Agreement (Study 1 BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 1.27 .284 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(1, 137) = 0.30 .587 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = 5.92 .004 ** 
          PSC x 2 (category: moral/fact) F(1, 44) = 3.71 .061 † 
          PSC x 2 (category: moral/preference) F(1, 44) = 11.78 .001 ** 
   PSC x 2 (category: fact/preference) F(1, 44) = 2.32 .135 
Model: PSC x 3 (category) B (SE) t statistic p 
Contrast: PSC within Facts 0.02 (0.50) t(69) = 0.04 1.00 
Contrast: PSC within Morals -1.46 (0.59) t(69) = 2.59 .037 * 
Contrast: PSC within Preferences 1.01 (0.44) t(69) =2.30 .072 † 
DV: Mental State (Online Sample BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 1.36 .261 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(2, 137) = 0.04 .844 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = 5.92 .004 ** 
          PSC x 2 (category: moral/fact) F(1, 44) – 5.07 .029 * 
          PSC x 2 (category: moral/preference) F(1, 44) = 12.33 .001 ** 
  PSC x 2 (category: fact/preference) F(1, 44) = 1.06 .309 
Model: DV ~ category + PSC + (moral x PSC) B (SE) t statistic p 
PSC 0.29 (0.08) t(67) = 3.64 < .001 *** 
PSC x moral -0.53 (0.16) t(67) = 3.30 .001 ** 
Contrast: PSC within facts/preferences 0.30 (0.08) t(67) = 3.64 .001 ** 
Contrast: PSC within morals -0.24 (0.14) t(67) = 1.70 .178 
DV: Person Present (Online Sample BLUPs)  
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 0.61 .546 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(1, 137) = 0.22 .637 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = .04 .962 
     Model: DV ~ category + PSC B (SE) t statistic p 
  Main effect: PSC (within moral/preference/fact) 1.49 (0.65) t(68) = 2.28 .026 * 
DV: Mental Imagery (Online Sample BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 0.31 .732 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(1, 137) = 0.07  .797 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = 0.39 .680 
     Model: DV ~ category + PSC B (SE) t statistic p 
  Main effect: PSC (within moral/preference/fact) -0.13 (0.11) t(68) = 1.15 .253 
DV: Arousal (Online Sample BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 0.11 .892 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(1, 137) = 0.26 .611 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = 0.35 .703 
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     Model: DV ~ category + PSC B (SE) t statistic p 
  Main effect: PSC (within moral/preference/fact) -0.05 (0.06) t(68) = 0.77 .443 
DV: Valence (Online Sample BLUPs) 
Term F statistic p 
PSC x 3 (category: fact/moral/preference) x 2 (ROI: 
ToM/VMPFC) 
F(2, 135) = 0.13 .868 
PSC x 2 (ROI) F(1, 137) = 0.03 .857 
     PSC averaged across ROI   
     PSC x 3 (category) F(2, 66) = 0.03 .857 
     Model: DV ~ category + PSC B (SE) t statistic p 
  Main effect: PSC (within moral/preference/fact) 0.51 (0.47) t(68) = 1.09 .281 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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General Discussion 
 This dissertation began by examining the relationship between social prediction 
and activity in the theory of mind network (ToMN). Prior work in social psychology has 
established that social behavior can be predicted through multiple sources, such as 
dispositional and normative information (Cialdini et al., 1990; Gilbert & Malone, 1995), 
and in Part 1 we demonstrated that ToMN activity is related to prediction error in both of 
these domains. Part 2 demonstrated that moral claims are perceived as more 
subjective/social than prior work would anticipate; but furthermore, moral claims actually 
elicited greater activity across the ToMN compared to preferences, which were initially 
chosen as a benchmark of social content. Part 3 examined the relationship between 
ToMN activity and metaethical variability. Prior work has established that some moral 
claims are perceived as more objective than others (Beebe, 2014; Goodwin & Darley, 
2012; Wright et al., 2013), and we observed that subjective moral claims elicited greater 
ToMN activity, whereas objective moral claims elicited less. We argued that this 
relationship may be best understood in terms of prediction: Moral claims may represent a 
special case of social prediction, in that they are generalized across people and are 
socially relevant in a way that preferences (typically) are not.  
Item Analysis as a Middle Path 
 It is worth briefly commenting on the analytic approach taken in Part 1 and Part 
3. Social behavior is complicated, and it can be difficult to rule out every conceivable 
confound between experimental conditions. This is especially true of social neuroscience 
research. Subtle differences between conditions (and the stimuli that comprise them), can 
confound simple BOLD subtraction analyses, and complex social stimuli multiply these 
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subtleties dramatically. At the other end of the spectrum, computational modeling can 
allow researchers to characterize neural activity at an extremely fine-grained level; 
however, applying these techniques to social behavior typically requires abstracting the 
behavior from its real world analogue (e.g. as in economic games). Item analyses can 
offer a middle path. By generating a complex set of stimuli (various claims and scenarios 
in the present work), researchers can allow for emergent, naturalistic variability in their 
stimuli, while at the same time testing multiple fine-grained hypotheses, directed at the 
underlying processes. Perhaps even more importantly, these stimuli sets can be preserved 
as a resource, and passed to other researchers. There is a growing consensus that 
neuroscientific research will require us to move beyond single study designs and toward 
aggregation (Woo et al., 2017); item analysis could provide a simple way to foster 
cumulative research in social neuroscience.  
Morality as a Scaffold for Social Prediction 
 Predictive coding approaches argue that the brain is fundamentally organized 
around predicting incoming sensory information (Barrett, 2017; Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010). This is a radical claim, and future work is necessary to verify it. However, if we 
accept the theory (tentatively, and for the sake of argument), then it is worth exploring its 
implications for moral psychology. In particular, it is worth exploring its interaction with 
our interpretation of Part 3, where we suggested that decreased ToMN activity for 
objective moral claims may stem from these claims being predictable, i.e. objective moral 
claims elicit less social prediction error. 
Research in moral psychology is largely dominated by theoretical debates about 
“which” actions are moralized. For instance, moral foundations theorists (Graham et al., 
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2011; Iyer et al., 2012) argue that morality is comprised of several foundations (harm, 
fairness, purity, loyalty, and authority), whereas harm theorists argue that all of these 
foundations are reducible to harm and the relationship between victim and perpetrator 
(Gray et al., 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015). These theories are about the content of 
morality; about what does, or does not, fall within the semantic purview of the moral 
domain. By extension, these debates are also about what motivates moral behavior: either 
a collection of distinct values, or a singular aversion to harm. By contrast, a predictive 
account of morality raises the possibility of a different motivation: that people may feel 
compelled to behave in accordance with moral norms (or even non-moral norms more 
generally) because doing so maintains structure in one’s social world, simplifying the 
process of social prediction. I unpack this idea below. 
 At any given moment, I have the power to radically change my social 
environment. Sitting in a coffee shop, I could scream at the top of my lungs. If I did, then 
I would instantly draw the attention of every person in the room. Some might ask me 
what’s wrong, some might avoid eye contact, some might yell at me, but in every case 
their behavior is more unpredictable than it was a moment ago, before I screamed.  
A predictive coding account suggests that our brains are fundamentally designed 
to minimize prediction error (Friston, 2010), and our social environment (other 
independently acting agents) is a large potential source of prediction error. I propose that 
social norms may depend on a positive feedback loop of mutual social prediction error 
minimization. If we infer how others predict we will behave and then act in accordance 
with these predictions, then we can minimize their social prediction error. By minimizing 
their social prediction error, we reduce the potential that they will alter their behavior, 
  250 
 
which in turn makes them more predictable. Likewise, it is in their interest to do the same 
for us. Violating our predictions about their behavior comes at a cost, as it simultaneously 
makes us less predictable to them—i.e. they could lie, steal, or cheat, but doing so runs 
the risk of disturbing their social environment, making it less predictable. Importantly, 
this cost is independent of any actual punishment issued by an agent. Put another way: 
conformity keeps the social world stable, and every moment that I continue to conform, I 
am acting on my environment to keep it predictable. I also rely on everyone else to do the 
same.  
 Consider the question: “If God does not exist, then why would anyone behave 
morally?”, i.e. if there is no clear standard for what is right and wrong, then why can’t I 
decide for myself what I can and cannot do? The answer, on the proposed account, is: 
Because everyone else has predictions about how you will behave, and if you violate 
them, then you forfeit the structure that they provide. Also on this account, morality fits 
within a broader spectrum of normative expectations, rather than as a distinct domain (as 
in the moral/conventional distinction, Turiel, 1978; Wainryb et al., 2004). If objective 
moral claims are highly predictable, as suggested by our findings in Part 3, then 
objective moral claims may be interpreted as social predictions that are most critical for 
regulating social relationships, within one’s social context.  
This proposal is also consistent with prior work, which has argued that morality is 
fundamentally about relationship regulation (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Fiske & Rai, 2014). The 
present work adds a potential mechanism giving morality its normative force. 
Philosophers have argued that this normative force may stem from reason (Kant, 
1785/2005), or emotion (Hume, 1739–1740/1969), but the present proposal suggests that 
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we are compelled to observe moral (and normative) rules because doing so keeps our 
social environment predictable. In other words, moral rules may serve as a scaffold for 
social prediction.  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has presented three papers, showing that: a) ToMN activity is 
related to social prediction error; b) the ToMN is particularly active when people read 
moral claims; and c) this activity is related to metaethical status, where subjective claims 
elicit more ToMN activity, and objective claims elicit less. We suggested that objective 
moral claims may represent strong social predictions—the moral beliefs that we expect 
others to hold by default. Although a unified, predictive coding account is a radical and 
contentious claim, adopting it may shed light on why we are compelled to act in 
accordance with moral norms: because by conforming to the social predictions of others, 
I can act on my social environment to keep it predictable. Morality then, may be a shared 
projection that makes social coordination possible. 
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